Hey Buddha! Don’t Think! Just Act!: reply to Finnigan

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and Easy Wandering as the employment of *wu-wei*. Its use returns in the outer chapters, which coincide with the presumed period during which the *Laozi* was being composed and the figure of Laozi starts to play the role of spokesman in stories where he lectures Confucius in Daoist awareness.


3 – Finnigan’s note 3 grants herself the “not unreasonable” assumption that we are not Buddha—in the context of a discussion of Zen, that is controversial and needs more argument.

Hey, Buddha! Don’t Think! Just Act!—A Response to Bronwyn Finnigan

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The Problem: How a Buddhist can Conceptualize a Buddha’s Enlightened Action

In the course of a careful and astute discussion of the difficulties facing a Buddhist account of the moral agency of a buddha, Bronwyn Finnigan develops a challenging critique of a proposal I made in a recent article (Garfield 2006). Much of what she says is dead on target, and I have learned much from her comment. But I have serious reservations about both the central thrust of her critique of my own thought and her proposal for a positive account of a buddha’s enlightened action. Curiously, in another fine essay (Finnigan and Tanaka forthcoming), Finnigan and her co-author have anticipated much of what I will say in reply. I will rely in part on that second essay in my reply to the critique that appears in this volume.

The first task is to be clear about exactly what is at issue between us, as it is easy to lose focus and closely related questions can be hard to distinguish. In Garfield 2006 I was concerned not to give an account of a buddha’s action, but rather to explore the resources that Buddhist philosophy has internally to explain the nature of a buddha’s thought after enlightenment. These are slightly different issues. One might, for instance, think that even the best Buddhist action theory or philosophy of mind is ultimately unsuccessful, but still think that it faces no special problems in accounting for a buddha’s thought. Or, one might think that one can provide a compelling account of awakened thought or action, but believe that account is not available within a Buddhist philosophical framework. In any case, while my focus in Garfield 2006 was thought, Finnigan’s is action. I agree with her that my account has important implications for action theory, and will engage her critique in that domain.
On the other hand, we are both concerned with the central question: how can a Buddhist explain a buddha’s awakened thought and action? In Garfield 2006 I argued, as Finnigan points out accurately, that while Indian Buddhist philosophy did not have the resources to articulate a theory of a buddha’s awakened thought, Chinese Buddhism, inflected both by Indian Yogācārīn ideas and by Daoist ideas, does. I argued that this is because of the availability in the Chinese tradition of a non-representational theory of mind not available to an Indian Buddhist philosopher. I say this at the outset because I will argue that Finnigan’s own account of a buddha’s action, while perhaps an acceptable external account of how an awakened being conceptualized in some tradition can think and act, is not, as she believes, acceptable within a Buddhist framework, for reasons having to do with issues in both Buddhist philosophy of mind and theory of action. I will also argue that, for closely related reasons, her critique of my own proposal is not successful.

Finnigan’s Official Account of Action

Let us call an account of action Davidsonic if, according to it, when one acts (1) one does so for reasons (as opposed to mere causes); (2) one can explain one’s own action by appeal to those reasons; and (3) one represents one’s action intentionally. Finnigan’s account of action is Davidsonic. She writes:

Agency, according to our definition, is instantiated in intentional action, and intentional action involves the capacity both to ‘direct’ behavior and to give intentional explanations for the directedness of such behavior.

Such accounts of the nature of action are familiar in the West, and are indeed fairly mainstream. I concede to Finnigan that if a Davidsonic account is correct, then the account of awakened thought and action that I proposed in Garfield 2006 is not cogent. I would add, however, that if Buddhist action theory were Davidsonic, Buddhism would have no resources for explaining a buddha’s awakened activity. On the other hand, I will show that to adopt a Davidsonic account at the outset begs the question in this context. Part of the burden of my 2006 argument is to provide a non-Davidsonic account of action, to show that such an account is available to Buddhism, that the Chinese tradition opens this possibility, and that a non-Davidsonic account can in fact provide an account of awakened action. Interestingly, as we will see, Finnigan, despite what she says in this essay, agrees.

