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Ideology, Strategy and Conflict in a Social Movement Organization: The Sierra Club Immigration Wars

Leslie King†

What cultural and structural factors allow conflict in a social movement organization to persist over long periods of time? Using data gleaned from interviews, archival materials, newspaper articles and online sources, I examine the Sierra Club’s conflict over immigration policy, an issue which has persisted for decades without clear resolution. I argue that ideology accounts for some activists’ position on club policy, while others based their stance on strategic concerns, which were linked in part to forces external to the club. At the same time, the democratic structure of the Sierra Club has allowed factions to continue working towards their own agendas. This case reveals a more complicated connection between ideology and strategy than previous studies have indicated and illuminates how intense conflict may not necessarily be associated with dramatic outcomes.

Since the 1970s, members of the nation’s oldest and largest environmental organization, the Sierra Club, have engaged in impassioned debates over the club’s policy on international migration. The conflict intensified during the 1990s and early 2000s and disagreement persists over whether the national organization and its regional and local chapters should back stricter limits on migration to the United States as a means of protecting the environment. This issue became particularly heated in 1997-1998, when the club held a nationwide referendum on its immigration policy and again in 2004, when advocates of tighter restrictions on immigration attempted to gain control of the board of directors in what some called a potential “hostile takeover” (Center for New Community 2004).

The debate has often been antagonistic, rancorous, and public. Some participants have issued charges of racism and nationalism; activists have received threatening letters; and the dispute has led to the formation of two spinoff groups, one designed to encourage the club to adopt a policy advocating stricter limits on immigration (Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization—SUSPS), and a second mainly designed to counter the first (Groundswell Sierra). Debates over immigration policy have taken place in chapter meetings, on-line discussion sessions, op-eds and letters to the editor of newspapers and other publications, in press interviews, radio talk shows, and public statements issued by activists on each side. At key moments, the media have covered the debate and independent commentators have entered the discussion, many of them apparently as rankled as some Sierra Club activists (see Guillermo 1998).2

It would be difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the “immigration wars.” According to Sierra Club executive director, Carl Pope, the 1998 immigration referendum “was the most intensely debated issue in the club’s history” (quoted in Branigin 1998b). According to one estimate, the referendum cost $350,000, the most expensive in the club’s history (Clifford 1998). Adam Werbach, Sierra Club president from 1996 to 1998, threatened to resign if the 1998 referendum passed and in 2004, when immigration-reduction advocates tried to gain

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1 Many thanks to Steven Barkan, Deborah McCarthy, Marc Steinberg, Nancy Whittier and Sarah Wilcox for comments and suggestions and to Katherine Rickenbacker for research assistance. I am very grateful to the Sierra Club members and staffers who shared with me their knowledge about club structure and history as well as their perspectives on the immigration issue.

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control of the board of directors, he joined other club members and commentators in claiming that “at stake is really the heart and soul of the organization” (quoted in Chea 2004).

What is the “heart and soul” of a social movement organization? One could argue that an organization’s “heart and soul” is the ideology that guides its issue selection, its ideas about solutions to problems, and its choice of tactics (see Dalton 1994: 12). While researchers have increasingly used ideology—or the very similar concept of collective identity—to understand movement action, relatively few have examined internal disputes over the fundamental ideological underpinnings of a group, especially when such disputes do not result in schism or other major change or upheaval. One reason for the dearth of such studies might be that, often, organizational disputes happen behind closed doors. Because the Sierra Club is a very large, democratically run organization, at least some of this conflict is played out in public. The ongoing club dispute over migration policy illuminates how ideology is, to some degree, mutable; and it reveals the complexity of the relationship between ideology and strategy in a social movement organization.

THEORY AND METHODS

Research on conflict in social movements has tended to focus on disputes resulting in major transformation and has sought to understand both the sources of conflict and its consequences, mostly thought to be negative (see Balser 1997). Conflicts arise for diverse reasons, including disputes over the nature of the problems involved, what to do about them, and how to present the movement’s version of reality to the public (diagnostic, prognostic, and frame resonance issues—Benford 1993). Organizational changes resulting from conflict include goal transformation, the establishment of coalitions with other groups, factional splits, increased or decreased radicalism, organizational disappearance, schisms, major strategic transformations (e.g., from service agencies to radical action groups or vice versa), or adoption of new tactics (Balser 1997; Barkan 1986; Downey 1986; McCammon 2003; Minkoff 1999; Zald and Ash 1966). Conflict may also create a context in which movement activists and adherents might reassess or change their positions (see Kreisberg 1998). In some cases, months or even years of debate may constitute a slow evolution, part of a gradual shift in the ideology or collective identity of a movement organization.

Researchers often point to ideological disputes in their explanations of conflict and/or factionalism (Benford 1993; Downey 1986). Ideologies are systems of meaning that are more fixed and stable and less explicitly strategic than frames. Russell J. Dalton writes that ideology “provides a framework for organizing and interpreting the political world; it defines core values and peripheral concerns” (1994: 12). Ideologies are often identified as central in shaping action, activity and organizational structure in social movements (Downey 1986; Reger 2002; Valocchi 2001). One way to think about ideology is as a set of orienting principles that “forms the nexus between ideas and actions” (Gerring 1997: 972). Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston (2000: 43) conceptualize ideology as “a system of meaning that couples assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to promoting or resisting social change.” And Dalton (1994: 12) argues that “the ideological identity of an organization guides its choices of what goals to pursue, what tactics are appropriate to its position and what resources are available for mobilization.”

In all these theoretical conceptualizations, ideology is linked to action or strategy. “Strategy” is usually associated with some type of decision, such as how to best mobilize resources; which goals or activities to pursue; whether and/or how to expand the group; and whether to (and/or how to) adjust or change the group’s goals. James Jasper (2004: 10) argues that sociologists should pay more attention to strategic choices, which “are frequently transferred into conflicts, as different individuals or factions favor different choices.”

