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Japan’s Proactive Multilateralism

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Japan’s Proactive Multilateralism

The UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2013

ABSTRACT

Japan’s 2013 UN Arms Trade Treaty diplomacy exhibited neither the standard minimalist, subservient negotiating style nor policymaking restricted to the usual actors. Juxtaposition of the treaty and the 2014 arms export policy revision illustrates how traditional “peace diplomacy” can evolve into “proactive pacifism.”

KEYWORDS: Japan, UN, arms trade, diplomacy, negotiating style

IN THE EARLY 1990S, JAPAN EMBARKED on a decades-long multilateral diplomatic effort to monitor and regulate the transfer and use of conventional weapons. In 1991, Japan joined the European Community in proposing the establishment of an arms registration system, the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA). The creation of key international weapons frameworks followed, including the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997), the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008), and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA, 2001). Japan’s most significant diplomatic effort came in 2006, when it co-authored with six other nations a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark

The UNGA approved the ATT on April 2, 2013; Japan’s cabinet deposited...
the instrument of acceptance on May 9, 2014 and the treaty took effect on December 24.1

Throughout the multiyear ATT negotiation process, Japan assumed an active leadership role in bringing transparency and accountability to the global arms trade through a range of diplomatic activities, including cooperating with like-minded states, hosting gatherings, bridging gaps, working with international civil society (ICS) organizations, and contributing to the wording of the treaty text.2 These proactive efforts belie the traditional depiction of Japanese foreign policy as an essentially passive, reactive, norm-derived exercise in coping with the international environment through deference to the United States, with little independent initiative-taking. A typical example of what had been dubbed “probe, push, and panic” diplomacy was the proceedings of the UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS) from the early 1970s into the 1980s. Michael Blaker provides a stinging assessment of an almost directionless negotiating style that managed to contribute not a single sentence to the Law of the Sea Convention despite the critical importance of an international regime governing the sea that surrounds the island country of Japan.3

Japanese UN diplomacy entered a transitional stage in the post-UNCLOS 1990s. Oshiba Ryo noted that UN-centric diplomacy, a core diplomatic pillar in the 1990s, faded from the scene during the Cold War, returning in the 1990s through participation in peacekeeping operations and promoting international norms, especially human security.4 Reinhard Drifte argued that this activism merely reflected traditional diplomatic patterns that were carried over into UN diplomacy, namely US-centrism and gaiatsu (external pressure)


as the key formative force behind what might be called Japan’s reactive multilateral activism: “The Japan-US framework seems to be the strongest incentive for the vigour and direction of Japan’s multilateral diplomacy. It works by way of US pressure on Japan for international burden sharing.” Japan’s multilateral mission, Drifte asserted, was “to assist its American ally [to] soften friction with multilateral institutions, not to pursue an active autonomous diplomatic agenda.”

Ueki Yasuhiro, who served in the UN, acknowledged Japan’s “resilient passivism” and “extreme wariness toward the use of force and involvement in realpolitik,” but also noted that “support for a strengthened United Nations has become identical, in the eyes of many Japanese, with Japan’s increased international role and responsibilities.” In the 1990s, however, this activism still consisted only of “half successful” “indirect contributions,” with “political realism . . . still in the making.” Fukushima Akiko identified the emergence of a post-UNCLOS theme of “international cooperation” and a move beyond bilateralism, with multilateral diplomacy providing instructive lessons on “how to use coalition politics, to which Japan is not yet accustomed.” She predicted that multilateralism would “compel Japan to be more proactive rather than reactive in its foreign policy,” with the UN, “despite its shortcomings,” being “a natural organization for Japan to place at the core of its multilateral foreign policy.”

After intense criticism of Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” during the 1990 Gulf War, calls for “normality” increased in Japan. Ozawa Ichiro’s clarion call for Japan’s transformation into a “normal nation.” Ozawa’s “normality” revolved not around the usual manifestation of enhanced military power but on expanding the mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to include UN peacekeeping operations, which started with Cambodia. Japan adopted human security as a foreign policy pillar, creating the UN Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999, with special attention given to small arms and light weapons (SALW) issues. UN diplomacy reached new heights after 9/11. In 2003, Japan

assumed the role of lead country for demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan, working closely with the UN Development Program (UNDP) and other agencies in reintegration efforts, and joined the multinational force created through UN Security Council resolutions in Iraq.9

By the time Japan co-sponsored the ATT resolution in 2006, its UN diplomacy could not easily be depicted as passive, reactive or subservient. It had been co-sponsoring annual UN resolutions on SALWs with Colombia and South Africa, citing “Japan’s long-held view that the transfer of arms should be prohibited when they were used in violation of international obligations, such as humanitarian law or relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”10 Nor did Japan’s ATT policy serve as an extension of US arms trade policy. The US, the world’s largest arms exporter, initially stood aloof from the ATT and only signed on after a change in administrations and concerted mediatory efforts by Japan and other signatories. Japan’s role in ATT negotiations illustrated the materialization of Fukushima’s “coalition politics,” with a dose of normative considerations and proactive independence.