Finnigan’s Dilemma

Finnigan points out correctly that I fail to distinguish adequately two models of the acquisition of the kind of spontaneous responsiveness that I argue a Chinese model can attribute to a buddha. She helpfully labels these two models as a Daoist deconstructive model and a Confucian constructive model. She writes:

[T]he Classical Chinese offer us two different models of . . . spontaneous responsiveness. In one account (the Confucian) this capacity is acquired as a result of cultivation, and in
another (the Daoist) this capacity is recovered by removing the obscuration of culture. . . .

The question now arises: to which notion of spontaneous responsiveness does Garfield appeal in his claim that Buddhism is completed when it is taken to China?1

Garfield’s position on this question is fundamentally ambiguous. In explicitly aligning the Buddhist Yogācāra ideas of foundation consciousness with Daoist thought, he seemingly invokes the Daoist deconstructive model of recovering spontaneity to account for a Buddha’s capacity to act. . . .2

However, in his appeal to metaphors of skill acquisition, Garfield can be seen also to invoke the Confucian constructive model of acquiring spontaneity to account for a Buddha’s capacity to act.

Finnigan is correct. I do appeal to both models in characterizing a Chinese account of a buddha’s enlightened consciousness. And there is at least a prima facie tension between them. Finnigan puts her finger on this tension:

[W]hen enlightened persons act spontaneously, do they do so in a way that is (at all) informed (however latently) by their internalized discourse, or are their actions purely automatic expressions of their inherent nature? Garfield tells us that the internalized discourse “(like a raft) must be discarded” (Garfield 2006, p. 21); it is “transcended” [23]; “we leave discourse behind” (p. 23). However, it is unclear whether this ‘leaving the discourse behind’ is a mere phenomenological abandonment (i.e. one responds spontaneously, without thinking about the internalized norms, but in a way that is structurally informed by these norms) or whether the abandonment is deeply structural with respect to the mind (i.e. one literally responds from the state of alāya vijñāna, free from conceptuality, representation, and subject-object duality). Are the spontaneous responses of enlightened beings essentially the result of cultivation or do they arise from our inherent nature, which, by methods involving the progressive purging of concepts and cultural norms, has finally been uncovered?

According to Finnigan, then, there is a serious dilemma to be resolved and I can’t have it both ways. Awakening, in her view, cannot consist in both the accumulation of cognitive and action-guiding skills that must be acquired by practice—however much they disappear from introspective consciousness—and the elimination of cognitive and action guiding skills in favor of an innate set of skills that antedate practice. Now, I think I can have it both ways, and I, in accord with Finnigan and Tanaka (forthcoming), will argue for this below.

For now, let us simply note that if Finnigan’s dilemma were as destructive as she takes it to be, the Buddhist tradition as a whole would be in serious trouble. After all, Buddhist accounts of the path are replete with both admonitions to cultivate merit, compassion, and nondual wisdom and admonitions to abandon vice, attachment to self, and conceptual superimposition. Moreover, while we find self-grasping and other klesas described as innate, inasmuch as they are present from birth in a single life, they are also described as adventitious, inasmuch as they arise from karma, are not part of our fundamental nature, and can be extirpated. On the other hand, even though our buddha-nature or potential for awakening is described as innate, this is presented, right from the Pali canon through to the late Mahāyāna, as part of our primordial nature, to be manifested spontaneously when obstructions are eliminated. The klesas are to be abandoned through the cultivation of virtue, in order to enable
spontaneous manifestation. This is common rhetoric of the path. Were Finnigan’s
dilemma as irresolvable as she suggests, the heart of the tradition would have to be
cut out. Fortunately, this is not the case. Before we see how Finnigan and I each re-
solve Finnigan’s dilemma, let us see why the solution she proposes in the present
comment cannot work.

Finnigan’s Solution

First, Finnigan argues that the deconstructive model cannot work. This is because,
according to this model, the Buddha’s “behavior would simply be a direct, innate
response to the stimulation of particulars.” And of course such a response, being
non-intentional, and incapable of being explained intentionally by its author, would
fail the Davidsonic condition for action. Finnigan sums this up nicely:

[T]he deconstructive model does not solve our problem. While a buddha’s behavior may
be designated ethical, a buddha cannot be claimed to act intentionally or be designated
an ethical agent in this model. The deconstructive approach allows no room for a buddha
to direct his behavior, let alone to provide reasons that explain the directedness of his
behavior.