Various case studies show how ideological differences have led to conflict over strategy (see Downey 1986). Several case studies of conflicts (see Barkan 1986; Benford 1993; Haines
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1984) have found that ideological splits between radicals and moderates lead to conflicts over strategy which, in turn, can lead to major organizational change and even schism, as moderates seek to protect the organization from the provocative views and associated strategies of more militant members. However, in some instances social movement activists may strongly adhere to a particular principle, or set of principles, but may choose (for any number of reasons) not to act on that principle. Ideology may shape or constrain strategy but the relationships between ideology and strategy are not always straightforward or predictable. Ideology and strategy develop within—and also determine—organizational structure (see Dalton 1994; Reger 2002; Valocchi 2001). Organizations with formalized structures are said to weather conflict better than those with less formalized structures (see Balser 1997).

With approximately 750,000 members, the Sierra Club is the largest U.S. environmental organization. The club has a fairly decentralized structure, with 66 chapters (usually statewide organizations) and 355 groups (regional subdivisions of a chapter). The national organization has an elected board of directors, an executive director appointed by the board, and numerous paid staffers. Because board members are elected by members (rather than by the previous board, for example), the Sierra Club is the most democratic of the large, national environmental organizations. Currently, the national organization primarily works on lobbying, legislation, legal issues, like most other national environmental groups, as well as mobilizing public opinion on specific issues (Dowie 1995; Kunofsky 2005b). While much of the membership is paper-only, many members work at the grassroots level on environment-related issues that their groups decide on. Local and state organizations are often quite active and may engage in a variety of issues using an array of tactics (Bender 2003; Pitts 2003). Thus, the Sierra Club has a firmly entrenched organizational structure but one that is fairly flexible and that allows input and activism at different levels.

The literature would predict that an organization like the Sierra Club, with a formalized but somewhat decentralized structure, would be well positioned to handle conflict and, indeed, the club has not been seriously weakened by the disputes over migration policy. However, the democratic nature of the club also allowed those on each side of the conflict to continue to push their agendas; in a less democratic organization (e.g., most of the other large mainstream environmental groups), a decision by the board of directors would be much harder to contest than would be the case at the Sierra Club. Thus, while its structure has helped the club weather the conflict, that very structure has also allowed the conflict to persist.

To examine how Sierra Club activists on both sides make sense of the immigration question and to explore why and how the conflict over immigration policy has persisted, I draw on Sierra Club archival materials, public statements by commentators and activists posted on the internet or published in newspapers and other news sources, and interviews with key activists. The activists I interviewed included three Sierra Club members staunchly opposed to a club migration policy under any circumstances; two members favoring a neutrality position (no club migration policy) for pragmatic reasons; and two strongly favoring a policy. In addition, I was able to draw on data from interviews with other activists involved in efforts to limit migration to the United States for environmental reasons (see King 2007). I examined twenty-five letters to the editor representing a variety of positions on the issues and seventy-eight newspaper articles from 1997-98 identified via a LexisNexis search. In addition, I analyzed dozens of email messages archived by individual activists and by the Sierra Club. I also examined statements produced by individual members and by local groups; some were gleaned from archives at Sierra Club headquarters, others were sent to me by activists and still others were located on the internet with searches, using Google and Alta Vista. All told, these data reveal what I understand to be the full spectrum of positions on and arguments about the issue of migration policy.

In analyzing the data, I followed a modified grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), examining and re-examining materials for key ideas that spoke to or about environmental ideologies, understandings of population and environment and migration. I
also identified strategic positions that argued for pragmatism, the ability to form alliances with other groups and club unity. The process was iterative and my thinking about the material and my questions about it developed as the research moved forward. I categorized key ideas as they emerged and revisited them regularly throughout the process.

IDEOLOGIES IN THE SIERRA CLUB

These data reveal that different environmental ideologies co-exist in the Sierra Club and shape the immigration debate, the three most important of which are conservation, “mainstream environmentalism” and environmental justice. These are most often referred to as separate movements; however, because they provide orienting principles and because they co-exist in one organization, I believe it makes sense to think of them as ideologies. Each one has a somewhat different understanding of environmentalism and, thus, different prescriptions for advancing environmental protection.

The conservation perspective has the longest history in the Sierra Club and continues to dominate the club’s identity and policies. The club’s first activities involved organizing wilderness excursions and working to preserve national park land through legislative as well as educational activities. Historically, the membership of the Sierra Club, like the conservation movement as a whole, has been predominantly middle-class and white; not surprisingly, much conservation-related work has been undertaken with the interests of this constituency in mind (Dowie 1995; Fox 1981). In the broadest sense, the theory underlying conservation ideology focuses on protecting nature both from people (to protect nature for its own sake) and for people (for recreation and enjoyment of the outdoors—see Luke 1997). Conservationists may be more or less critical of systems of production and consumption and of inequalities, but the norm is to work within the current political/economic system to pass laws protecting certain spaces from development.

Concern about human health arose among environmentalists in the 1960s and 1970s, when a new set of activists, many of them from lower-income backgrounds, became concerned with toxic waste and pollution, issues that were not directly related to wilderness preservation (Taylor 1997). Historian Stephen Fox (1981: 292) writes that when human health was added to the agenda “the movement exploded. Conservationists had always thought themselves a tolerated minority—when the survival of a bird species or a river canyon was at stake. But everything changed when human survival became an issue.” The Sierra Club and other big national organizations began, to greater or lesser degrees, to include these health-related issues on their agendas. The human health perspective mixed with the conservation perspective to form what I will call “mainstream environmentalism.” While the antitoxics movement retains characteristics that are different from those of most mainstream organizations like the Sierra Club (for example, it tends to retain a more working-class base), ideas about the protection of human health worked their way into the conservation movement. The antitoxics (or human health) perspective has been able to co-exist and mix with conservation because, first, the flora and fauna conservationists were concerned with protecting were threatened by pollution and toxins; and, second, almost everyone has a stake in human health.