Significantly, the Japanese Diet ratified the ATT unanimously. Therefore, the policymaking milieu warrants a reconsideration of several current assumptions about Japan’s policymaking process to explain this proactive diplomacy. The popular focus on Kantei gaiko (prime ministerial diplomacy) must be tempered and incorporated into a broader policymaking context relatively devoid of strife between politicians and bureaucrats, with a rather traditional Foreign Ministry–led configuration for UN diplomacy.11 The emergence of Japan’s civil society since the 1980s has been noted, especially on issues involving strong humanitarian normative appeal in alliances with international NGOs, as seen in the politician-NGO-INGO alliance that proved essential in forging support among political leaders and bureaucrats for the Ottawa Convention.12 In the ATT case, it was the

formative relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and ICS actors that took the spotlight.

Drifte’s study of UN diplomacy in the 1990s identified one consequence of what he saw as the absence of Japanese political leadership: “failure to integrate certain issues into a more relevant political context, thus reinforcing the reactive character of Japanese foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy in general.”13 Prime ministerial leadership actually did provide a broader political context for the ATT. On April 1, 2014, the cabinet adopted the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. The policy enabled Japan to engage in the transfer of weaponry abroad. This policy replaced the Three Principles on Arms Exports forged by the Sato Eisaku cabinet in 1967 and strengthened by the Miki Takeo cabinet in 1976, basically forbidding Japanese arms exports as part of Japan’s “peace diplomacy.” In other words, Japan appears to have entered the global arms trade at the precise moment it was pledging through the ATT to monitor and curtail such trade.

It is tempting to assume that the Japanese government took advantage of an international norm rooted in a pacifist peace diplomacy to camouflage its transformation into a full-fledged arms trader. This certainly fits the narrative of a cabinet intent on strengthening national security through greater attention to hard power and its instruments. However, two different ruling party coalitions presided over parallel policy tracks that reflected different sets of policy processes, which resulted in the melding of these tracks. In reality, Japan had already been transferring defense equipment under the old Three Principles as special cases. Therefore, the ATT evolved into a policy that addressed the ascent of Asian countries, including China, in the global arms trade, and legitimized Japan’s own limited entry into arms transfers in accordance with the international law and treaty regulations it helped draft. In other words, the political context of the ATT and the new Three Principles emerged through a pragmatic and incremental process that illustrates how traditional peace diplomacy is evolving into what is now called proactive pacifism, or a diplomacy that aspires to contribute more actively to global peace efforts through international cooperation.

13. Drifte, Japan’s Quest, 63–64.
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM

ATT diplomacy consisted of a long-term incremental process that established international humanitarian laws built on existing norms pertaining to the transfer of conventional weapons. In the words of British Foreign Secretary William Hague in 2014, “This Treaty will help make the world safer, by placing human rights and international law at the heart of the decisions about the arms trade. For the first time, countries have agreed on international rules governing everything from small arms to warships.” The normative and universal legal aspirations contrast significantly with previous arms control objectives and methods.

After World War II, disarmament generally pertained to weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, while efforts to control and regulate the export of conventional arms focused on national security and commercial interests primarily involving the major Western nations producing weapons and dual-use items. The mechanisms reflected Cold War efforts to control the flow of goods and technology to the Soviet Union, inaugurated in 1950 by the informal Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). These agreements operated on the basis of consensus decision-making, with implementation left to the discretion of participating nations. Japan had been actively engaged in the key proceedings in the 1970s and 1980s but violated COCOM rules in 1987, when the Toshiba Machine Company provided the Soviets with technology that allowed the manufacture of difficult-to-detect submarine propellers, resulting in the strengthening of control over dual-use equipment exports.

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the international community focused more intently on conventional weapons, with the UN considered the appropriate forum for such deliberations. Many states took special note of the negative humanitarian and social impact of unregulated arms trading and sought to move beyond the voluntary nature of previous arrangements for reporting transfers, toward internationally binding regulations.


Discussions began to coalesce around the necessity for greater transparency of the arms trade, especially through national reporting of those transfers. These were the key mechanisms on which Japan would expend much of its diplomatic efforts during ATT negotiations.

