The work of André Green: an introduction

Louis Scuderi

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses

Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses/661

This Masters Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations, and Projects by an authorized administrator of Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu.
ABSTRACT

André Green was a French psychoanalyst whose work represents a unique contribution to the fields of theoretical, clinical, and applied psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic social work. Little has been written about him in English, however. In this study, Green’s overarching theoretical project is reviewed, in addition to some of his major concepts and their clinical implications. Green’s relationship to French psychoanalysis is outlined, as well as his relationship to his major influences: Winnicott, Bion, Lacan, and most importantly, Freud. Green’s conceptions of the drives, narcissism, and the work of the negative are discussed in detail, and his work is situated in the history of international post-Freudian psychoanalysis. Green’s work represents an innovative approach to psychoanalytic theory and practice: one that is radical, constructive and integrative, yet loyal to Freud’s texts and precepts. The implications of Green’s work as a whole are outlined, as well as what uses can be made of his approach and concepts in future psychoanalytic and psychoanalytic social work theory and practice.
The Work of André Green: An Introduction

A project based upon an independent investigation, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Work.

Louis Scuderi
2015

Smith College School for Social Work
Northampton, Massachusetts 01063
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my family, friends, Maia, Stacey, and my analyst, James Grotstein.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I INTRODUCING ANDRÉ GREEN

II DRIVES

III NARCISSISM

IV THE WORK OF THE NEGATIVE

V THE CLINICAL, CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES
CHAPTER I

Introducing André Green

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce André Green and his work, and to provide, in Green’s language a “framing structure” (2001a) for more rigorous expositions of his concepts in later chapters. I will provide a brief overview of Green’s life up until he began developing his theory, and outline what I plan to be a focus of subsequent chapters.

I would like to encourage the reader to attempt to be mindful of the plurality of influences on Green’s development, as a literally “stateless” (in terms of nationality) person and metaphorically stateless psychoanalyst and theorist. I consider Green to be an embodiment of the international “independent” tradition in psychoanalysis, alongside the likes of Donald Winnicott, Michael Balint, and Joyce McDougall, among others. They, and Green, are a group of analysts that can only be defined, paradoxically, by the singularity of their contributions and approach to theory and the clinical encounter, and by succeeding in the historically difficult endeavor of staving off the perils of psychoanalytic dogmatism and orthodoxy.

Thus, perhaps an organizing question in reading this chapter, and this project en masse, should be: how is it that Green incorporated and subsequently “objectalized” (1999b, p. 84) the effects of the encounters he had with many of the most ingenious and influential psychoanalysts of the 20th century, while maintaining an extraordinary independence of thought and creativeness. In this chapter I also hope to elucidate some of
the experiences that Green went through in order to find-create his identity as a psychoanalyst and theoretician, and the degree of influences that he had to negotiate in doing so.

*Early life: Cairo*

Green was born on the 12th of March, 1927 to a Sephardic Jewish family in Cairo, Egypt. The Cairo of Green’s youth was divided between the “Arabs and the so-called European community, of which the Jews were a part” (Hunter, 1990, p. 158). French was the common language of this rather cosmopolitan community, and Green considered it his “maternal tongue” (ibid). He was the youngest child of four, born nine years after his mother’s third child. Green also participated in frequent family trips back and forth between France and Egypt due to his elder sister’s health problems (Chervet, 2013, p. 159). Such trips began with Green’s mother leaving the very young Green in Egypt, but eventuated in the entire family participating in the journeys (ibid).

Green’s early life in Cairo was determined, most likely while Green was in analysis, as a particularly dark time. The precedent for Green’s renowned clinical entity, *the dead mother complex* (2005), in which the maternal object is prematurely decathected, catalyzing a near-interminable and ravaging experience of loss and depression, appeared to be Green’s own upbringing. Green’s mother was thrown into mourning when he was two years old, as she had a lost sister who was burned alive (Chervet, 2013, p. 159). It could be assumed that Green’s mother was psychologically absent during the young André’s upbringing - she had hypercathected her dead sister and Green’s ill sister - leaving him with a trauma that would spur his interest in studying the negative, the way in which the psyche responds to loss and absence.
Only a little while later André Green’s father went bankrupt, “partly due to this context [the loss his own daughter and his wife’s sister] and partly due to personality traits” (Chervet, 2013, p. 159). His father died when Green was 14, in 1941. In 1946, when Green was 19, he decided to immigrate to France permanently in order study medicine. Green would later state that he “knew very little about Egypt when I lived there,” and “knew much more about France” (Hunter, 1990, p. 158). Egyptian nationalism was on the rise during the time that Green emigrated, and he most likely would have been exiled if he hadn’t left on his own volition.