A third perspective focuses on social and environmental justice. This ideology has little in common with old-style conservation; it shares with mainstream environmentalism a focus on human health and well-being but adds a focus on social inequalities. Environmental justice has its roots in civil rights and antiracism; concern about environmental inequity has been added to an existing progressive ideology that opposes inequalities and is more radical than conservation in its critique of dominant social and economic practices. Environmental justice is primarily concerned with the well-being of people rather than with preserving tracts of undeveloped land and tends to define “environment” more broadly than would conservation ideology, including, for example, urban environments. The environmental justice movement arose in the 1980s when people of color began working together to counter environmental...
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racism; a pivotal event in its development was the publication of *Toxic Waste and Race* by the United Church of Christ in 1987, which connected race, class and environment (see Taylor 1997). The environmental justice movement was more radical than previous environmental movements. According to Dorecta Taylor (1997), “The advent of the environmental justice movement marks a radical departure from the traditional, reformist ways of perceiving, defining, organizing around, fighting and discussing environmental issues. . . . In addition, environmental justice questions the racial and class homogeneity of the environmental movement.”

In 1990, several civil rights leaders sent letters to mainstream environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, charging them with racist hiring practices and calling for more equitable distribution of resources among environmentalists. Michael Fischer, Sierra Club director at the time, stated, “It was like someone took a two-by-four and hit us on the side of the head. . . . It was a wakeup call.” (quoted in Dowie 1995: 147). At least since that time, some members of the Sierra Club have become interested in addressing race- and class-based environmental inequalities. And as the demographic profile of the country has changed and the concerns of environmentalists have broadened, the club leadership has become concerned about the club’s image as a middle-class, white organization (Dorsey 2003).

These environmental ideologies are associated with divergent understandings about the meaning and importance of population growth as an environmental issue and about migration to the United States as part of the population question. For conservationists, population growth may be seen as a threat to nonconstructed space, whereas environmental justice proponents would be less concerned with population growth and more concerned with existing inequalities between groups of people.

**HISTORY OF THE SIERRA CLUB’S IMMIGRATION POLICY DEBATE**

Why do some Sierra Club members advocate stricter limits on migration to the United States? The argument rests on a basic assumption that population growth is directly related to environmental degradation. National populations grow, remain stable, or decline due to a combination of birth and death rates and net international migration. In the absence of immigration, a population grows if births exceed deaths. For a population to replace itself in the absence of positive net in-migration, the total fertility rate (TFR—a measure of the average number of children per woman) needs to be around 2.1. In 2005 the TFR in the United States was just under that (CDC 2007).

Those favoring stricter limits emphasize that immigration is a major cause of U.S. population growth. Immigration-reduction advocate Ric Oberlink explains that “the U.S. population is already the third largest in the world. . . . It’s projected to hit 400 million by the middle of the next century . . . [and] over two-thirds of that growth is coming from immigrants and their descendants” (*Living on Earth* 1998). The environmental argument for limiting migration to the United States has both national and global components. First, population growth, generated in large part by international migration, is said to put a strain on natural resources such as water; contribute to sprawl, with its attendant loss of farmland and forests; and exacerbate congestion, including crowding in national parks. This position resonates with conservationist ideology and its concern for protecting undeveloped spaces. A second argument for limiting immigration holds that U.S. population growth is particularly problematic for the health of the entire planet because of the superconsuming lifestyle Americans lead. Though he did not ultimately support a Sierra Club policy to limit migration, journalist and environmentalist Bill McKibben, clearly explains the position of “limitations” supporters. 11

An extra hundred million Americans means, for instance, a staggering amount of carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere and warming the climate. . . . At the moment, we’re building bigger homes and driving bigger cars. And even if we came to our senses, the momentum of natural increase and immigration would render most of our changes meaningless. (1998: 19)
Since 1996, the Sierra Club has opted to maintain an official policy of neutrality on immigration. However, prior to 1996, club members were often actively involved in efforts to stabilize the U.S. population, including reducing the number of immigrants to the United States. Such activities were typically carried out in local population groups and through the club’s national population committee. Much of the work done by population groups focuses globally on family planning and women’s empowerment; but some activists have consistently advocated limiting migration to the United States for environmental reasons (Pitts 2003).

From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, Sierra Club members occasionally spoke publicly in favor of stabilizing the U.S. population, both through lowering fertility and/or lowering immigration levels (Kunofsky 2005a). Sierra Club population activists lobbied Congress and testified before various congressional committees. For example, in 1980 members testified on behalf of the club to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, calling for a population policy with an explicit goal of U.S. population stabilization: “It is obvious that the numbers of immigrants the United States accepts affects our population size and growth rate. It is perhaps less well known the extent to which immigration policy, even more than the number of children per family, is the determinant of the future numbers of Americans” (see Sierrans for Population Stabilization 2005). Over the years, however, this stance became a source of conflict, as some members questioned the appropriateness of advocating for stricter limits on immigration.

There has been some disagreement among members as to exactly what the official club policy was prior to the mid-1990s. This was confirmed by email messages on file at Sierra Club headquarters and elsewhere that I was able to review. According to a statement on the website of Sierrans for U.S. Population Stabilization (SUSPS 2005), the Sierra Club adopted an explicit policy regarding immigration in 1988 which read,

> Immigration to the U.S. should be no greater than that which will permit achievement of population stabilization in the U.S. The Sierra Club will lend its voice to the congressional debate on legal immigration issues when appropriate, and then only on the issue of the number of immigrants— not where they come from or their category … Sierra Club statements will always make the connection between immigration, population increase in the U.S. and the environmental consequences thereof.

According to a California-based member who first became active in her local population group and later participated in the national effort to ensure the club’s neutrality, immigration was a hot issue in the early 1990s. This member recalls that she and her husband began attending meetings of their local population committee in the early 1990s:

> We were interested in [working on population] because we thought it combined women’s issues and environmental issues and we wanted to volunteer somewhere . . . but then it turned out that maybe one-third of the people . . . were focused on immigration. And they started really pushing an anti-immigration agenda, which really isn’t why most of us were there, and they were really quite vehement in their pushing of it . . . .” (Jones 2003).