Japan’s active engagement in arms issues since the 1990s involved a mixture of normative and pragmatic objectives, ranging from concern over the tragic toll of human devastation, through the use of SALWs in war-torn environments, to the ascent of Asia, especially in the late 2000s, as a major market for arms sales and purchases. Japan contributed funding for the creation of the Small Arms Trust Fund in the UN (2000), joined in creating the POA, a non-binding international agreement (2001), provided the president of the Biennial Meeting of States (2003), and served as facilitator of the Second POA Review Conference (2012).

This activism came against the backdrop of SDF and humanitarian aid worker dispatches to fragile and failing states, where they were exposed to SALWs, resulting, for example, in the slaying of a Japanese NGO worker and a police officer in Cambodia. By the early 2000s, Tokyo’s “peace consolidation diplomacy” involved cooperation with UN DDR efforts in Africa, especially Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, after which Japan sent troops to Iraq and co-led the DDR effort with the UNDP in Afghanistan, where Japan lost another NGO volunteer in 2008.

By this time, Japan considered small arms, as stated by then Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, to be at “the nexus of peace and development” and intricately related to other problems, ranging from child soldiers to post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building. While most arms experts did not consider SALWs weapons of mass destruction in the same way as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, Japanese did consider them “de facto WMDs” because of their devastating impact on the human security of huge swaths of a nation’s population. This had been a major rationale of Japan’s support for the Ottawa Convention (mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster bombs). The problem was the absence of the major producers and users of

such weaponry in the signatories of these conventions. This led, in part, to efforts by Japan and other nations, supported by INGOs, to build on the normative achievements of these conventions, regardless of their shortcomings, to establish international legal standards through an ATT.\footnote{Ishigaki, “Defining the Future,” 382.}


The resolution mandated the UN secretary-general to create a Group of Government Experts, established in 2008 with representatives from 28 states, that recommended the formation of the Open-Ended Working Group, convened twice in 2009. Based on these efforts, the UNGA adopted Resolution 64/48, calling for preparatory meetings to pave the way for a conference on the arms trade. In 2011, the UNGA called for the convening in 2012 of the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. The 2012 conference ended without the requisite consensus on a treaty text because a number of key states, including the US, Russia, and India, called for continued negotiations to improve and clarify the final text.
The impasse pushed the ATT conference back to March 18–28, 2013. Conference participants elected Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia as president of the proceedings. Woolcott approached the new conference well aware of the magnitude of the divisions among the contending parties and appointed facilitators to formulate various provisions of the treaty, including weaponry, ammunition, transactions, defense cooperation agreements, and other matters. The facilitator-led deliberations resulted in a draft treaty text. However, Iran, North Korea, and Syria prevented the consensus required for adoption.

The threat of a second failure of the conference led to 11 countries, including Japan, abandoning the consensus rule by pushing the draft onto the floor of the UNGA for a vote. On April 2, 2013, the UNGA adopted the ATT by a vote of 154 to 3 (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), with 23 abstentions. By this point, the Barack Obama administration shifted from the George W. Bush administration’s opposition to ATT to support and co-sponsorship of the draft. The ATT was opened for signing at UN headquarters on June 2, 2013, and took effect on December 24, 2014. Few international treaties have taken effect as quickly.

ATT NEGOTIATIONS: THE JAPAN FACTOR

The level of Japanese engagement over the entire seven-year period of ATT negotiations was unusually high. Japan’s involvement included serving as vice chair of the Asia-Pacific group at both the 2012 and 2013 conferences; hosting a regional meeting for NGOs in Tokyo (2009) and co-hosting a follow-up meeting in Malaysia with the UN Regional Center for Peace and Development (2012); continued support for the Small Arms Trust Fund (2012–13); and assisting in creating an online database for the UNRCA. Woolcott also appointed Ambassador Amano Mari of the Japanese delegation to the Conference on Disarmament to serve as one of the facilitators overseeing the final draft of the treaty section on brokering. Ultimately, after the ATT’s launch, Japan would become the largest contributor to its operational budget.

Two distinctive features of Japan’s negotiating approach stand out: “coalition politics” in shaping the wording of the text, and its partnership with ICS organizations. We focus on the first feature in this section and turn to ICS organizations in the following section.

As anticipated by Fukushima, Japan engaged extensively with a cohort of like-minded states in supporting the treaty and in mediating differences when delegates became less like-minded. Japan’s effective mediation is credited with breaking logjams over controversial text issues. It should be noted that like-minded states did not correspond to regional groupings. Japan’s spokesperson role for Asian nations must be considered nominal because of the hesitation of a number of regional countries with regard to stringent monitoring of arms flows.