*Emigration to France*

Green’s mother died when he was 22, and he had not seen her since he moved. He later described his early years in France as “solitary” and “difficult,” “because I had no family living in France, no friends” (Hunter, 1990, p. 158). It took Green a long time to establish relationships, with friends or faculty. Still, Green married at age 23 in 1950, and eventually had four children.

Green felt that studying medicine squelched his creativity, and he considered 1953, the year he began studying psychiatry, “the year of my birth” (Chervet, 2013, p. 159). He had been waiting to study the psyche, and would eventually claim that psychoanalysis - perhaps the ultimate medium for learning about the mind’s workings - should have a singular research itinerary, one that does not adopt principles and techniques from medicine or the natural sciences. “Even now I regret and deplore that a young man who wants to become involved in the psychical field - either is a psychiatrist or psychoanalyst - must train in medicine. Medical training is probably one of the best ways to obscure the mind” (ibid, p. 158).
While Green was beginning his psychiatric residency in 1953 at St. Ann’s Hospital in Paris, there was a split in the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, the oldest analytic institute in France. The SPP was founded in 1926, and divergences over competing positions on the training of analysts was to make room for the rise of Jacques Lacan, who was to have a tremendous influence on the international psychoanalytic and greater intellectual scene. The society split primarily due to tensions between two camps represented by Daniel Lagache (whom Lacan was allied with at the time) and Sasha Nacht, with the former representing an integrative, interdisciplinary approach to psychoanalysis and the latter a technical, medically-influenced approach. Lagache and Lacan founded the French Society of Psychoanalysis (SFP), while Nacht remained the head of the SPP.

The early 1950s were also the time in which psychopharmacology and neurology began to take shape, which spurred passionate discussions between Green and his fellow psychiatric residents about the mind-body problem and “all the great theories that lay behind psychiatry” (Hunter, 1990, p. 160). Green was an organicist himself during his early years at St. Ann’s, but the rather incredible diversity of perspectives on the mind that his peers represented at the time - psychoanalytic, Marxist, phenomenological, and eventually structuralist - seemed to influence him in one way or another.

Indeed, “St. Ann’s Hospital was a special place in Paris,” according to Green (Kohon, 1999, p. 16). In contrast to the relatively bourgeois, conservative, and at times anti-Semitic ethos of other hospitals, St. Ann’s was populated by leftist intellectuals. Its walls were covered in surrealist paintings, which were thematically connected to psychiatry and psychopathology (ibid). It was during his stint at St. Ann’s that Green met Henri Ey,
“truly the only father figure that I ever had” (ibid, p. 19), who was a resident there in the 1920s.

Early fathers: Ey and Ajuriaguerra

Ey was not a faculty member at St. Ann’s - he worked outside of Paris on most days - but taught weekly seminars at the hospital. He desired to propound an extremely broad view of psychiatry that “included psychoanalysis in a broader view, which also included phenomenology, the biological findings, and so on” (Kohon, 1999, p. 18). Green was “Henri Ey’s greatest pupil” (ibid), and would end up continuing Ey’s lectures after he retired. Green seems to have subtly appropriated Ey’s (1989) notion of “organo-dynamism,” which attempts to account for the psyche’s biological roots and dynamic properties, in his interpretation of the drives as the matrix of the subject and “a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic… a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body” (Freud, 1917, p. 122).

Green was to consider the three years he spent at St. Ann’s to be “some of the richest years I ever lived” (ibid), and to pave the way for him parsing out his own thoughts on the mind’s workings. He was not loyal to psychoanalysis yet, and was just beginning to become aware “that there was no such thing as one psychoanalysis, but that each psychoanalyst, even if he revered, say, Freud, or Melanie Klein, or anybody else, would necessarily understand psychoanalysis in a way which was his own” (Hunter, 1990, p. 161). Green still considered that the “secret of mental diseases was in the brain” (ibid), found psychoanalysis unscientific, and was impressed by the effects of psychotropic drugs on patients he’d seen in the wards he frequented.