The constructive model, Finnigan argues, fares better. She argues that, using this
model,

it is not that a buddha consciously represents his knowledge about the nature of reality
and infers what action would be appropriate when he responds to situations. Rather, he
can be said to have developed and refined the complex associative matrix that implicitly
informs his responses. Phenomenologically, his responses are direct and do not involve
any consciously represented thoughts (beliefs, intentions), but, nonetheless, they presup-
pose a complex cognitive structure.

That is, like a good Confucian, a practitioner cultivates a sophisticated set of cogni-
tive, perceptual, and behavioral skills, and internalizes them to the point that one
forgets that they are operative. This is indeed part of the account I advanced in Gar-
field 2006, of course. But, there is more to come. For Finnigan’s concern is to under-
stand the Buddha as a moral agent, and to understand his agency as appropriately
Davidsonic. To do so, we must still understand his action as intentional, and as expli-
cable by him in intentional terms. Finnigan puts the point this way:

[A buddha’s] responses are typically informed by previously learned conceptualized in-
formation . . . even if this information is not consciously occurrent at the time of action.
Moreover, not only does this associative process enable a buddha to respond in a certain
way; it is also the basis for reason-giving explanations.

Now, Finnigan is aware that this Davidsonic account raises a problem for a Bud-
dhist account of a buddha’s action. She asks whether this model is compatible with
Dharmakīrti’s system. Finnigan answers “no,” concluding:

This is because the ‘objects’ a buddha identifies, recognizes, discriminates between, and
articulates as content in reason-giving are generally characterized phenomena (i.e., they

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are conceptual types), and it is conceptualized cognition that is suspect in the
Dharmakīrtian system. So we have a dilemma: either we accept the constructive model
but revise (or reject) the Dharmakīrtian system or we jettison the idea that a buddha can
act and, hence, be an ethical agent.

Finnigan is correct to note that this horn of the dilemma would be anathema to
Dharmakīrti. The reference to Dharmakīrti, though, is too narrow. The real question
concerns whether this is compatible with any account according to which a buddha’s
knowledge and action is non-conceptual, non-inferential, and spontaneous. It is not.
And since all Buddhist accounts agree on these matters, this horn cannot be accept-
able at all within the Buddhist tradition. This is the heart of the problem regarding the
understanding of enlightened thought and action.3

Finnigan concludes by advising that we reject the view that a buddha’s thought
and action are non-conceptual, rejecting the “Dharmakīrtian” nominalism of the
tradition. She urges that this is a relatively minor revision, and claims to be in good
(though unnamed) company in recommending this revision. Therefore, she concludes:
First, the non-representational account of thought suggested by the Chinese tradition
cannot provide an account of Buddhist agency. It is (1) incoherent, facing Finnigan’s
dilemma; and (2) incapable of grounding a Davidsonic theory of action. Second, a
Davidsonic account is available to Buddhism that can provide such an account.

Finnigan’s Wake

We will return to the charge of incoherence below. I happily conceded that the non-
representational model I recommend cannot ground a Davidsonic theory of awak-
ened action of the kind Finnigan proposes, but this is a virtue, not a vice. Finnigan’s
recommendation of what she regards as a “relatively minor” change to a Dharmakīrtian
position is in fact unavailable to a Buddhist of any stripe, and would constitute a
wholesale abandonment of Buddhist metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and moral
psychology. While Finnigan’s account of awakened action might be an interesting
alternative to Buddhism, it is not Buddhism. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, in Finnigan’s model, a buddha must be ignorant of the contents of his
own mind. She argues, as we have seen, that “phenomenologically, his responses are
direct and do not involve any consciously represented thoughts (beliefs, intentions),
but, nonetheless, they presuppose a complex cognitive structure.” In this account,
his actions appear to him to be direct, involving no conceptual thought or inference,
although in fact they do involve such thought. A buddha is hence essentially self-
deceived (and knows less about his own actions than, for instance, Finnigan does).
For a buddha to be systematically self-deceived about the nature of his own action is
more than out of the spirit of an account of awakening, more than an abandonment
of one strain of thought in the tradition: it violates any plausible, even deflated, con-
strual of omniscience. In Finnigan’s account, we lose buddhahood, and it is no lon-
ger clear what Buddhism is about.