Japan focused on legal obligations related to the criteria governing prohibition and risk assessment of arms transfers (Article 6) and implementation of national reporting (Article 13). Japan’s reference for the wording of the text lay largely in the cumulative lessons learned from experiences with international agreements on conventional weapons, disarmament, and human rights. MOFA assigned legal and disarmament experts from Tokyo and Geneva to the delegation to monitor clauses pertaining to transparency, accountability, inclusivity, and enforcement through the binding authority of international law.

The ATT parts ways with existing conventions on the issue of prohibition. While some latitude is granted to states, prohibition is absolute if tied to specific risks associated with the illegal use of weapons. National reporting is essential because of the opposition of many states to the creation of a monitoring or supranational enforcement mechanism, with the effectiveness of the treaty dependent on reporting by states. Japan played a mediatory role between contending views on risks associated with transfers in Article 6, and it shifted to a vigorous advocacy role on the issue of transparency and accountability in Article 13.

Article 6 has been called the heart of the ATT, because it prohibits the wanton transfer of conventional arms in violation of international obligations, including UN arms embargoes. The first two sections of Article 6 prohibit weapons transfers that violate UN Security Council sanctions or the obligations of a state under international agreements to which it is a party. Unlike mines and cluster bombs, transfers of designated conventional weapons are not prohibited. Many states wish to sell, and many more nations wish

to acquire, such weapons. This elevated the importance of establishing rules to govern the transfers, especially since states are tasked with enforcing these rules, not an international agency. This, in turn, heightened the importance of producing national reports annually detailing arms transfers and how these transfers complied with ATT provisions. Japan and its cohorts believed that these reports would “not only make States accountable to their arms agreements, but also improve transparency, promote dialogue, and build confidence among State Parties.”

Much of the discussion focused on the third section of Article 6, which specifically prohibits arms transfers for the execution of serious violations of international law and norms. According to one study, “Article 6(3) is potentially one of the most important provisions in the ATT and the success of its implementation will be one of the main yardsticks by which the treaty as a whole will be judged.” In essence, the article prohibits the transfer of conventional weapons when the state is aware that such transfer would contribute to the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or certain war crimes.

Initially, the draft wording of Article 6 constituted one of the main obstacles to agreement on the ATT. A contingent of states, led by the US, pushed for clear and limited prohibitions on arms sales with a reference to intent and specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The original draft of Article 6(3) read:

A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty for the purpose of facilitating the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or serious violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The phrase “for the purpose of” suggested the need to demonstrate that states were providing arms specifically to commit genocide and crimes against humanity. The majority of countries, however, felt that “few states would knowingly authorize a transfer of arms for the limited purpose of committing genocide.” In addition, the draft specifically referenced the

26. All passages cited in this discussion of Article 6, including Japanese text proposals, can be found in Ishigaki, “Defining the Future,” 399–404.
Geneva Conventions rather than the broader set of international humanitarian norms that were considered to be customary international law.\textsuperscript{27}

The Japanese sided with the majority view that shifted the focus away from the intent-based “for the purpose of facilitating” to a more “knowledge-based” criterion. They proposed that:

A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2(i) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party, including those under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The Japanese proposal shifted the provision toward the assumption that states were not likely to support genocide consciously, rendered the intent-based wording less restrictive and the transfer more conditional, and omitted the reference to the Geneva Conventions’ “Common Article 3” by subsuming it within a wider range of “international agreements.”

The Japanese delegation facilitated a compromise wording through deliberations with knowledge-based and intent-based parties, in close consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Key actors included Australia, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, the chief advocate of intent-based wording. Japan focused not only on attaining US agreement but also on bringing together states not committed to US participation, arms exporters and importers opposed to strong restrictions on their activities, states devastated by illicit arms, and parties determined to stand on the moral high ground. The compromise wording based on the Japanese proposal opened the door to agreement by all parties:

A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2(i) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 399.
The compromise wording retained the possibility of intent-based transfers by some arms providers and specified potential violations, but also retained the term “international agreements,” extending the application of international law beyond the Geneva Conventions, especially its Additional Protocols, which extended the coverage of the conventions and elaborated on the rules of armed conflict.

On Article 13, Japan played less of a catalytic or mediatory role, engaging in forceful advocacy. It sought mandatory reporting and broad distribution of these reports to the public. From the Japanese perspective, the publication and dissemination of arms export and import transaction reports was the key method for ensuring transparency, and essential to holding states accountable for treaty violations. This strong push for reporting was a reaction against states opposed to the establishment of inspection or verification mechanisms. Many states maintained that since arms trading was legal and necessarily confidential, “the establishment of a group of inspectors to determine if a legitimate arms transfer conducted by a state in accordance with its domestic laws and regulations was unnecessary and impractical.” Therefore, Japan, like-minded states, and civil society groups did not attempt to create a supra-national oversight body, focusing instead on improving monitoring procedures by adopting provisions found in existing frameworks, especially UNRCA, despite their imperfections.

