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Metaphor or Delusion? A Mīmāṃsaka's Response to Conceptual Metaphor Theory

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Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), an approach to human thought and language that began with the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), claims that metaphor is not merely a linguistic phenomenon, but is implicated in structuring human thought. On this view, that people use words like “attack” and “defend” to describe argumentative moves demonstrates that they think of argument as a kind of war. This is opposed to the view that some words like “attack” are polysemous, sometimes meaning to engage in physical warfare and sometimes meaning to argue against a position. One implication of CMT is that nearly all human concepts are understood metaphorically, so that reasoning about argumentation turns out to involve concepts of war. This view comes in for criticism by cognitive linguists, such as Murphy (1996), Rakova (2002), and McGlone (2007, 2011), but within analytic philosophy of language, it is typically ignored in favor of debates within the semantics-pragmatics literature which tend to focus on a different set of views. In Indian philosophy and area studies, on the other hand, CMT is often adapted as a methodology for comparative work, although with little attention to criticisms of its framework. In the present article, I draw on resources from within classical Indian philosophy to think about CMT. I argue that seventh-century Indian philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s work has important implications for thinking about metaphor itself as well as for the role of CMT in cross-cultural philosophical work. I argue for three claims: (1) Kumārila’s arguments against an opponent anticipate contemporary criticisms of CMT, in particular that it is at best implausible, and at worst internally inconsistent; (2) if these arguments have force, there is reason to be cautious about some of CMT’s claims; and (3) given that Indian philosophy has its own indigenous reflections on metaphor, more philosophical work on these theories is a desideratum in terms of both first-order philosophical questions and methodology.

I. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa on Metaphor

Introductions to papers on metaphor often refer to Aristotle, and then make observations such as “only in the twentieth century has [metaphor] been regarded as an important problem in the study of language and thought” (McGlone 2007, p. 100). While understandable, given the influence of...
Greek thought on much philosophy, this exclusion of the lengthy and sophisticated history of linguistic philosophy in India robs contemporary thinkers of an opportunity to engage with other approaches to the phenomenon we call “metaphor.” Indian thinkers considered the problem of what they call “secondary” or “non-primary” (amukhya) meaning from an early date. And while secondary language in general was certainly seen as an adornment to poetry (the study of poetry and aesthetics was called alaṁkārasāstra, the discipline of ornamentation), it was also taken seriously as a part of everyday human linguistic practice.3

One philosophical context in which secondary meaning is taken seriously is Mīmāṃsā, or “Exegesis,” which focuses on the interpretation of certain Vedic texts (the brāhmaṇas) that contain ritual instruction and explanation. Mīmāṃsā is concerned with secondary meaning because Vedic texts, which were understood to be an epistemic instrument, or means of knowledge (pramāṇa), were also replete with figurative language. Mīmāṃsakas (as Mīmāṃsā thinkers are called, with the -aka functioning like -ist or -ean) needed to explain how figurative language could be involved in communicating knowledge. This makes their inquiry especially relevant to questions posed by contemporary philosophical study of metaphor, as Mīmāṃsakas focus on the relationship between language, thought, and knowledge, as well as methodologies for textual interpretation. Thus, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, an early and important Mīmāṃsaka (roughly seventh century c.e.), gives significant attention to how humans interpret expressions like “Devadatta is a lion” or “the student is fire.” Kumārila argues that people understand such sentences in multiple stages, in an account which he develops in detail in the Tantravārttika (henceforth TV), which is a sub-commentary, or commentary on a commentary, on Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsāsūtra.4

While our ultimate interest is in Kumārila’s arguments against his opponent, let us first briefly understand his positive account of what we would today call “metaphor” and what he calls gaunavṛtti, or a word’s function (vr̥tti), which is based on properties (gaunā) that are similar—for example the aforementioned “Devadatta is a lion.” This property-based function of words is one of two secondary functions he identifies. The other, indication (lakṣaṇā), is what we might call “metonymy,” as it involves relationships such as contiguity or cause-and-effect. A well-worn example is “The village is on the Ganges,” where the village is adjacent to the river Ganges, but not directly upon it, and thus we understand it to mean “The village is on the bank of the Ganges.” For the sake of simplicity, I will use “metaphor” for gaunavṛtti and “metonymy” for lakṣaṇā in this context.5 Hearers employ both functions to comprehend the meanings of words in particular contexts. According to Kumārila, all nouns primarily refer to generic entities, and it is the role of metonymy to shift from a generic referent to a particular, so that a string of words with unrelated referents can then be understood as a semantic unity (see endnote 7 for discussion of the
semantics of verbs, which I simplify). A common example of this is the sentence

1. Bring the cow (gām ānaya).⁶

According to Kumārila, the words in the sentence first convey only their generic meanings, represented by dashed areas, as in Figure 1. Depending upon the context, metonymy will select appropriate, more specific meanings (represented by solid areas in Figure 2) for each word, and at this stage of comprehension, the hearer would also be able to construe the words together as a single semantic entity (represented by the speech bubble), rather than a string of unrelated meanings. When the resulting sentence meaning is intelligible, no further function is necessary.
However, sometimes, there is an obstacle to our understanding the sentence at this stage. Then, metaphor works to resolve the obstacle. Let us consider one of Kumārila’s examples:

2. The boy is a fire (agni māṇavakaḥ).

Here, the candidate sentence meaning in Figure 3, which has resulted from the previous application of metonymy, is unacceptable, as shown by the dark dashed lines in the speech bubble. This is because there is a category mistake, or, as Kumārila puts it, “the boy is not understood as being invariably associated with fieriness.” A competent interpreter would not accept this as a sentence, so a further metaphorical stage of comprehension is required, one which involves identifying similarities between a fire and the boy.

Kumārila argues that what we understand from metaphor about the word “fire” is that fieriness has certain properties, for instance being bright or brilliant (paiṅgalya). What we understand from metaphor about the word “boy” is also something that has certain properties. Kumārila argues that the boy is similar (sādṛśyā) to the fire. In other words, the two share some properties. Here, the shared property is being bright. There is a bit of a worry here, though. We might think the boy is “bright” in the sense of intelligent, lively, and so on, whereas the fire is “bright” in the sense of having an orange color. These features are not the same (see Figure 4).