There is a further irony: in an attempt to provide a Davidsonic account of awak-
ened action, Finnigan has undermined a buddha’s moral agency even by the lights of
a Davidsonic theory. For that account of agency requires that we be able to give more or less accurate reason-based accounts of our own action. Massive self-deception renders that impossible. So, in this account, not only is a buddha not a buddha as Buddhism understands that status, but such a buddha is not a moral agent as a Davidsonic would understand that status.

Things get worse. A central idea behind the Davidsonic model Finnigan advances is that action, especially morally evaluable action, must be intentional. Intentionality in this sense involves both purposiveness and, as Finnigan has been at pains to argue, contentfulness. Intention is almost universally used in English translation of Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali technical vocabulary to translate cetanā, as in the oft-quoted statement by the Buddha, “It is intention (cetanā) that I call karma; intending, one acts by body, speech, and mind,” or in Nāgārjuna’s statement that “action is of two kinds: intention and the intentional.” And this is a very good translation. Buddhist action theorists agree with Finnigan that the action of non-awakened beings is universally intentional in just this sense, dependent upon cetanā. And, like Finnigan, Buddhist moral theorists tie moral responsibility to cetanā, since it is that which gives rise to karma.

There is a problem here for Finnigan, and a fatal one, a problem that gets to the heart of what is wrong with her account: no Buddhist philosopher has ever accepted the thesis that a buddha has cetanā, and indeed the absence of cetanā in a buddha is central to every Buddhist account of awakened consciousness. This is so for several related reasons. First, cetanā accumulates karma, and a buddha does not do that. Second, cetanā is always conceptual, and a buddha’s thought is non-conceptual. Third, cetanā involves desire, and a buddha is without desire, since desire attaches one to cyclic existence. Fourth, cetanā intervenes between perception and action, and a buddha’s responses are direct and immediate.

Now, one might argue on independent grounds that this is an incoherent or implausible theory of awakened action—that the Buddhist account of buddhahood stands in need of wholesale revision—but that is neither what Finnigan takes herself to be doing nor what she takes me to be doing. In Garfield 2006 I explore the resources the Buddhist tradition has for making sense of a buddha’s awakened action as it is described internally; Finnigan takes herself to be doing the same. That is precisely why it is important to her that she is proposing only “minor” revisions of doctrine, and, I suppose, the reason for the claim that she follows so many unnamed others in this direction. But this is no minor revision, and it is not attested either in the tradition or in recent scholarship. Instead, it is a heterodox position unavailable to any Buddhist, and for deep reasons.

All of this is to say in yet another way that Finnigan gets off on the wrong foot at the start by presuming the appropriateness of a Davidsonic model of action and responsibility in a context in which such a model is explicitly rejected. By presuming the appropriateness of this model of action across the board, Finnigan fails to see the radical distinction the Buddhist tradition draws between benighted and awakened action, and hence fails to see the difficult problem that is to be solved. Her solution is no solution at all within the tradition; instead, it is an abandonment of the tradition.

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Finnigan finds herself forced to this abandonment because she is convinced that it is the only tenable horn of a dilemma that she poses at the end of her comment: “either we accept the constructive model but revise (or reject) the Dhammakirtian system or we jettison the idea that a buddha can act and, hence, be an ethical agent.” This is, however, a false dilemma. The “constructive model” Finnigan endorses is a jettisoning of Buddhism; the other horn—the one she rejects—is not the jettisoning of the idea that a buddha can act, but a jettisoning of the idea that the Davidsonic theory of action is the only available theory. In Garfield 2006 I argued for just such an alternative. In her forthcoming essay with Tanaka, Finnigan joins me in endorsing that alternative. Let us turn to her defense of that position.