States remained deeply divided on whether national reporting should be mandatory, and on whether these reports should be available to the public. On this issue, Japan’s position was clear: “Japan was a principal State advocating for both mandatory reporting and publication since the July 2012 Conference.” Japanese concerns were reflected in a proposed insertion in one of the early treaty drafts underlining the importance of transparency: “Promote cooperation, transparency and responsibilities of States Parties in the trade in conventional arms, thus building confidence among States Parties.” The clause was opposed by North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.

In March 2013, the Japanese worked closely with Costa Rica and Lithuania on a joint statement on mandatory reporting, presented by Lithuania, which garnered the support of 37 states, followed by a second statement supported by

28. Ibid., 404–09.
29. Ibid., 404.
30. Ibid., 405.
by 62 countries.\textsuperscript{31} The drafters continued to confront strong opposition to mandatory reporting from some states. However, the group sensed a rough consensus forming that might allow the Secretariat to distribute national transaction reports to other states that agreed to submit reports. The eventual acceptance of dissemination to other states opened the door for Japan, Costa Rica, and Lithuania to seek expansion of access beyond states.

The three nations submitted a proposal for a March 2013 treaty draft that would make reporting immediate (within a year of ratification), mandatory, and public. Article 10, “Reporting and Recordkeeping,” read (emphasis ours):

4. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, provide an initial report to the secretariat of relevant activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, regulations and administrative measures. States Parties shall report on any new activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available \textit{and public} by the secretariat.

5. Each State Party shall submit annually to the secretariat by 1 July a report for the preceding calendar year concerning the authorization or actual transfer of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty. Reports shall be made available \textit{and public} and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat.

Several states continued to oppose mandatory reporting or sought to weaken it through word changes (e.g., “should” rather than “shall”). The dissemination issue required extensive maneuvering by the troika. Ultimately, the final version of the ATT replaced “and public” with a mere comma, but a powerful one. Articles 10(4) and 10(5) in the draft treaty became Articles 13(1) and 13(3) in the final draft. The final sentences in 13(1) and 13(3) both read: “Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat.” Without the comma, states appear to be the sole recipients of these reports. The comma “disconnects the object of the dissemination of the reports,” making it “\textit{not} possible to assert that the circulation is \textit{limited only} to the State Parties.” In other words, “the new sentence structure provides a clear opening for the reports to be distributed to interested parties \textit{other than} States Parties.”\textsuperscript{32} “Reports shall be made available [comma]” thus provided the basis for the Secretariat to disseminate the reports

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 406; see also Whall and Pytlak, “Role of Civil Society,” 6–7.

\textsuperscript{32} Ishigaki, “Defining the Future,” 408, note 79.
publicly to civil society organizations that wished to monitor compliance, as well as to states parties. Thus, eventually, the troika prevailed, as most states came to accept obligatory national reporting, but with the form of these reports unspecified in the treaty text and thus left to the discretion of the states.

In the end, the ATT negotiations were an instance of distinctive, sprawling, multi-year multilateral diplomacy.

The negotiating process itself was marked by the emergence of a number of coalitions and like-minded groups. The co-authors were made up of exporters and importers from different continents, with the aim of working regionally as well [as] internationally at the United Nations. Control Arms brought together a wide range of different civil society groups, including NGOs, parliamentarians, medical professionals, survivors of conflicts, and regional groupings. Industry added their own thoughts on practical implementation particularly on how to manage “parts and components.” Some countries caucused on the basis of regional arrangements. Others clustered to advance specific issues such as gender-based violence and sustainable development. Leadership was shared among individuals and coalitions. Crucially, the UN political groupings were split and redundant. States were freer to engage with like-minded states and drive common agendas. The two chairs pushed UN member states towards consensus but expected delegates to engage in genuine negotiations and drafting. The final text contains echoes of speeches and written contributions from numerous delegations.33

The process yielded several “firsts”: the treaty “was not born through an already-established practice”; “it moves beyond the focus solely on illicit trade and requires states to assess the potential negative consequences of arms exported in legitimate transfers”; and “transparency is also at its heart, again moving away from voluntary political arrangements toward obliging states” to keep records and reports on their transactions. The results reflected “constructive ambiguity,” raising questions about implementation and omissions.34

Japan accepted the ATT as representing “what the international community could agree upon.”35 Its intense effort addressed key obstacles involving state-centric monitoring of arms sales and the legality of arms sales by exposing illicit transfers via civil society monitoring in the court of global public opinion through codified international norms and the legitimacy of the UN.