Elsewhere, Kumārila explains what similarity is and how it is recognized. He defines similarity in the Ślokavārttika (ŚV) as “the presence of an
aggregate of features which is in common with some other category of objects." So either we must accept that the boy and the fire share a brightness in common (both are visibly glowing in some manner) or there is a further figurative relationship (between two kinds of brightness) that Kumārila has not explained.

Another important claim Kumārila makes is that similarity is a relationship between certain common features (avayavasāmānya), and these features are in common not just among individuals, but among individuals as they are understood to be a member of a category or class (jāti). In his discussion of similarity, he notes that similarity obtains between a number of features: the origins of things, their properties, their substrates, their actions, their capacities, or their particular character. For instance, in the sentence

3. Devadatta is a lion (siṃho devadattah).

the similarity between Devadatta and a lion might be that they both have a particular capacity, such as the ability to conquer. But while we can say that Devadatta is like a lion in this regard, we would not normally understand the following sentence as expressing similarity:

4. A lion is an animal (paśuḥ siṃḥaḥ).

This is because insofar as such a sentence is about the lion’s nature, it is a statement of identity—this is that. In Kumārila’s view, similarity presupposes some kind of difference. In contrast, sentences like (4) express identity between the universal (being an animal) and the individual (which is an animal). Only when there is some difference (bheda) can there be similarity. In what follows, I argue that this requirement of some distinction plays an important role in Kumārila’s arguments against his opponent, whose view is analogous to CMT.

The opponent, whom I will call “the superimposition theorist,” is arguing against Kumārila’s view just outlined. (Some details of the argument depend
upon other views, which were discussed earlier in the TV, and are not relevant for our purposes.) The opponent’s central problem with Kumārila’s view is that the word “lion” needs to be used in its primary meaning in order for there to be predication, or for Devadatta and lion-nature to have the same referent (sāmānādhiranya). Their alternative proposal is as follows:

And without the word “lion” being applied (apravartamānena) [to Devadatta] the sentence “Devadatta is a lion” cannot attain its purpose of having the same referent. How does it do this then?

An expressed meaning is accomplished by superimposition of one meaning’s nature upon another meaning. Having accomplished this expressed meaning, there is the application just of the words in themselves.

For, through observing that his actions and properties are similar (sadrśā) to a lion’s actions and properties, Devadatta and his actions and properties come to have conformity (sārūpya) [with a lion] as conceptualized in their entirety. And therefore the word “lion” has only its innate meaning being employed, and to that extent there is no logical defect in positing primary meaning because that meaning has been superimposed [upon Devadatta]. But where the primary meaning itself is not subject to superimposition, in that case it is “primary.”

This brief discussion is all we have of the superimposition theorist’s view before Kumārila goes on to refute it. What we see is that the superimposition theorist agrees that the word “lion” refers to a universal. However, they disagree with Kumārila that the word also has a secondary meaning (e.g., properties of courage).

Instead they argue that Devadatta’s actions and properties (kriyāgūṇa) are simply understood as similar to a lion and its actions and properties (sīmhaśadṛśa), on the basis of the primary meaning. As a result, Devadatta, his actions, and his properties are said to “achieve conformity” (sārūpyam āpadyante) with the lion, his actions, and properties. This conformity is achieved by conceptualizing the cluster as in their entirety (sāmastyaparikalpanayā). In other words, there is an ordinary predication of Devadatta as a lion, but in understanding the expression a hearer will conceive of Devadatta in a particular manner, that is, completely in terms of a lion.

We can reconstruct the superimposition theorist’s account as follows: first, the primary meaning of the words (a universal) is understood, just as Kumārila says. Then, since the primary meaning is necessary for the sameness of reference, we can assume that a hearer understands the speaker as saying “Devadatta is a lion” (where “lion” refers to the general nature of a lion, rather than his being a particular lion). However, rather than taking this as incongruous and searching for another interpretation of the meaning of “lion,” the speaker accepts the ordinary meaning and uses it to imagine Devadatta as being a lion. She thinks of Devadatta, along with all of his features, in a way
that is, in its entirety, guided by her understanding of lion-nature. Precisely what this imaginative construction amounts to is left open.\textsuperscript{18} Figure 5 shows these two stages of the superimposition theorist’s view.

Kumārila’s response to the superimposition theorist is simple. He argues that people who aren’t confused (bhrāntivarjita) would not accept such a cognition. Based on what he says about similarity elsewhere, and on his arguments in this section, I think his main point is that although the superimposition theorists claim to be relying on similarity for the explanation, they are unable to do so. Below I offer a reconstruction of Kumārila’s responses on the basis of his commitments in the text.\textsuperscript{19}

Assume the superimposition view for \textit{reductio}:

1. Similarity is a relationship that depends on recognizing difference in some respect.
2. Superimposition consists in part in apprehending similarity between Devadatta and a lion.
3. If one apprehends similarity between Devadatta and a lion, then one recognizes that Devadatta and a lion are different in some respect.
4. If one understands that Devadatta and a lion are different in some respect, then one would not make an identity claim between Devadatta and a lion.
5. One makes an identity claim between Devadatta and a lion.
6. One does not understand that Devadatta and a lion are different in some respect (\textit{modus tollens} 5, 4).

![Diagram](image-url)
One does not apprehend similarity between Devadatta and a lion (modus tollens 6, 3).

As a result, there is a contradiction with the superimposition’s view, in premise 2, that it is possible to apprehend similarity between Devadatta and a lion, and the conclusion, 7, that similarity cannot be apprehended under this view.