By the mid-1990s, most of the members of the National Population Committee (appointed by a committee that is appointed by the board of directors) favored a club policy advocating stricter limits on immigration (Jones 2003) but in the club as a whole, including regional and local organizations, the issue was highly divisive.

It was with hopes of quelling the vehement disagreement over migration policy that, in 1996, the board of directors issued a directive that “the Sierra Club, its entities, and those speaking in its name, will take no position on immigration levels or on policies governing immigration into the United States.” Whether the new rule officially changed club policy or not, the directive changed the practice of those members who had actively lobbied for tighter limits on immigration.
Minutes from the board meeting illustrate the directors’ concern with putting an end to the disputes.

George Klein, Chair of the Population Stabilization Campaign Steering Committee, said there was a great deal of dispute on the subject and compromise was necessary to come up with the resolution. . . . Director [Dave] Foreman noted that views on the subject of immigration are so divergent and intertwined with other issues that it was necessary to face the fact that we could not agree on the subject and move on. (Sierra Club board of directors meeting 1996).

Club Conservation Director Bruce Hamilton explained to a journalist that the board’s decision was taken because of the divisive nature of the immigration issue which, he said, "was distracting us. It tore us apart" (quoted in Cleeland 1997).

A brief statement in the club newsletter, The Planet, explained that the neutrality policy was decided upon after the club had, for several years, debated,

a full range of policy options on immigration. . . . The board’s actions reflect a desire to put the immigration debate to rest within the club and to focus on other pressing components of our population program. The board instructs all club chapters, groups, committees and other entities to take no position on immigration policy. (The Planet 1996)

Such a ruling might have led to the resignation of members or and the formation of a new, separate group, such as has occurred at other points in the history of the club. In 1969-70, when the club would not give them permission to sail to Amchitka to protest nuclear testing, Vancouver Sierra Club organizers Jim Bohlen and Irving Stowe founded the Don’t Make a Wave Committee, which later became Greenpeace. Similarly, David Brower founded Friends of the Earth in 1969 in response to disagreements over Sierra Club policy (Carmin and Balser 2002). What makes the immigration policy conflict different? The founders of Greenpeace, who wanted to engage in a specific, targeted action, could do so without the support or organizational apparatus of the whole club. In contrast, Sierra Club members favoring a club policy of population stabilization need the club to lobby Congress; this could be done by a new group but would not be nearly as effective or as symbolically meaningful.

David Brower, founder of Friends of the Earth, was a charismatic leader who was able to found organizations and raise money. At the time that he resigned from the Sierra Club, his attempts to guide the club in a new direction had led to charges that he was “unwilling to respond to the board’s directives, was financially irresponsible, and was too radical” (Carmin and Balser 2002: 373). There was a disconnect between Brower’s environmental ideology and that of other club leaders and members at the time. In the case of the Sierra Club, the leaders and members continue to share common ideological underpinnings (more on this below)—than was seemingly the case at the time David Brower resigned.

Advocates for population stabilization, however, took a different tact. In response to the board’s decision, a group of members led by Alan Kuper, Ben Zuckerman and Bill Hill gathered enough signatures (approximately 2,000—Cleeland 1997; Zuckerman 2003) to demand a vote by all 550,000 club members.14 The ensuing referendum is an example of how the democratic structure of the club allowed for a conflict—that might otherwise have ended with the Board decision—to continue. According to Zuckerman (2003), he and his colleagues were inspired in part by recent initiatives in California:

In California we have these statewide ballot initiatives, some of which have gotten a lot of publicity all around the country . . . the voters can basically change the policies of our legislature, and the Sierra Club works in a similar manner. . . . [W]e decided to collect the signatures to change this neutrality policy and have the club actually take a position on the U.S. immigration levels and policies, and our motivation is—was basically then and still remains—that the worst possible thing for the world’s environment and for the U.S. environment especially, but also for the world, is to have more and more Americans because we have such a
large per capita impact on the planet. . . . To have a constantly rapidly growing U.S. population is a disaster not only for the United States’ environment but also for the world’s environment, and that was our main motivation as to worrying about whether the club’s policy . . . was wrong.

The resolution they asked to be brought to a vote, which became known as “Alternative A” read:

Shall the Sierra Club reverse its decision adopted February 24, 1996, to take no position on immigration levels or on policies governing immigration into the United States and adopt a comprehensive population policy for the United States that continues to advocate an end to U.S. population growth at the earliest possible time through reduction in natural increase (births minus deaths), but now also through reduction in net immigration?

The board of directors, dismayed by the upcoming referendum, decided to place an alternative on the ballot in September, 1997 (Alternative B), which read:

The Sierra Club affirms the decision of the Board of Directors to take NO position on U.S. immigration levels and policies. The Sierra Club can more effectively address the root causes of global population problems through its existing comprehensive approach:

- The Sierra Club will build on its effective efforts to champion the right of all families to maternal and reproductive health care, and the empowerment and equity of women;
- and the Sierra Club will continue to address the root causes of migration by encouraging sustainability, economic security, health and nutrition, human rights and environmentally responsible consumption.

By including economic security, health and nutrition and human rights Alternative B statement goes beyond a conservation perspective and, in affirming a commitment to human rights and economic security, even leans toward a social/environmental justice position. However, it simultaneously retains a concern for population growth, which will be addressed “at the source.” Thus, Alternative B apparently sought to strike a balance between diverse ideological positions. Members were asked to choose between Alternatives A and B. In the spring of 1998, members voted 60/40 for Alternative B and its policy of neutrality on migration.

### IDEOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC POSITIONS ON IMMIGRATION POLICY

Statements made by Sierra Club activists as part of the migration debate reveal a divergence in ideas about the main cause of environmental problems—including what those problems are—that are related to the ideological orientations discussed above: conservation, mainstream environmentalism and environmental justice. Table 1 summarizes how those ideologies intertwine with strategic concerns to produce differing stances on club migration policy. One ideological position holds that population growth, including migration to the U.S., is the most pressing environmental challenge. This position resonates most closely with the conservation perspective. The ideological position most divergent from the conservation and population-stabilization orientation holds that population growth is not an acceptable or relevant issue for environmentalists (see Dorsey 2003). This stance is most closely associated with social/environmental justice. In the middle are ideological varieties of conservation and mainstream environmentalism. All positions are concerned to varying degrees with population, consumption and production practices. What differs is the emphasis placed on each component. Table 1 also shows how various ideological positions are related to strategic concerns, mostly having to do with public perception of the club and the club’s ability to retain or build alliances with other groups. Thus, some members who are ideologically in agreement with the goal of U.S. population stabilization oppose the club’s involvement in the issue for strategic reasons.
Table 1. Position on Whether the Sierra Club Should Take a Stand in Favor of Limiting Migration to the U.S. in Relation to Ideology and Strategy.

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<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Position on</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration Policy</td>
<td>Favors population stabilization, including policy to limit immigration, for ideological reasons</td>
<td>Favors population stabilization, including policy to limit immigration, for ideological reasons</td>
<td>Population stabilization desirable but one of many important issues and needs not be a top priority</td>
<td>Opposes population stabilization policy that includes limits on immigration for ideological reasons</td>
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<td><strong>Strategic Choice on</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Club Migration Policy</td>
<td>Strategy not main concern; position taken due to ideology</td>
<td>Strategic issues critical; opposes club policy on migration for strategic reasons</td>
<td>Strategic issues important; opposes club migration policy for a mix of strategic and ideological reasons</td>
<td>Strategy not main concern; position taken for ideological reasons</td>
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Adherents to the position that the club should advocate for U.S. population stabilization typically believe migration to the United States should be slowed immediately and that this is best achieved through a legislative initiative that would reduce the number of migrants allowed into the country. Alan Kuper, who spearheaded Alternative A, stated, “The underlying cause of our environmental problems is too many people, and everybody knows that” (Cleeland 1997). And, “You could argue that the whole reason we needed an environmental movement in the first place was because of the doubling that has occurred since World War II. . . . It’s all about population and numbers.” (quoted in Motavalli 1998). Ben Zuckerman, also an Alternative A leader, wrote, “What causes environmental damage? Not surprisingly, it’s too many people using too much energy and materials” (Zuckerman 1998). According to an activist supporting Alternative B (neutrality on immigration), those supporting immigration reduction felt strongly that without limiting immigration, none of the other work the club was doing really mattered, that any gains would be erased by the growing population (Jones 2003).

In stark contrast to the position that population is the main environmental issue is the position that population growth is not a critical environmental concern. While activists holding a social/environmental justice perspective may concede that population growth does matter somewhat, it is quite low on their list of environmental concerns. Only a small minority of those speaking publicly in the Sierra Club debate expressed a clear affinity with this position. Former Board member Michael Dorsey (2003) has espoused an environmental justice-oriented perspective, arguing that immigration-reduction efforts are racist and also unenforceable: “The idea of sealing borders is preposterous and impossible—people will risk their lives to enter this country. It would take a police state to enforce closed borders. . . . People should be allowed to move around freely.” Rather than population growth, Dorsey’s main concern is with the environmental consequences of production practices and with social and environmental inequalities. Dorsey (2003) explained: “There’s a fundamental denial that firms place [such a heavy] burden on the environment. . . .” He advocates a “three-strike” policy to deal with corporate repeat environmental offenders. Santos Gomez, population committee member in the mid-1990s, might also be placed on the environmental justice end of the spectrum. He stated, “I don’t talk about population stabilization. . . . If you use that language, you’re fighting a losing battle. The first objective is not fewer people on the planet, but better lives for people. I work to improve economic opportunities and give residents hope that they can improve their environment and communities” (quoted in Coyle 1997).

The two opposing positions described above are motivated to act based on ideology. A large middle group appears to have taken their position on migration policy based on a mix of ideological and strategic concerns. Some in the middle really do support U.S. population stabilization but not for the club at this moment in time. Some in the middle position advocate
population stabilization—and possibly immigration reduction—not via policy but instead by addressing the root causes of international migration. This notion is evident even in the wording of Alternative B, which claims the club will “address the root causes of migration.” (emphasis added). Implicit in this statement is the idea that immigration should be addressed; but instead of addressing it through a U.S. migration policy it is to be addressed “at the root.” This notion of addressing the “root causes” of migration became a standard theme of Alternative B supporters. Carl Pope, the club’s executive director, stated, “Make no mistake: overpopulation is, without question, a fundamental cause of the world’s ills. . . . But these are fundamentally global problems; immigration is merely a symptom” (quoted in Branigin 1998A: A02).

Some members believe that population growth matters to the environment but only as one of many issues and not as one that should be a top priority. Those in the “middle” positions discussed human rights and social issues more frequently than those members who most fervently advocate for population stabilization. An example of such a stance was expressed by Sierra Club member and population activist George Klein, who said, “I’m not saying immigration is not an environmental issue, but less so than the purists. Even if population declines, if we over consume and over pollute, it doesn’t matter. To population purists, the main issue is seen only in terms of the population, but the issues are interconnected, there is more to the picture” (quoted in Bender 2003: 152). Similarly, Peter Kostmayer, former executive director of Zero Population Growth, and Karen Kalla, co-chair of the Sierra Club National Population Committee, wrote (1997),

Population is only one of the many interconnected factors that influence the health of the environment. Much of our environmental degradation is a symptom of an unsustainable global economy, partly driven by government policies that exacerbate poverty and undermine laws protecting public health and human rights. Deeply entrenched government subsidies promote overconsumption, thus wasting natural resources.

In its emphasis on interconnections and health, this position resonates with a progressive version of mainstream environmental ideology. But it does not completely negate the position that population growth is environmentally undesirable.

Overlaid onto the ideological positions described above were strategic concerns, the first to do with the club’s public image, including the ability of the club to create and maintain connections with “other constituencies,” especially environmental and social justice groups as well as the growing Latino community. The second strategic concern was related to club unity. As shown in Table 1, many Sierra Club activists expressed ideological support for U.S. population stabilization but, for a variety of reasons, did not favor a club policy on immigration (Kunofsky 2005a).