34. Ibid., 144.
From a Japanese perspective, the achievement of the ATT is not the creation of a new international arms trade organization but rather the consolidation and codification of several existing norms that can serve as a possible deterrent to wanton defiance of international public opinion backed by UN condemnation and sanctions.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ATT IN JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

As ATT negotiations progressed, a new development reinforced Japan’s intense focus on transparency and accountability. In 2012, Asia overtook Europe in defense spending, with five of the 10 largest military budgets possessed by China, Japan, India, Russia, and South Korea. By the following year, Asian defense spending increased by 3.6% (to US$ 407 billion), much of it due to the increase in Chinese spending (7.4%). Between 2009 and 2013, China was among the five largest arms buyers in the world. Asian states are major consumers but not sellers of arms—with one notable exception. China entered the top five between 2009 and 2013, with sales increasing by 212% between 2004 and 2013, based largely on the rapid development of its military technology.

Amid the growing tension in bilateral relations and the regional security environment, the China factor made it more imperative to mandate adherence to common international transaction rules and to provide national reports accessible to public scrutiny. However, Japan did not single out Beijing publicly for special attention in the ATT deliberations. Beijing had already been consistently casting negative votes or abstaining. There was little need for finger-pointing since conference participants were aware of Chinese

activities in troubled regions. China claimed to have been abiding by UN Security Council sanctions on arms exports and adopted its own export controls for military goods in the late 1990s, but its weapons had managed to find their way to sanctioned countries. Chinese arms transfers globalized, starting from the initial call in 2006 for an ATT. According to one observer, “In the case of China’s arms transfers in sub-Saharan Africa (and sanctioned nations) the record is clearer: China has not only violated UN sanctions but sought to cover it up. . . . Worse still, a review of Chinese compliance by SIPRI [the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] . . . uncovered evidence that Chinese diplomats repeatedly sought to intimidate UN arms experts and attempted to block annual reports to the Security Council.”

The China factor may have validated the wisdom of working under UNGA auspices without UNSC fetters, but the Japanese pragmatically avoided putting all the diplomatic eggs in the normative basket, understanding that international norms and UN condemnation have limited and situational efficacy. The government’s lifting of the arms trade ban on the eve of the ATT’s ratification may thus appear to be a move to counter specifically China’s burgeoning arms trade, but the policy shift reflected a much broader policy context that incrementally wove together domestic interests, continuity with international cooperation efforts from the 1990s, and recent regional strategic developments.

The first major effort to lift the 1967 arms trade ban came under a coalition cabinet led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ loosened the weapons export ban in 2011 for SDF peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, for participation in joint development and production of weapons with other countries, and to address the plight of the beleaguered defense industry. Pacifist Japan had developed its own arms industry, but with only one customer: its own SDF. The intent had not been to open the floodgates for Japanese arms sales abroad. There was no expectation of an immediate boost in sales or profits. Japan did not see itself as in the same club as the US, UK, Germany, Russia, and China. The adoption of the 2014 Three Principles on Transfer and Defense Equipment Technology by the coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito reflected strong continuity with DPJ policy moves, including the long-standing wish for joint weapons

production, enhancing the effectiveness of SDF’s peacekeeping operations, and precedents for the transfer of weapons and dual-use equipment.

In reality, the DPJ move reflected the incremental loosening of the arms export ban initiated by previous LDP cabinets. Exceptions had been granted for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, with strict screening procedures to ensure compliance with this condition, and safeguards against unintended uses of these weapons and transfers to third countries. Before 2014, chief cabinet secretaries had announced 21 weapons equipment export approvals. These exceptions extend back to the 1983 approval of arms technology transfers to Washington during the Nakasone Yasuhiro cabinet, the approval of cooperative missile defense technology research after the 1998 North Korean missile launch, and the 2004 exclusion of the Ballistic Missile Defense. Transfers were justified in 2001 in the Anti-Terrorism Law, and in 2002, restrictions were waived for the export of demining machinery and equipment, just in time for Japan’s non-military support for multinational forces in Afghanistan. In 2003, transfers were approved under the special legislation for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, with night-vision goggles, chemical protective gear, bulletproof vests, and police equipment and patrol cars flowing to Baghdad during Japan’s dispatch of SDF troops in 2004–06. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations also witnessed the transfer of bulldozers, power shovels, and bucket loaders used by the SDF in locations such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Haiti. In 2006, three patrol boats found their way to Indonesia. The cabinet’s more recent provision of patrol boats was not a break from past practices but a staple of export exemptions. Significantly, dual-use equipment had been exempted from the Three Principles on Arms Exports, and Japan supported dual-use exemptions in the ATT negotiations as well. In a sense, the exceptions became the rule.