We have seen that Kumārila has discussed premise 1 in the ŚV in his section on comparison (upamāna), and premise 3 is an application of that premise to the case at hand. Premise 2 follows as a matter of definition of the superimposition theory. Premise 4 is a point about language. Kumārila makes this point at several places in the TV, at 3.2.1 as well as 1.4.23, where we have been focusing. At 3.2.1, he argues that since the similarity between fire and the boy cannot be understood until fire itself is understood, we must take the universal as the primary meaning. However, without some relationship between being fire and being a boy that allows sameness of referent between the words “fire” and “boy,” the statement would be nonsensical as an identity statement. Thus, another level of linguistic meaning must be understood to secure reference. However, as the superimposition theorist has argued, the only thing expressed is the primary, ordinary meanings of the words, amounting to an identity claim between Devadatta and a lion (premise 5). If that is true, by modus tollens on premises 6 and 3, respectively, one cannot understand similarity between the lion and Devadatta. The superimposition theory is self-refuting.

According to Kumārila, not only is there an internal incoherence in the superimposition theory, but it is implausible. In an extended analogy, Kumārila suggests a thought experiment in which two people are using ordinary language (that is, not metaphorical language) to describe a shimmering mirage on the horizon. He uses this case because it is commonly accepted by Indian thinkers that seeing a mirage on the horizon as water is a kind of cognitive superimposition. He wants to show that the metaphorical case is not a case of cognitive superimposition. Kumārila argues that in cases where either the speaker or the hearer are confused about the difference between the mirage and the water, saying “That is water” would not result in superimposition. This is because when someone thinks that the shimmering light on the horizon really is water, they would hear the sentence “That is water” as meant in its ordinary, primary sense. But in a case where both speaker and hearer recognize that they are seeing a mirage, and the hearer knows that the speaker isn’t trying to lie, the speaker saying “That is water” would be taken to communicate similarities, since both persons can directly see that there is no water. There is no motivation for inserting superimposition into the explanation, when similarity is sufficient. For Kumārila, a superimposition account of metaphor at best is implausible and at worst is internally inconsistent. In what follows, I argue that Kumārila would say as much about CMT, insofar as it involves cognitive superimposition.
II. Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Early Work

The cluster of theories in linguistics and cognitive science that I am calling “Conceptual Metaphor Theory” or CMT can be traced back to the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), which has been developed over the years by a number of researchers. In what follows I focus first on Lakoff and Johnson’s original work in CMT, and then on more recent proponents of CMT such as Fauconnier and Turner (2003) and Slingerland (2008, 2011), who argue for a version known as “blending theory.”

CMT claims that metaphor is not primarily linguistic, but cognitive. Conceptual metaphor theorists argue that most (although not all) human concepts are understood metaphorically, where for something to be understood metaphorically is to be understood or experienced in terms of another thing (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 5). In CMT, human beings experience the world through image schemas, which are structures based on sensorimotor interaction with the world. For instance, because we move in the world from place to place and we observe objects moving in the world, we abstract from this direct experience to a PATH schema. We can apply this schema to other more abstract concepts, such as LOVE. We then understand LOVE in terms of a PATH. According to CMT, evidence that we understand abstract concepts in terms of more concrete ones is found in patterns of language use such as

Look how far we’ve come.
We’re at a crossroads.
We’ll just have to go our separate ways.
We can’t turn back now.
I don’t think this relationship is going anywhere.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 44)

These ordinary expressions are taken as evidence of a conceptual metaphor, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. These expressions are not linguistic metaphors like e. e. cummings’ “love is more thicker than forget,” William Shakespeare’s “Love is a smoke raised with the fume of sighs,” or even Pat Benetar’s “Love is a battlefield,” all of which involve the prototypical “X is Y” predication. They would typically be characterized as literal or idiomatic uses of language. However, according to CMT, the prevalence of certain patterns of language use demonstrates that human beings think of LOVE as a JOURNEY.

What does it mean to think of one thing as another? In more precise terms, CMT proposes that there is a “mapping” or “projection” between two domains, the source (JOURNEY) and the target (LOVE). The source is the domain whose content is applied to the target. This mapping or projection involves identifying analogous aspects of the concept JOURNEY and the concept LOVE, which can be used in drawing inferences. For instance, since
LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Fig. 6.

JOURNEY has a goal, we can infer that so does LOVE, and thus a couple who has been together for a long time might say things like “Look at how far we’ve come.” Figure 6 illustrates this mapping.

On the CMT analysis, the conceptual metaphor underlying ordinary idioms about love can be represented with a unidirectional arrow represent the mapping from source to target. For instance, if the concept of JOURNEY involves travelers, agents who are participating in the journey, then we can map this aspect of the concept onto LOVE, and conclude that love has such a structure, where the lovers are understood as travelers. Reflecting on their early account of conceptual metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson say:

We accordingly adopted the Projection Metaphor, based on the image of an overhead projector. We saw a target domain as an initial slide on the projector and metaphorical projection as the process of laying another slide on top of the first one, adding the structure of the source to that of the target. This metaphor for metaphor allowed us to conceptualize the idea that metaphors add extra entities and relations to the target domain. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 253).

Such a metaphor may immediately remind us of Kumārila’s superimposition theorist, and indeed, my contention is that cognitive superimposition is involved in both theories. Before demonstrating this, it is worth reiterating the following point: The precise details of CMT versions vary, for instance in terms of posited explanatory neurological underpinnings and the implications they have for views about human culture, syntax, linguistic development, et cetera. However, all versions of CMT are committed to the claim that metaphor is primarily cognitive, not linguistic. At the core of CMT is the idea that, save for a handful of directly experienced concepts, those derived from our sensorimotor system, we understand concepts metaphorically. For instance, according to Slingerland (2011), even abstract philosophical concepts such as TRUTH are understood in terms of concrete imagery, even
though we may not realize it, due to the diffuse nature of this imagery (p. 11). CMT thus takes a strong position about epistemic access to concepts. Aside from a certain number of sensorimotor schemas, all human concepts are grounded in (cognitive) metaphor.

III. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa against CMT

We have much more detail about the variety of theories of conceptual metaphor than we do about the superimposition theorist that Kumārila argues against. Further, the superimposition theorist in the TV is not explicitly committed to any broader claims about the metaphoricity of thought. Rather, they are presented just as claims that putative cases of secondary meaning (meaning at a second stage from the primary denotation) are only primary meaning and a subsequent cognitive superimposition. This commitment might be compared to that of Donald Davidson and others, who argue that the idea of metaphorical “meaning” is a canard, and that hearers instead participate in imaginative actions due to hearing an obviously false sentence (Davidson 1978). However, while Davidson and the superimposition theorist both argue that there is no secondary meaning, only the superimposition theorist seems committed to the claim that understanding a metaphor involves conformity of the target to the source in its entirety. Kumārila focuses upon this claim and not just the question of whether there are two kinds of linguistic meaning.

For this reason, then, the superimposition theorist and CMT are plausible analogs. Especially against Lakoff and Johnson’s projection metaphor, which resonates strikingly with the imagery of superimposition, we might think these are two similar approaches to metaphor. But are they similar enough for Kumārila’s argument to have any force against CMT? Below I adapt Kumārila’s argument to source and target rather than lion and Devadatta.

Assume the CMT view for reductio:

1. Similarity is a relationship that depends on recognizing difference in some respect.
2. Superimposition consists in part in apprehending similarity between source and target.
3. If one apprehends similarity between source and target, then one recognizes that source and target are different in some respect.
4. If one understands that source and target are different in some respect, then one would not make an identity claim between source and the target.
5. One makes an identity claim between source and target.
6. One does not understand that source and target are different in some respect (modus tollens 5, 4).
7. One does not apprehend similarity between source and target (modus tollens 6, 3).
In CMT, the explanation for metaphorical thought is that people construct mappings between two different domains. These mappings involve finding correspondences that involve similarity: having similar structures, similar capacities, et cetera. Thus, similarity is also implicated in CMT, even if the term “mapping” is being used. Kumārila’s superimposition theorist is explaining a linguistic expression, but in CMT the theorists are explaining not only metaphors in language, but conventional expressions that are taken to have metaphorical roots. However, premise 5 as carried over directly from Kumārila’s argument does not quite get at the CMT theorist’s view. They are concerned not only with expressions like “love is a journey,” but with the putative conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, which is assumed by ordinary language about love. Thus, we should revise this premise: making an identity claim about source and target amounts to

5. One understands the target mediated through the source.

To understand the target concept in terms of the source concept would be to have epistemic access to the target only by virtue of the source. For instance, in the case of the concepts of LION and DEVADATTA, understanding DEVADATTA in terms of LION would be to draw on information about lions to reason about, and act with regard to, Devadatta. Our revised premise 3 would then be

3. If one understands that the target and the source belong to different categories, then one would not understand the target mediated through the source.

In other words, there is some independent access to the target that is not mediated through the source. This coheres with Kumārila’s emphasis on cognitive superimposition, which occurs in cases of delusion, such as seeing a mirage on the horizon and thinking it is water. He points out that in such a case, where we understand the shimmering appearance on the horizon in terms of our concept of water, there is no discrimination between the concept of water and the appearance on the horizon.29 However, someone who points to the horizon in such a case and says “That is water” isn’t speaking in a way we’d consider metaphorical or figurative—they are identifying water and the mirage. They understand the mirage in terms of water.

While Kumārila does not draw implications about how such confusion would affect action, an analogous criticism has been made by a number of thinkers against CMT. Murphy (1996, p. 180) argues that if it is true that we actually think of arguments in terms of war (and have no access to the concept ARGUMENT other than as metaphorically mediated), then what keeps us from deciding to use real napalm and missiles in arguments? Kumārila’s commentator, Somesvara, seems to have this worry in mind when he refers
to a metaphorical passage in the *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* that says, “A woman is fire,” wondering how rituals involving fire would be performed if we really thought that a woman is fire.\(^{30}\)

**IV. CMT-Blending Theory as a Reply to Kumārila**

One way to put the worry due to Kumārila (and, more recently, Murphy) is that unless we have some contribution from the target (for instance, the concept ARGUMENT or the person of Devadatta), we are confused, not reasoning with metaphor. However, this worry only has force against the view in which there is a single direction of mapping, from source to target. A reply is found in Fauconnier and Turner’s (2003) blending theory, which takes seriously Lakoff and Johnson’s idea that metaphors “add extra entities and relations to the target domain,” and on which mapping can occur in two directions.\(^ {31}\) Blending theory posits not only a source and target domain, but a third entity, a “mental space” called a “blend,” in addition to another called a “generic space.” (Mental spaces are parts of working memory—Fauconnier and Turner’s theory is motivated in part by a desire to give a neurologically grounded account of conceptual metaphor.) Fauconnier and Turner also take seriously the claims about the fundamental nature of metaphorical cognitive processes, arguing that the process of blending is involved in a wide range of linguistic processes.\(^ {32}\) According to this view, instead of one-to-one mapping (for instance LOVE IS A JOURNEY), which is fixed in some way (in culture, individual standing beliefs, etc.), mapping occurs in working memory in the interpretive process, and results in a temporary blend (bottom circle, Figure 7), which can then get used for further interpretation. This illustrates how Lakoff and Johnson’s LOVE AS A JOURNEY metaphor might be understood as a temporary blend.\(^ {33}\)

According to blending theory, however, our ability to draw these connections depends in part on a generic space (top circle, Figure 7), which restricts which aspects of the source are mapped to the target. For instance, although love is like a journey in involving two agents moving along a path, there may be other structural aspects of a journey that are not relevant for the blend, for instance that human beings are spatiotemporally restricted from simultaneously taking two journeys that occur at different places. However, human beings are not likewise restricted from being on multiple romantic journeys simultaneously.\(^ {34}\)

Further, in blending theory, there are “double-scope” blends, in which the mapping is not simply from source to target, but also from target to source. A common example is THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER. In this blend, illustrated in Figure 8, the source is the BUTCHER, and the target is the SURGEON.\(^ {35}\) However, this case does not involve understanding a surgeon only in terms of a butcher. Rather, the goal of this inept surgeon is still healing (from the space of SURGEON), using medical tools (from the space of
Fig. 7.