Herbert Haines (2006: 231) writes that “representations of social problems that movement organizations and activists present and the solutions they propose tend to make them in the eyes of outside audiences ‘moderate’ or ‘radical,’ ‘reasonable’ or ‘outrageous’, ‘realistic’ or ‘unrealistic’ and the like. . . . [D]ifficult decisions that pit cherished principles against image-management considerations must sometimes be made.” In discussions surrounding the 1998 club-wide referendum, many supporters of Alternative B (neutrality on migration) voiced concern about the public perception of the club. Leaders and activists expressed worry that the club might be perceived as nationalistic or as racist were it to advocate limits on immigration. Executive Director Carl Pope told a journalist that if the club were to support stricter limits on migration, “We would be perceived as assisting people whose motivations were racist” (quoted in Branigin 1998A: A02). Indeed, charges of racism and nationalism were rampant in the public discourse. Such accusations came from within the club and without. In addition, there was concern about possible connections to right-wing anti-immigrant groups. Journalist Nancy Cleeland (1997) wrote that “anti-immigration groups have tried for years to pull mainstream environmentalists into their camp, using personal letters to high-level activists, ads in magazines and newsletters, conferences with environmental themes and research
papers that appear to support their arguments.” The Political Ecology Group (PEG), a social/environmental justice organization, worked to defeat the immigration reduction initiative in the Sierra Club. Brad Erickson (2003), PEG’s president in the mid-1990s, explained that his group had two strategies for opposing immigration limitation efforts, including those of the Sierra Club. The first strategy was to initiate dialogue; the second was to expose links to right-wing organizations. Many of the immigration-reduction supporters of the Sierra Club consider themselves political liberals and opponents of racism (see, Evans 1998; Zuckerman 2003; Kuper 2007). But the idea that club policy might be associated with nativist, right-wing groups was worrisome; the possible connection to anti-immigration groups generated press coverage and caused real worry among Sierra Club members who wanted no public connection with such groups.

Former president of Zero Population Growth Peter Kostmayer and Sierra Club population activist Karen Kalla (1997), in a statement supporting Alternative B, wrote, “Whatever our motivations, focusing on restricting immigration further could associate us with racist groups and the growth of hate crimes…” One local Sierra Club chairman said, “The thing I’m concerned about in this election year is that if we pass this thing, politicians will grab a hold of the Sierra Club’s good name and use it to skirt environmental issues and get elected on some sort of anti-immigrant background” (quoted in Lelyveld 1998).

In contrast, Alternative A supporters acted more directly out of ideological concerns, arguing that the club “had to do what was right” (support stricter limits on immigration), even if some people misunderstood (see Litton 1998). One commentator claimed that “club leaders are terrified that by backing a reduction in immigration, they will be called bad names. . . . But the job of leaders is to articulate their organization’s policies. If their motives are not racist, they should fight attempts to label them as such” (Harrop 1998). Similarly, Alternative A leader Alan Kuper explained, “We cannot think the way politicians do. They think short term and they avoid hard choices, but hard choices not made now become much harder choices that must be made in the future” (Living on Earth 1998).

Alternative A supporters felt that opponents were afraid to take a stand on immigration reduction for fear of weakening alliances with environmental justice groups and with minority communities. Many were extremely concerned, for example, about the possibility of alienating Hispanic communities and law makers (Jones 2003; Kunofsky 2005). Peter Kostmayer and Kalla (1997) wrote, “We rely on our ability to build trust and to forge an inclusive movement. African-American and Latino communities and their elected officials are our most consistent allies when it comes to the Sierra Club’s conservation priorities. A focus on further restricting immigration quotas would undermine our ability to work with these essential allies.” The Ozark Chapter of the Sierra Club issued a statement explaining its opposition to a club stance on immigration: “[W]e will lose valuable allies in the environmental movement, who will be distressed over the club’s actions in this highly sensitive area of public policy” (Hengerson 1998). Sierra Club activist Anne Ehrlich explained: “There is . . . a lot of complexity in the club, and there was a fledgling social justice movement who became very upset by the whole immigration discussion. They felt it would jeopardize their efforts to reach out to ethnic communities which it may have. It’s very complicated and there’s a lot of intolerance all around” (quoted in Bender 2003: 160).

Another pragmatic, strategic concern was club unity. Some Sierra Club supporters of club neutrality on immigration believed that immigration should be slowed but worried that the immigration issue was too divisive. Some felt that, because members could not agree on the issue, it “was tearing the club apart” (Kunofsky 2005a). Anne Ehrlich, longtime supporter of slowing population growth and Sierra Club board member in the mid-1990s, stated, “It’s not that my opinion has changed on the matter of immigration, but that the club was not ready to deal with it in any coherent way.” Ehrlich voiced concern that some members of the club “assume that everyone who brings up the topic is a racist or has racist motivations. And until we can persuade them that this isn’t necessarily so, we aren’t going to have a cool, calm,
dispassionate discussion” (quoted in Kirschten 1998: 533). Sierra Club activist Judith Kunofsky expressed similar a similar view. Kunofsky, a strong supporter of population stabilization, founded the Sierra Club population program in the mid-1970s and was a leader in trying to get the club involved in the immigration issue. However, she became convinced that the club was truly split and that, ultimately, “the Sierra Club can’t work on an issue over which key leaders are divided.” There was also concern that the club might lose membership or support if it were to adopt a policy advocating limits on immigration. Some volunteers and staff people threatened to quit the club if it were to take a stand in favor of limiting immigration; those advocating limits on immigration were apparently not contemplating leaving the club to the same extent. Thus, Kunofsky came to believe that while an immigration policy consistent with U.S. population stabilization was right for the country, the Sierra Club should not be involved (Kunofsky 2005a).