42. For the conditions under which defense equipment and technology can be transferred, along with the text of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, see Naikaku Kanbo [Cabinet Secretariat], Bouei Soubi Iten San-Gensoku ni Tsuite [On the three principles of defense equipment transfers], <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/bouei.html>, accessed August 14, 2016.
The Japanese government felt the need for joint production of weapons with other countries as its military budgets gravitated toward negative annual growth rates during the 2000s. The defense industry had suffered from a shrinking domestic market because of negative budget growth and the high cost of research and development. According to the Ministry of Defense, more than 100 companies abandoned military equipment production between 2003 and 2012.\textsuperscript{43} The most prominent of the weapons systems prevented from joint development were F-35 fighters and SM-3 Block IIA missiles. The new Three Principles cleared the way for joint production with Britain, France, and others. Whether the Japanese can be competitive after having been blocked from this market for decades remains to be seen: expectations are low for an immediate boost in sales and profits. The defense industry’s share of total industrial output is 1\%, and for even the largest military contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, military equipment sales provide only 10\% of total profits.\textsuperscript{44}

The optics suggest Japan’s use of the front door to control the arms trade through the ATT and the back door to sneak into the global arms trade through the new Three Principles. ATT negotiators and cabinets viewed the two issues as complementary, neither an anti-China measure nor the abandonment of peace diplomacy. If anything, for China’s arms trade, Japan’s approach constituted a diplomacy based on persuasion through international law and public opinion, not confrontation. In fact, in pushing for the monitoring of other states, Japan potentially placed restrictions on its own transfers.

\textit{The ATT Policymaking Process: Something Old, Something New}

Japan’s ATT policymaking configuration consisted of MOFA delegates, diplomats representing like-minded states, and ICS representatives. Traditionally,


MOFA exercises jurisdiction over UN policy, and the ATT was no exception. MOFA had been the hub around which other relevant ministries revolved, including the Ministry of Defense; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the National Police Agency; and the National Security Council. The unanimous political support for the ATT facilitated prompt ratification in the Diet and reflected the general support for the convergence of the ATT and the new Three Principles, which in turn illustrated the selective guidance and coordination role played by the Prime Minister’s Office in placing the ATT in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy.

Japan’s engagement with ICS actors and the low-key role of domestic NGOs constituted one of the more distinctive features of ATT diplomacy. Japanese NGOs played pivotal roles in convincing the government to support issues like the Mine Ban Convention, which the government was initially hesitant to support. However, as reflected in the Diet’s unanimous ratification, the government supported the ATT from the outset, co-sponsoring the 2006 ATT resolution without much input from domestic NGOs then or thereafter. Much has been written about the dominant role of international, more than domestic, advocacy actors in initiating and participating in UN ATT proceedings, buoyed by deep expertise on arms trade issues. Like many states, Japan actively sought to include ICS representatives in its deliberations. In all, 219 representatives from 46 NGOs participated in the final ATT negotiating conference in March 2013.45

Japan worked intimately with three nongovernmental groups in particular: Control Arms, the Stimson Center, and SIPRI. Control Arms was the largest coalition of civil society groups involved in the ATT process. Japan’s cooperation with Control Arms intensified after co-sponsoring the UNGA resolution that jump-started the ATT in 2012. Control Arms, following a strategy of working closely with self-identified “like-minded states,” encouraged Japan to support more-ambitious goals for a robust treaty while encouraging a leadership role in organizing support for the ATT in the Asian region. Control Arms viewed Japan and the other six co-authors of the ATT resolution

(Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Kenya, and the UK) as “brokers,” serving as lead countries in guiding the process to its conclusion. Control Arms worked to forge agreement on priorities between “brokers” and so-called “progressive” forces, especially Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago, which were endeavoring to make human rights and humanitarian principles in Article 6 more explicit.\textsuperscript{46}

The Japanese found think tanks to be a fountain of knowledge based on their long experience and expertise in weapons-related public policy activities. They turned to the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank that had expertise on the export control regimes of weapons systems and approached arms control and non-proliferation issues in a practical and pragmatic manner. Japan and the Stimson Center co-organized numerous conferences in New York to exchange ideas and to build support and momentum for the ATT among UN members.

SIPRI’s renowned database on global arms trade and military expenditures is used by governments and NGOs to monitor legal and illegal arms transfers globally. In this sense, SIPRI was already playing the role of a nongovernmental watchdog over the arms trade. Japanese interests overlapped with SIPRI expertise in transparency, compliance, and risk assessment. SIPRI focused on how to address the implementation mechanisms of the ATT, especially reporting. The Japanese valued SIPRI for its impartial and expert insights on issues that were particularly contentious among negotiating delegations. The Japanese delegation felt it especially imperative to enable SIPRI and other watchdog organizations to access national arms transfer reports.