Fig. 8.
The benefit of the blending approach over the early CMT approach is that rather than presume that ineptitude is in the domain of BUTCHER, there is contribution (marked with asterisks) also from SURGEON, which leads to a blend of two different domains whose structure is not determined by just one of them.

Thus, in response to the worry that the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR leads to faulty inferences (such as using napalm against philosophical interlocutors), the blending version of CMT can stipulate that there is some contribution from the domain of ARGUMENT. Thus, tools of conversation rather than war would be used to accomplish the goal.36

V. Kumārila against CMT-Blending Theory

Although Lakoff and Johnson’s original superimposition metaphor is complicated in blending theory—the transparency placed on the projector contributes content, but now so does the projector itself—a worry still remains. This worry is called the “homunculi” problem in contemporary work critical of CMT. For instance McGlone (2011) argues that, to avoid the unwanted consequence that we think of arguments in every way as war, there must be a further interpretive step that excludes certain aspects of the source domain (which, recall, depends on perceptual schema) so that we do not make bad inferences (2011, pp. 566–567).37 However, McGlone argues that the theory has no explanation for why some attributes are selected while others are not. Aside from positing a tiny metaphor-interpreting homunculus in the brain (pushing the problem back another level), McGlone argues that CMT fails as an explanation.

Kumārila argues something similar in his response to the superimposition theorist, although in a manner that is specific to his Vedic context. In Kumārila’s view of the Vedas, they are unauthored (apauruseya), and their meaning must be understood without recourse to human intention. However, he argues that the superimposition theory requires an individual to do the work of superimposing, and since the Vedas lack such a person, we cannot employ this theory in that context. And given that we want as simple and explanatory a theory as possible, we should prefer a theory that explains both ordinary and Vedic speech.38

Kumārila does not explain why he thinks that the superimposition theory requires a person in a way that his comparison theory does not (and he does explain the ordinary, non-Vedic metaphor of Devadatta and the lion in terms of speaker intention). But we might think that something like the homunculus worry is shaping his view. Perceptually-based superimposition is a cognitive event that takes place in the mind of an agent in the presence of certain perceptual stimuli, such as a mirage (taken to be water) or a shiny shell (taken to be silver). The agent identifies some set of features in the
perceived stimuli that are similar to the features in the superimposed concept. However, there are other features that, were the agent to attend to them, would differentiate between the two. This omission hints at the selectivity that McGlone worries about in the case of conceptual metaphor. In the putative case of linguistically based superimposition, a hearer trying to recover the speaker’s intention in speaking a certain way is trying to ascertain which features the speaker has selected and which she has omitted. Is Devadatta like a lion in having shaggy hair or in being courageous? Kumārila still has the burden of explaining how it is that hearers can interpret metaphors without recourse to speaker intention (real or constructed). However, his reticence about superimposition hints at a preference for grounding interpretation in facts about the world, which language users have access to, independently of mediating concepts.39

In conclusion, Kumārila’s arguments against his original target are relevant to contemporary discussion about metaphor. In his view, we do not need superimposition in order to understand the similarity between lions and Devadatta, so long as we can have independent epistemic access to both concepts.40 Kumārila’s project is to explain the role of language in conveying knowledge of dharma, as well as to give an account of the interpretive processes of language users. Thus, as it brings together psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, and close textual analysis, it is well suited for contemporary efforts in understanding metaphor as well as applying that understanding to philosophical texts. One thing that Kumārila does not do, however, is attempt what we might call “cross-cultural” or “comparative” philosophy, that is, philosophical engagement of the sort evidenced in this article, where philosophical points of view from different cultural contexts are brought together in an effort to solve long-standing philosophical problems.41 However, in closing, I would like to reflect briefly on how his work may be applicable for comparative methodology, especially methods drawing on CMT.

VI. Conclusion: Implications for Cross-Cultural Philosophy

One of the most vocal proponents of CMT in the realm of comparative philosophy today is Edward Slingerland, who argues that understanding the work of, for example, the Chinese philosopher Mengzi should involve attention to image schemas and how cultural influences cause them to vary (Slingerland 2017, p. 434; also 2011, 2008). According to his understanding of CMT, taking its deliverances seriously would allow philosophers engaging in textual analysis to interpret texts in a systematic manner, one that is attuned to the (metaphorical) cognitive underpinnings of reasoning, and that might de-exoticize Chinese philosophy, often taken to be essentially analogical in some manner foreign to so-called Western thought (Slingerland 2011, pp. 22–24).
While writing earlier than Slingerland, and with less focus on the specific details of CMT, Karl Potter also argues that “the identification of metaphorical links in the conceptual systems in which philosophical writings are and have been embodied” would be a fruitful research program, since it might allow us to explicate a community’s “conceptual system” (Potter 1989, pp. 32–33). Unlike Potter, Slingerland argues that the widespread use in Chinese philosophy of metaphor (and analogy) is evidence that they recognized, perhaps implicitly, the insights of contemporary cognitive science regarding the embodied self (Slingerland 2011, p. 27). In contrast, Potter does not draw on Indian philosophy of metaphor and analogy at all, focusing instead on the possibility that there is a conceptual scheme associated with the Sanskrit verbal root kr (to do / to make), which supports the metaphor that acting is making (Potter 1989, p. 29). On the basis of this metaphor, he argues that since Indian thinkers accept that awareness is acting, they also accept that awareness is making, and thus we can explain why it is that they think awareness results in unobservable products, karmic traces (samskāra).

More recently than Potter, Joanna Jurewicz has written a monograph and a series of articles applying CMT (both the early work of Lakoff and Johnson as well as Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory) to the Rgveda (e.g., Jurewicz 2010, 2013, 2014 among others). Linda Covill’s 2009) A Metaphorical Study of Saundarananda draws on Lakoff and Johnson’s work to identify and explore conceptual metaphors in Aśvaghoṣa’s famous Buddhist poem. Finally, in the context of early Vedic as well as Buddhist thought, Laurie L. Patton (2008) has used Lakoff and Johnson, Fauconnier, and others to explore the cultural imaginaire of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and several hymns of the Rgveda.