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Much of the work on conflict and factionalism in movements has assumed that ideology is linked to strategic choices; several studies have focused on splits between “moderates” and “radicals” (see Barkan 1986; Benford 1993; Haines 1984). In his study of frame disputes within the antinuclear movement, Robert Benford (1993) found that disputes were more common among the movement’s most moderate and most radical groups than between other factions. Generally, the moderate groups had a single-issue focus while the radical (progressive) groups linked issues such as poverty, oppression, militarization and environment. A similar type of split occurred among some of the participants in the Sierra Club debate, whose disagreement derived from ideological clashes and whose theories of society differed fundamentally. Those in the social/environmental justice camp, like the progressives in Benford’s study, preferred to focus on interconnections—in this case especially between inequalities and environment—and could not countenance a policy with a single-issue focus on immigration, which ran counter to their understanding of environmentalism. Those most staunchly advocating immigration limits (who tended to be more conservation-oriented) fought hard for a migration policy because their theory of environmental degradation held overpopulation to be a major—if not the major—environmental problem.

Steve Barkan (1986) has described a different variation on disputes between radicals and moderates, revealing how a perceived need for external support led to interorganizational hostility in the Southern civil rights movement as many moderate participants felt strongly that they would lose the support of Northern white liberals and federal officials if they adopted “radical” strategies. Barkan (1986: 204) writes: “Militant groups can be counted on to embrace provocative views; fearing the effects on external supporters, moderate groups can be counted on to condemn such views.” In the case of the Sierra Club, this scenario was reversed; the provocative stance was that of advocating stricter limits on migration. “Moderates,” who shared this perspective, chose to “protect” the club by steering it away from a policy that threatened to alienate potential allies and donors.

In the scenarios described by Benford and by Barkan, ideology was directly linked to action in that activists’ understanding of the nature of an issue (e.g. a radical/progressive stance versus a moderate one) led to associated strategic choices. Similarly, in Downey’s (1986) study of the antinuclear group, the Clamshell Alliance, ideology directly led to certain strategies and tactics and a commitment to decision making by consensus (which Downey argues ultimately led to factionalism and subsequent disbandment).

In the Sierra Club immigration policy dispute the connection between ideology and strategy was more complicated. First, the factions could not be broken down in traditional radical/moderate terms. While they would most likely be labeled the more politically moderate, the activists with the “provocative views” may have been those supporting U.S.
population stabilization. Like the moderates in the antinuclear movement described by Benford (1993), they focused on a specific policy rather than stressing the interconnectedness of inequalities, corporate practices, etc. But the idea of limiting immigration is not an “extremist” issue in the United States; 52 percent of the population favors tighter restrictions on migration into the country (Carroll 2005). However, it was those who would typically be considered the most radical or progressive—those most inclined to see different types of oppression and inequalities as interlocking and the least inclined to favor a policy to limit immigration for environmental reasons—who helped convince club leadership and other club members that the club risked losing support (e.g., of Hispanic groups, lawmakers, and funding sources) if they were to adopt the “moderate” stance of supporting limits on immigration. This divergence from the expected right/left (or moderate/progressive) categorization confused even some Sierra Club activists. For example, one social/environmental justice activist (and proneutrality on immigration), stated in an email to a colleague “I’m still trying to understand the conceptual framework of these ‘liberal’ closed-border folks.” The experience of the Sierra Club reveals how categories such as liberal and conservative, radical and moderate, are not always useful in understanding interactions among movement participants.

For many Sierra Club activists the disagreement was over strategy rather than over ideology. Most were apparently not deeply ideologically opposed to population stabilization policies, as were those who were strongly focused on social/environmental justice. Most members seem to have been clustered in a more middle, “mainstream environmentalist” ground. Many neutrality (no club policy on immigration) supporters shared a similar theory and set of values with proponents of immigration reduction, believing population growth to be an important environmental concern. Yet though they shared this environmental ideology, these activists vehemently debated the immigration question and came to different conclusions about what the position of the club should be. The relationship between ideology and strategy in this case is complex; shared environmental ideologies do not necessarily result in shared ideas about strategy and policy.

On one side of the strategy dispute (between club members who basically agreed that U.S. population stabilization was desirable) were those who argued forcefully that a club stance on immigration reduction was absolutely necessary and should be instituted even if it meant possible negative reactions from the public or more disagreement within the club (see statements of SUSPS website 2005). On the other side were those concerned that advocating stricter limits on immigration would hurt the club. In a nutshell, some immigration reduction activists felt that certain supporters of neutrality were selling out; in turn, some neutrality supporters thought the immigration reductionists were putting the club at risk.

The complicated relationship between ideology and strategy can help us begin to address the important question of persistence. Why is this conflict still going on? One possible, though partial, answer is that advocates of a club policy on immigration reduction are aware of the ideology/strategy disjunct. If many members support the idea of population stabilization in theory but oppose a club stance for pragmatic reasons, perhaps they will change strategic positions in response to new political opportunities or other external factors (e.g., funding possibilities or changes in public opinion).

Because most studies have focused on factionalism and conflict that result in major change, the literature would lead us to hypothesize that a conflict as intense and as lengthy as the Sierra Club debate over immigration would result in substantial organizational transformation. The club has held together, its membership has grown and, for the most part, little has been altered. This may be because many (possibly even most) members, while differing over strategy, continue to share similar environmental ideologies.

Apart from the ideology/strategy question, organizational issues are crucial to the longevity of the immigration-policy debate. I have explained how the democratic structure of the club has allowed population-stabilization advocates to continue pressing their case. It is also possible that Sierra Club senior staff, and possibly the board of directors, had organi-
zational concerns that they did not routinely make public. One such issue may have been a concern with the availability of financial resources. Resources are often a key issue in movement conflicts (see Balser 1997). A club stand on immigration stabilization had the potential to negatively affect two vital funding streams: from corporate foundations and individual contributions. The question of funding did not come up frequently in the public debate; however, immigration-reduction advocates Leon Kolankiewicz and Roy Beck (2001) contend that some in the Sierra Club were aware that business strongly favored immigration and that the club receives money from foundations connected to business. Contributions from individuals may have been an issue as well. For example, an article in the Los Angeles Times explained that David Gellbaum, who contributes millions to the Sierra Club, threatened to withdraw all support for the club if it came out in favor of limits on immigration. Gellbaum reportedly stated, “I did tell Carl Pope in 1994 or 1995 that if they ever came out anti-immigration, they would never get a dollar from me” (quoted in Weiss 2004). In addition, like other large, national environmental organizations, the Sierra Club was very dependent on direct mail for funding (Dowie 1995). Kolankiewicz and Roy Beck (2001) suggest that population stabilization is a harder “sell” to contributors, because population stabilization, “doesn’t improve the environment; rather, it keeps environmental conditions from growing worse. You can’t photograph the bad things you prevented—because they didn’t happen” (p. 50).