The Japanese regarded ties with ICS organizations as a two-way street. They recognized that “think tanks and academia in general are essential vehicles for fostering critical perspectives among government officials and in general audiences.”\textsuperscript{47} They found ICS resources of great use for supplementing understanding of the technical dimensions of weaponry and the arms trade, and in return, the Japanese were able to provide insights on navigating the confusing politics-infused processes found in the UN. Not all collaborative efforts are successful, however. For example, NGO use of

\textsuperscript{46} Whall and Pytlak, “Role of Civil Society,” 4–5.

\textsuperscript{47} Tomoaki Ishigaki, “Collaboration between Governments and Civil Society on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education,” in UNODA, \textit{Civil Society and Disarmament}, 17.
testimonies of victims of SALWs had been “an effective and powerful way of reaching out to a larger audience” in the case of the Mine Ban Treaty, as Japan found in the case of atomic bomb survivor (hibakusha) testimonies.\footnote{Ibid., 14, 18.}

In the ATT case, however, ICS groups and the Japanese found key government representatives a much tougher audience as they held on tightly to more realist national interest and sovereignty concerns.\footnote{Whall and Pytlak, “Role of Civil Society,” 7–9.}

The US did not play a major role in forging Japan’s ATT negotiating positions. The George W. Bush administration opposed the ATT in 2006, and from 2009, Japan found itself mediating between a more favorably inclined Barack Obama administration and the knowledge-based caucus. Japan did play, to some extent, a role that Drifte led us to expect: Tokyo’s multilateral activism seeks to smooth relations between the US and international organizations. In this case, Japan helped mediate between the US and the majority of negotiating parties in a way that brought the US on board. This effort was not unique to Japan but was in line with several like-minded partners, many of them US allies as well. Japan’s own entry into the arms trade reflected domestic interests and a long-standing commitment to its own form of international cooperation, not US pressure.\footnote{Sato Seigo, “Nichi-Bei-Oh no Tsujo Heiki Iten Seisaku no Hikaku” [Comparative study of the conventional arms transfer policies of Japan, the US and Europe], Gunkshuku Kenkyu [Disarmament Review] 5 (2014): 56–68.}

THE NORMALITY OF JAPAN’S PROACTIVE PEACE DIPLOMACY

ATT diplomacy reveals a level of proactive involvement not usually associated with Japanese diplomacy, especially when it comes to issues defined strongly by normative objectives. Japan co-authored the initial ATT Conference resolution, hosted ATT-related conferences and workshops, funded ATT activities and UN arms transfer databases, mediated differing views among states, and contributed to the wording of key sections of the treaty. The policymaking configuration reflected the centrality of MOFA, a cooperative working relationship with like-minded states, close cooperation with the president of the ATT Conference, and the unprecedented deep partnership with ICS actors.
The shift, led by the Prime Minister’s Office, to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology over two ruling party cabinets provides the larger context of the ATT. Even though exceptions had been made over decades, the arms transfer go-ahead may be yet another nail in the coffin of Japanese pacifism on its march toward military normality. Yet, the Three Principles were intended to enable the SDF to fulfill peacekeeping and humanitarian missions more effectively, not to build military capabilities or to compete with the major global arms exporters. International norms met national interests with the heightened recognition since the 1990s of the devastation caused by SALWs amid the emergence of human security as an international norm, punctuated by direct Japanese exposure to SALWs on humanitarian and peace-building missions.

Japan’s normality can be viewed in the same vein as practices followed by normative diplomacies like Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland, which use the ATT to legitimize their participation in the arms trade. Therefore, the ATT illustrates how a classic peace diplomacy instrument enables Japan to embark on a conditional transfer of arms in line with the practices of other ATT members, based on international law that requires transparency and accountability. The ATT creates a strong dual obligation for Japan to effectively monitor not only the arms policies of other states, but also its own transfers.51 To date, Japan is the only Asian country to have ratified the ATT, and at the one-year mark, when the treaty required the first national report on transfers to be submitted, Japan’s report indicates strict compliance with the rules its delegates labored hard to embed in the treaty.52 And according to SIPRI, from 2014 to 2015, Japanese arms sales decreased by 0.8%.53

Japan’s ATT diplomacy illustrates a proactive multilateral diplomacy guided by pragmatic national interests wrapped in normative considerations emphasizing persuasion rather than coercion. The ATT and the Three Principles on

Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology illustrate the incremental process by which peace diplomacy has been evolving since the 1990s toward a normality based on accepted international practices, not on military power. The ATT’s normality illustrates the long distance Japan must still travel if it really does wish to attain that kind of normality.