A close exploration of these studies in relation to the philosophy of metaphor is a desideratum, but for the purposes of this article, I limit myself to the following observations, by way of Jurewicz’ work. First, work in this area draws on CMT without attending to criticisms of its methodology. Second, strong claims about cognition and not simply textual connections are often made on its basis. Jurewicz (2014) draws on CMT to argue that Vedic ritual can fruitfully be understood as a conceptual metaphor. For instance, in the ritual of constructing the fire altar (Agnicayana), she identifies the source domain as food preparation. Thus, Prajāpati as creator is one who consumes cooked food (the animals ritually sacrificed), and the abstract target of creation is understood “in terms of the preparation of food and its cooking” (p. 84). In other words, there is an underlying conceptual metaphor of the creation of the world as the preparation of food, its eating, and digestion. Jurewicz concludes:

If we take into account the nature of metaphors discussed at the beginning of my paper we will understand the power of the ritual. Metaphors operate
effortlessly, automatically and unconsciously. This does not mean that the Brahmins did not know what they were doing but that connections between the modes of the source domain and between the source and the target domains operated in such a way that they could be immediately integrated in one coherent experience both bodily and mentally. When the sacrificer felt hunger during his preliminary fast, he not only knew he was a God who had made space for the future world and that this future world was fire, but also felt it physically as well. (p. 87; italics mine)

According to Jurewicz, by investigating the conceptual metaphors underlying ritual structure and language, modern scholars can come to understand the way in which ritual participants conceived of the abstract ritual in terms of more concrete bodily experience. We can understand how they felt and thought. In reflecting on the methodology of connecting CMT with Sanskrit philology and philosophy, Jurewicz (2004) emphasizes that this approach bridges the epistemic gap between moderns and premoderns, saying things like “We begin to be able to think in Rigvedic terms” (p. 610). She argues that attention to conventionalized expressions, which are evidence of underlying conceptual metaphors, lets us conclude things such as

the desire [for various goods achieved by the ritual] was conceived in terms of fire that burns in the human being, moving and recognizing thanks to its flames, and that warms human beings up and demands quick satisfaction. (p. 608)

Jurewicz’ work in identifying textual connections between Vedic passages is thorough and enlightening. And yet some of her claims go beyond the orally transmitted text to the state of mind of Vedic ritualists and participants. These claims, about how Vedic persons thought about ritual, are ones that I think should lead scholars to reflect more carefully on philosophical debates about language and cognition. Insofar as Jurewicz is already going beyond the context contemporaneous to early Vedic peoples by drawing on CMT, it seems apt to consider thinkers such as Kumārila. Although living much later, he is part of the same broad intellectual tradition and, as we have seen, offers some different ways to think about metaphorical cognition.

To be clear, I am not claiming that Kumārila’s point of view on metaphorical comprehension was unchallenged in his day and should be accepted entirely by modern philosophers, or that it represents the point of view of the authors of the early Vedas. Neither am I claiming that Jurewicz or every scholar working on early Vedic thought ought to consider Kumārila’s philosophy. After all, he is separated from the origins of Vedic texts by many hundreds of years. And we might even suspect heterogeneity in how individual people thought and felt about rituals. Rather, my claim is that, given that there is ongoing discussion within Indian philosophy itself about how things like metaphor, metonymy, and analogy function, we should be cautious in making strong claims regarding how ritual metaphors
were cognized by ritual participants. Further, that some of Kumārila’s worries align with contemporary criticism of CMT is additional reason to be judicious in application of the methodology and the conclusions (in particular about human cognition) that can be drawn. The emphasis in CMT on the connection between modern and premodern persons is commendable. I agree that “Othering” or “exoticizing” premodern Chinese or Indian thinkers should not be the goal of engagement with their texts, and it is true that they share our human biology and physical environment subject to the laws of physics. At the same time, that the Indian intellectual tradition was attentive to, and engaged in debate about, the nature of metaphor is an invitation to think along with them about the relationship between language and thought.

In terms of applications of conceptual metaphor theory to comparative philosophy or history of philosophy, I am reminded of Slingerland’s discussion of the hermeneutic productiveness of CMT, in which he describes a sinological colleague responding to his analysis of Mengzi and Gaozi by saying that traditional textual analysis could lead to the same results (2011, p. 22). Slingerland’s response is to concede that CMT may not lead to different results: he himself points out traditional sinologists doing “conceptual metaphor analysis in all but name” (p. 9). Rather, he thinks that, as a knowledge of grammar helps unpack texts better than intuition when one gets to a troublesome spot, or as modern astrophysics predicts celestial movements better than medieval astronomy, insofar as CMT is an accurate model of human cognition it can help interpret philosophical texts in a more systematic and less ad hoc manner (pp. 22–24). The present article has not evaluated the empirical evidence for or against CMT, but has argued that there may be conceptual problems with CMT. Given that empirical research is still underway on CMT (Holyoak and Stamenkovic 2018), traditional tools seem to be able to deliver the same results, and philosophical traditions themselves disagree on the relationship between metaphor and thought, I would encourage more philosophical work in Indian theories of metaphor (along with other world traditions), with an eye toward lessons it may have for both our first-order philosophy and our comparative methodologies.

Notes

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1 – The silo-ization of CMT is evident in a number of ways. First, journals that publish mainly in this area are those like Discourse Processes and
Metaphor and Symbol, which tend to draw from cognitive linguistics and communications. The Journal of Pragmatics, which draws widely, including from analytic philosophy and linguistics, publishes papers on CMT, although these tend not to be from philosophy faculty but from those in linguistics and communication theory. Second, CMT is treated as an independent approach. For instance, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Metaphor” (Hills 2017) devotes a section to “Metaphor and Cognitive Linguistics,” but the material in this section is not integrated with the rest. It is described as a “distinctive style,” and the other theories in the rest of the entry are not presented as engaging with CMT. Finally, contemporary analytic philosophy of metaphor tends not to cite CMT literature, save to dismiss it briefly (e.g., Camp 2009, pp. 125 n. 22). An important exception is recent work by Wilson (2011), which observes this disconnect and begins to consider ways that relevance theory and cognitive linguistics may be brought together.