Finnigan’s Other Account of Action

In their forthcoming essay Finnigan and Tanaka ask what model of action is appropriate to the martial arts, and ask this question within a decidedly Japanese Buddhist framework. The problem they face is posed by the prima facie inconsistency of a Davidsonic theory of action with the Buddhist rhetoric and theory of action that permeates the Japanese martial arts discourse:

[A]n action is something more than a bodily movement that just happens. It seems that something goes on in our mind that directs our action. In order for us to say that we acted, we have to be able to say that we thought about it in this way or that. . . . So, based on the beliefs (knowledge, memory, desires) we have at the time, we deliberate on the best course of action and that is what we do.

How, then, should we understand the martial arts’ message: ‘Don’t think! Just act!’ in a way that doesn’t mean just throwing away all thinking and theories?

The problem is essentially this: If we think that our action is the result of intentions which we form by thinking about the best course of action, then, without a thinking-mind, we don’t form intentions. But if there are no intentions, then there is no explanation of action. No explanation, no way to rationalize our action. No rationalization, no responsibility. . . . But this seems crazy.

So, the question is this: if to act is to think, how is it possible to act appropriately in the martial arts, if that is to act without thinking? Can this be action at all? The answer that Finnigan and Tanaka find proffered within the martial arts tradition is heavily inflected by Chan/Zen (and hence by the tradition on which I draw in Garfield 2006). They appeal to the idea of mushin, or no-mind:

In dojō, ‘Don’t think! Just act!’ is often summarized in terms of mushin (no-mind). . . .

There is a ready-made answer to this question. The answer is: training. The difficult bit is to explain what training has got to do with mushin.

We are trained to understand kendo so that, ultimately, we can explain why we act in the way we do, for instance by reference to the ways of the traditional sword-masters. At the same time, we are trained to leave the thought about mental operations behind.
Hence, they suggest, there is another way to think of action. We act when our behavior satisfies an appropriate description, has an appropriate context in an evaluative matrix, and has been brought about through an appropriate training regime. Explanation and assessment of such action refers not to our intentions and beliefs, but rather to that training regime, the circumstances of action, and the appropriate evaluative matrix. Such an account of action and its explanation is non-Davidsonic, and makes no reference either to deliberation or to cetanā-intention. Our movement is an action in *kendo* because we have been trained to do this in this circumstance, because it is what the ancient sword-masters did, because it is elicited in this appropriate circumstance, not because we had an intention and a set of beliefs or because we deliberated regarding the best way to actualize that intention, even unconsciously. This is spontaneous action. Finnigan and Tanaka make this point eloquently:

The mistake, though, is to think that the *only* way our knowledge, beliefs, desires have any bearing on our action is by selecting just one or two of them in deliberation and forming them into an intention which then causes us to act. It is a mistake to think that unless we *form* an intention at the time of the act, we are not acting intentionally.

So there is reason why we can’t say that actions from *mushin*—that don’t involve deliberation or intention formation at the time of action—are not intentional. There is no reason to think that a master who acts from *mushin* does not act intentionally.

You don’t have to be a buddha—even a black belt *kendo* practitioner can act spontaneously. But a buddha acts spontaneously even in street clothes.

**Finnigan’s Awakening**

Finnigan is not unaware that her and Tanaka’s reflections on the nature of action in the martial arts have more general significance for the theory of action. Action can be understood quite generally as the outcome of hard training, and its explanation may advert simply to that training and to the consequence responsiveness one develops. She and Tanaka write:

Our actions express how accomplished we are, where this is the outcome of much hard training. . . . Importantly, one’s accomplishment as a *kendōka* is not explained in terms of what generated the action. It is *expressed* in one’s ability to respond in appropriate ways.