Concern with reducing population growth worldwide is a central ideological tenet that continues to be expressed as club policy. However, the extent to which the club’s policy to take no stand on U.S. population stabilization reflects the beliefs and environmental ideologies of most members is not clear. It is evident that many members (but how many?) favor U.S. population stabilization and, thus, limits on immigration to the United States but for pragmatic reasons oppose a Sierra Club policy on this issue. It would be a stretch to conclude that the “heart and soul” of the Sierra Club has been transformed since the 1970s and 1980s and that that transformation is reflected in the 1996 policy. As external factors—such as the number of immigrants entering the United States annually or public opinion about immigration—change, so might the level of support for a club policy on immigration limits.

NOTES

1 According to Gene Coan, staff member at the Sierra Club, “Groundswell is in large measure a counter to SUSPS, but not entirely. It is also a counter to other constituencies within the club (Coan 2005).
2 Independent columnist and former host of NPR’s “All Things Considered” Emil Guillero (1998) wrote, “Call it the Mean Green. Within the last year, anti-immigrant nativists turned immigrants from society’s toxin to toxic waste itself. What better way to say that a person of a different color is harmful or dangerous to society? Define them as more than just mere polluters. They are the pollutants themselves. From the nativist view, the United States is pristine water. Immigrants muck it up. It’s the subtext of the whole proposal.”
3 This term was used by several Sierra Club members to describe the conflict over the club’s migration policy.
4 Club staff members were not able to verify this amount (Gene Coan, email message to author March 16, 2007).
5 Kreisberg (1998: 262) explains that “a fundamental conversion of one or both sides may arise from the experience with conflict. Important members of one side may become convinced that the views of their adversary have great merit. . . .”
6 Researchers have used various terms, including “frames” or “collective identity” to describe something very similar to what I am calling ideology. See Oliver and Johnston (2000) for a discussion of conceptual issues concerning frames as opposed to ideologies. Collective identity “articulates the groups goals, beliefs, and visions of social change” (Reger 2002: 173) and thus shares many of the same components as ideology.
7 Balser (1997: 224) writes that decentralization “deters intragroup conflict by allowing subgroups to pursue a varied agenda in a relatively stable environment.”
8 For example, in the most recent election for board of directors, candidate Alan Kuper, who advocates a population stabilization policy for the club, writes, “My Sierra Club will always be faithful to its environmental mission, not to the politics of the moment. . . . [T]aking the lead in ending the environmental movement’s silence about immigration is not only right, it’s in the club’s best interest. We must correct the 1996 mistake, explain that US numbers can’t indefinitely exceed the limits of Nature’s services on which all life depends and advocate fair, humane reduction” (Kuper 2007, Sierra Club Election Information Sheet).
9 These include pamphlets and other club materials, such as letters, documents and email messages on file at the
Sierra Club offices in San Francisco. Unless email messages were clearly intended for the public, I do not directly quote or reveal names of authors of any email messages on file at the Sierra Club office or elsewhere as the senders presumably did not expect that their correspondence would be made public.

For in-depth discussions of different types of environmentalism, see Gottlieb (1993), Brulle (2000), Taylor (1997).

McKibben summarized arguments in favor of limiting immigration but he did not ultimately support a Sierra Club policy to work toward limiting immigration. His article continues, “I think we have no right to pass such laws, or even to support them in nonbinding forms like Sierra Club referendums, unless we also take serious steps in our own lives to lessen our impact on the environment. If we’re not willing to reduce the size of our families or the size of our sport utility vehicles, then cutting immigration is piggish scapegoating; it may save some of our landscape, but at the price of our national soul. If, however, we are willing to take some painful steps ourselves, then we earn the right to tell some tough truths to others—chief among them that even this rich land can’t grow forever. Numbers count.”

See the Sierra Club’s website (http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/population.asp) for a history of the club’s policy’s on population growth. It is not clear, however, that all members know the club’s policy history.

This club activist asked not to be identified by name in this paper; the name listed here is a pseudonym.

In 1998, when the referendum was held, membership was approximately 550,000; today membership has grown to approximately 750,000.

These are my interpretations of these activists’ positions. Since I did not interview each one—I am often relying on quotes from published materials—I present them here not to attribute specific ideas with specific individuals but instead to illustrate the main positions represented in the debates in general.

Many such activists were drawn to environmentalism in the first place (usually in the 1970s) via ideas about overpopulation and population explosion. Paul Ehrlich’s *The Population Bomb* (published by Sierra Club Books) and surrounding activities and discourse emphasizing environmental consequences of world population growth profoundly influenced people who were already or who subsequently became environmentalists.

The single-focus versus emphasis on interconnections has been described in previous studies (see Barkan 1979; Benford 1993). For example, Benford’s study of frame disputes (1993: 687) in the Austin nuclear disarmament movement, cites a progressive newspaper article: “Organizers for the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign are displaying a disturbing amount of issue elitism: the sense that the freeze is the single, most important issue of the day. ‘If we don’t deal with the nuclear weapons issue, none of the other issues will matter,’ say many freeze advocates.”

An organizational issue not examined in this paper concerns the division between members and the professional staff. According to Alan Kuper (2007), the professional staffers tended to oppose a club policy to advocate for population stabilization. Kuper explained: “By and large the staff are wonderful people. Some don’t really have an environmental background but they do have Washington credentials. They don’t want their job to be harder.” Kuper believed that a policy to reduce immigration would make their jobs more difficult because the issue is controversial.

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