2 – Work in Indian philosophy and related fields that draws on CMT includes Covill (2009), Jurewicz (2010, 2013, 2014), Patton (2008), Potter (1989), and Timalsina (2007). Notably, apart from Timalsina, none of these examples draws on Indian theories of metaphor, language, or thought. Work on Indian theories of metaphor and language, perhaps informed by analytic philosophy through the early work of thinkers like B. K. Matilal, likewise does not tend to engage with CMT. The situation seems different in Chinese philosophy. One leading representative of employing CMT in this regard is Edward Slingerland (2003, 2005, 2011, 2017). Other recent discussions (of which there are many) include Mattice (2014), Harrison (2015), and Camus (2017).

3 – It is also important to note that even in the alamkāra tradition, figurative language was not dismissed as “mere” ornamentation. Thinkers in this tradition draw heavily on philosophy of language and epistemology to develop theories of cognitive processes in figuration.

4 – In what follows, I explicate Kumārila’s text at a general level, setting aside some technical details that, although certainly crucial to Mīmāṃsā, are not directly relevant to the central point at hand. For more detailed historical and textual discussion on this section of the Tantravārttika (TV), I refer readers to McCrea (2008), Harikai (2017), and Keating (2017).

5 – Kumārila argues that gaunāvṛtti is involved in any kind of secondary (non-ordinary or extended) meaning that depends on similarity between properties. Thus, it may be broader than metaphor, although it is often translated or glossed as “metaphor.” Kumārila also explains
that gaunavṛtti allows for paraphrase of non-referring terms such as "sky-flower," and he takes laksanā to be involved in the cognitive process that results in a sentential unity from a sequence of words. Thus, gaunavṛtti and laksanā seem to include a broader range of phenomena than just metaphor and metonymy. In the present article, however, I will focus on cases that are typically recognized in contemporary thought as cases of metaphor and metonymy.

6 – Sanskrit lacks articles (definite or indefinite). The word gām ("cow") is declined in the accusative case, making it the object of the imperative ānaya ("bring"). It is a matter of context whether one ought to bring a specific cow or any cow. In fact, the situation is more complex, given the role of the verb, which is taken to convey multiple semantic aspects. As this discussion is not directly relevant to Kumārila’s discussion of metaphor, I omit consideration of the semantics of verbs, or bhāvanā (for discussion see Ollett 2013), although we do need to have an account of how verbs can be used metaphorically.

7 – Sanskrit allows for implied predication, which I have represented with "(is)" in Figure 3.

8 – Sanskrit: ... nāgnitvāvinābhāvena mānavakaḥ patriyate (TV at MS 1.4.22, p. 315). While I have, of course, referred to the English translation of the Tantravārttika (Tantravārttika [1924] 1998), translations are my own unless otherwise marked.

9 – Under what circumstances competent interpreters would accept such a sentence as merely a false or confused statement is interesting. However, here Kumārila is beginning with cases where language leads to knowledge (sābdabodha), so the explanation is focused on how good cases are to be understood, not on what distinguishes good from bad cases.


11 – See Raja (1969, pp. 245–248) for discussion of this issue as raised by Buddhists such as Sthiramati.

12 – ŚV, chapter on Upamāna, verse 20 (vol. 2, p. 582). Pārthasārathī’s commentary adds the example of a lion and Devadatta. That being able to conquer is the shared capacity is stated in the TV: “And in the case of ‘Devadatta is a lion,’ due to cognizing multiple properties, such as Devadatta’s ability to conquer, which are caused to be clustered together in the particular, since they are understood through the universal Lion, the cognition of Devadatta will bring about a meaning grounded in the original denotative capacity of the word itself” (sambhaviṣyati cātra

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śimhatvāvagatavyaktyupasthāpitprasyahakāraitvādyanekadharmapratyayād devadattapratyaya iti pūrvaiva sākīrī nimittam . . . [vol 2, p. 316]).

13 – ŠV, Chapter on Upamāna, verse 29 (vol. 2, pp. 584–585). The example sentence is my own, extrapolating on what Kumārila explicitly says in the text about similarity. Ślokavārttika (2009).

14 – He says this explicitly in verse 29: “Now, where commonality belongs to the principal matter itself, what is understood is oneness: ‘That is the very same thing.’ Where there is a distinction with regard to the principal matter (tadbheda), there is a conception of having similarity” ( . . . tatra tadbhede sadṛṣatvadhitāḥ [vol. 2, p. 585]). Whether things can be reflexively similar or not is not, to my knowledge, explicitly discussed by Kumārila. However, he does say that for an atom (the smallest component of reality), if there could be similarity with everything, then that would entail that there is no similarity, at ŠV, chapter on Upamāna, verse 28 (vol. 2, p. 584). This suggests that Kumārila does not think of similarity as reflexive, since self-similarity would lack difference and would be complete. Thanks to Roy Perrett for raising this question.

15 – Dialectically, the superimposition theory comes after a theorist who argues that a word conveys an aggregation of properties, along with other aspects such as substantial nature, actions, and the universal, and then only part of that aggregate is applied to Devadatta (see discussion in Harikai 2017, p. 287). It is in part as a contrast to difficulties with this view that the superimposition theorist argues that the universal must be applied to Devadatta. Thanks to Alex Watson and Roy Perrett for emphasizing this point.

16 – na ca śimhasabdenāpravarttamānena śimho devadatta iti sāmānādhikaranyaprayogo ghaṭate. katham tarhi.

17 – Harikai (2017) argues that the position is due to a Buddhist or Ālāṃkārika (p. 288), although I believe that the position is perhaps closer to a Grammarian such as Bharṭṭhari.

18 – A bit later, the superimposition theorist argues that such imaginative construction is necessary to explain how we understand non-referring
terms like “sky-flower” that are employed in metaphorical ways (“The self is a sky-flower”) and in inference (the Buddhist argues “There is no self”).