And so, I presume, she would agree that a moral agent’s actions can also be assessed in normative terms appropriate to the matrix of training, and to the circumstances of elicitation, and not in terms of her *intentions, representations, deliberations, or choices*. Moral psychology can be non-Davidsonic just as action theory can be. For a buddha who has abandoned conceptuality and is without cetanā, just as for the *kendōka*, the account of awakened action can only be non-Davidsonic. And fortunately Finnigan and Tanaka have shown, using an argument strikingly reminiscent of that in Garfield 2006, that this makes good sense, and even that it is an East Asian Buddhist perspective that provides the key to understanding how and why it does so.
It is now time to return to Finnigan’s dilemma. She argues that I can’t have it both ways: that the model of the cultivation of a buddha’s spontaneous responsiveness cannot both be constructive and deconstructive. As I noted above, there is prima facie reason to believe that it can be: both metaphors are common in Buddhist literature, and indeed are often joined in a discourse of what is to be abandoned and what is to be taken up. We are to cultivate virtue, and to abandon the afflictions of confusion, attachment, and aversion and their consequences, the superimposition of inherent existence, conceptual fabrication, et cetera.

Is the cultivation necessarily Confucian? I think not. Those traits we are enjoined to cultivate are often spoken of, even in India, as antidotes; and primal confusion, avidya, is characterized as positive—as the active projection of the false, not simply as the failure to apprehend the truth. The cultivation of virtues and of correct view is, in the metaphor of Candrakirti, the application of an ointment that removes the cataracts of ignorance; the cultivation of patience is, for Śāntideva, the elimination of an obstacle to compassion.

The cultivation Buddhism recommends is seen, even in an Indian context, as the development not of essentially positive qualities, but as the development of ways to eliminate vice, to remove obstacles to the manifestation of our potential for perfection. It is only when Buddhism moves to China, I argued in Garfield 2006, that this becomes explicitly thematized in terms of a buddha-nature, and in terms of a return to spontaneity. The metaphors that enable that thematization are indeed borrowed from both Daoist and Confucian sources, and both sources infiltrate Chinese Buddhism in complex ways (see Gregory 2002 for details). But the metaphors are not inconsistent with one another, and the model is not incoherent. We cultivate our own nature; we do so by developing the qualities that eliminate the obstacles to its spontaneous manifestation; that manifestation is present in awakening; that awakening enables spontaneous engagement; that engagement is awakened action; that action, like that of the kendōka, is an expression of our awakened nature.

I thank Finnigan both for pointing out the unclarities in the exposition of Garfield 2006 and for her and Tanaka’s defense of its central thesis.

Notes

Thanks to John Powers for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1 – I register here a small discomfort with this exegesis of Garfield 2006. In that paper my concern was more narrow than “the completion of Buddhism.” It was simply to understand how to construct a model of enlightened consciousness given Indian Buddhist nominalism and the consequent difficulty of talking about a Buddha’s mental states. But this exegetical point is not directly relevant to the philosophical question Finnigan raises here.

2 – Once again, I quarrel with the exegesis. I don’t assert in Garfield 2006 that ālaya-vijnāna is aligned with anything in Daoism. Nor is action my principal concern,
although I agree that my account has the implications for a theory of action to which Finnigan draws attention. And again, I think that the exegetical question is beside the point. I just don’t want the unwary reader to get the wrong idea about the contents or point of Garfield 2006.

3 – There is another way to put this point that may help to focus the difficulty for Finnigan’s position: A buddha is not a moral agent in Buddhist theory, at least not in the sense that ordinary beings are. Action (karma), in Buddhist action theory, always produces karma, and a buddha does not produce karma. Hence, whatever a buddha does is not action in the ordinary sense. Moreover, Buddhist ethics is all about what an ordinary being needs to do to become a buddha. It is about cultivation of virtue, elimination of vice, practice of path, and so forth—in short, about self-transformation, about transforming oneself into a buddha (see Garfield forthcoming). But a buddha has already accomplished this. So, a buddha is neither an agent nor a subject of ethical assessment, and so is not a moral agent. Hence, Finnigan is off on the wrong foot.

References


The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited—A Reply to Jay Garfield and Chad Hansen

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I begin by warmly thanking Professors Garfield and Hansen for participating in this dialogue. I greatly value the work of both and appreciate having the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with them. Aside from the many important insights I gain from their replies, I believe that both Garfield and Hansen misrepresent my position. In