19 – The discussion with the superimposition theorist includes several dialectical exchanges. Here, my focus is to present an argument consistent with the text, which brings together other commitments elsewhere in Kumārila’s work, and which explains what kind of confusion Kumārila thinks plagues the superimposition theorist. The argument is not found in the text in this precise manner.


21 – As Śabarabhāṣya puts it, his Sanskrit echoing Kumārila’s example of an identity statement in the discussion of upamāna, “For we do not interpret the statement ‘The boy is fire,’ to mean that ‘The boy is in fact (eva) flaming,’ in order to avoid construing the word ‘fire’ as figurative” (Śabarabhāṣya ad MS 1.1.5: na hy agnir māṇavaka ity ukte’gnisābdo gaunō mā bhūd iti jvalana eva māṇavaka ity adhyavasīyate). Śabarabhāṣya (2018).

22 – Kumārila discusses the superimposition theory in detail in this section, also considering an argument that, without superimposition, we cannot make sense out of empty or non-referring terms. For the sake of the present article’s focus, I set this discussion aside, although it is important in understanding how Kumārila himself thinks non-referring terms should be understood in response to Dignāga’s views.

23 – The literature on CMT is large, but a recent overview of the theories is in Sweetser and Dancygier 2014.

24 – To move from PATH to JOURNEY requires an intermediate step, knowing that a journey defines a path (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 90). Given LOVE IS A JOURNEY and that JOURNEY defines a path, there would be what Lakoff and Johnson call a “metaphorical entailment,” that LOVE DEFINES A PATH.

25 – CMT does also analyze novel poetic metaphors, as in Lakoff and Turner 2009 and Fludernik 2012; the latter takes up CMT’s revision into blending theory as well. However, CMT is not a theory of figurative language in this sense. Rather, it takes figurative language to be evidence of certain underlying modes of thought.

26 – A domain is “a chunk of conceptual matter which either constrains structure to be projected into another domain or receives such a projection” (Sweetser and Dancygier [2014, p. 17]).

27 – My representation of this example draws from material in Lakoff and Johnson 1980 (pp. 44–45) and Lakoff 1993.
28 – We will see that Slingerland’s view draws on CMT revised as “blending theory,” but his expression of epistemic access to concepts like truth is consistent with either early or blending theory CMT.

29 – “Or else, to the extent that some confused person, having superimposed water upon a mirage, uses the word, then both speaker and hearer, whose use of primary meaning is confused, understand ‘water’ in its meaning determined by the primary meaning” (yadvā tāvad bhrāntyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyām toya adhyāropyā śabdāṃ prāyukte tadobhayar mukhyārthādhyāvasānarūpāṇa toyapratiṣṭhir bhrāntimukhyatvam [vol. 2, p. 317]).


31 – In this article, I am using CMT to refer to theories including blending theory, despite the fact that blending theory and Lakoff and Johnson’s view have important differences. This is to take seriously the claim by Fauconnier and Lakoff that these views are not competing, but part of the same research project (Fauconnier and Lakoff 2009). A discussion of the distinction between the two approaches is found in Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 2013.

32 – For instance, they claim that “blending [is] a central feature of grammar,” and that “grammar is an aspect of conceptual structure and its evolution” (Fauconnier and Turner 2003, p. 86).


34 – The existence of a generic space that structures the associations between the two domains is one addition in blending theory. Another is the existence of a temporary “blend” mental space, which can subsequently be used as input for further blends. Thus we might take the resultant LOVE IS A JOURNEY and integrate it with another metaphorical concept, A JOURNEY IS A SURFACE. As a result, we can talk about the “ground we have covered” throughout a relationship. In addition, in blending theory it is possible to have multiple domains that inform the blend. Thus, instead of just one of the domains (e.g., JOURNEY), we might also draw from another (such as LOVE).

35 – Figure adapted from Kövecses 2010, p. 316.

36 – For instance, see Figure 2.2 in Dancygier 2016, p. 33, in which through “selective projection,” tools in the blend are “expressions addressing specific aspects of the dispute,” which are mapped to “weapons.”

37 – McGlone (2011) also focuses on theoretical parsimony in his discussion of CMT, although his concerns have to do with competing
interpretations of experimental data (pp. 568–572). He also focuses more on the empirical question of whether individuals actually process metaphors as blending theorists argue they do, a question beyond the scope of this article.

38 – “If qualitative expression is supposed by the speaker’s imposition, There could not be qualitative expression in the Veda, without someone to superimpose” (yady adhyāsena vaktrṇāṃ gauṇī vṛttih prakalpate | vede sā na kathāṃcit syād adhyāropayitur vinā || [vol. 2, p. 319]).

39 – Kumārila thinks people have perceptual access to universals (Taber 2017), and in his discussion of perception in the ŚV he explicitly argues against cognitive superimposition as being the way in which words refer to objects (Taber 2005, pp. 118–136).

40 – “And in this way, even without superimposition, there is an understanding in the hearers themselves of Devadatta’s similarity with being a lion” (tatra caiśāṃ svayam anāropyaiva simhatvam tatsādvṛṣyādipratītir bhavati [vol. 2, p. 318]).

41 – This is not a definition of comparative/cross-cultural philosophy.

42 – Potter (1989, p. 32) is careful to note that this metaphor does not constrain Indian thinkers, given that there is robust disagreement in the tradition. Rather, he thinks linguistic metaphors express “tendencies to behavior,” and that scholars must be cautious not to identify the English “activity as making” with Sanskrit expressions such as pravṛttir asti kriyā, which is not a translation, but an expression of metaphorical links.

43 – Interestingly, a glance at the bibliographies of these texts shows a common interest in cognitive linguistics, but not citations of each others’ work. This suggests that research in the application of cognitive linguistics to Indian thought (philosophical, religious, etc.) is occurring in relative isolation.

44 – One question for further consideration is precisely to what degree the philological and textual work she does (and that of others cited, like Covill and Patton) requires CMT.

References

Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