Green’s other great influence in the early 1950s was Julian de Ajuriaguerra, a
Spanish-French neurologist and psychiatrist who paradoxically turned Green into an organicist and then an analytic patient. Green was “one of his favorite pupils” (Kohon, 1999, p. 21), and Ajuriaguerra encouraged him to begin analysis because of Green’s struggles to control his temper (ibid). Green was also not a wholehearted organicist and psychopharmacologist, and found himself spending many hours with his patients (Hunter, 1990, p. 163). Such interactions led to transferential reactions that Green found himself unequipped to handle and evoked personal problems that he had yet to confront. It was in 1956, the year when he’d finished his residency, that he sought analysis and analytic training.

*Psychoanalysis, the Bonneval conference*

Green chose to train at the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, headed by Nacht. He chose Maurice Bouvet as his analyst, as he was regarded as one of the best at the SPP, perhaps second only to Nacht. Green considered training at the French Society of Psychoanalysis, and had been impressed by what he knew then of Lacan’s teaching, but had a preconception that were he to attend the SFP he would have “Lacan and Lacan alone” (Hunter, 1990, p. 164), while at the SPP he would find an institution that could contain a diversity of opinions (ibid). Green’s analysis with Bouvet lasted for four years, until 1960, and the last time Green saw Bouvet was the session before Bouvet died (Kohon, 1999, p. 21). Bouvet was 48, and in the midst of developing an object relations approach to psychoanalysis influenced by the work of British analysts like Ronald Fairbairn, Melanie Klein, and Donald Winnicott.

During the late 1950s Green worked as a part-time analyst and part-time psychiatrist, and fought off Lacan’s encouragements to attend his seminar and join his
society. “Lacan started an enormous game of seductions” (Kohon, 1999, p. 22), and challenged Green’s desire to stay loyal to the remains of the pluralistic spirit of French psychiatry and psychoanalysis at the time. Perhaps the climax of Green’s struggles to remain an independent thinker occurred during the famous Bonneval conference of 1960.

The conference was organized by Henry Ey, and its subject matter was the unconscious. It was to be the first time where people from the two societies that had split in 1953 could meet and discuss, as well a host of representatives of other disciplines (Hunter, 1990, p. 165). In addition to analysts, “psychiatrists, professionals and followers of all orientations; some neurophysiologically oriented, some philosophically oriented, some more or less inclined to a sociological approach,” were invited (ibid). Green recalled it as a “historic event,” and “one of the symposia that represents a sort of dream come true” (ibid).

For Green in particular, it seems that the Bonneval conference represented a catalyst for his future theorizing. He was confronted with Lacan’s ideas in the form of his then pupils’ - Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire - paper (published in English in 1970) on the unconscious, and found himself very impressed. “The analysts who were representing my Society [the SPP] gave papers that were very weak compared to those of the pupils of Lacan. This was a disaster” (Hunter, 1990, p. 165). Green himself presented a paper entitled “The unconscious and psychopathology” and wrote an introductory chapter entitled “The doors of the unconscious” for the publication of the conference’s papers (Kohon, 1999, p. 19).

Lacan’s seminars

Stirred up by what he had witnessed at Bonneval, Green began attending Lacan’s
seminars in 1960. He remained a member of SPP, and was thus in a rather unique position; the vast majority of attendees of Lacan’s seminars were his students and/or his patients. Lacan exerted an extraordinary influence on his followers, and continued to attempt to persuade Green to join his school. Green was able to resist, and was a “fellow traveler” (Hunter, 1990, p. 166) of his until 1967. In a few of Lacan’s seminars that have been published in English transcriptions of Green engaging with Lacan can be found at the end of lectures.

Green thus had a unique relationship to Lacan, one that was very positive and collegial while allowing Green the space for the independence of thought that he desired. Still, Lacan’s interest in Green remained insofar as he thought he had a shot of enticing Green to join his school. In 1967 Green published a seminal paper on narcissism entitled “Primary narcissism: structure or state?” in which he did not use nor cite Lacan’s work. The paper is a metapsychological examination of primary narcissism as a structure that facilitates the creation of a mental space for representation through identification with the mother, and Lacan took its publication as an indefensible betrayal.

Lacan began making “nasty, veiled allusions” to Green’s paper, and Green requested that Lacan spell out his criticisms of Green’s work in an open and exacting manner (Hunter, 1990, p. 168). Lacan refused, and Green cut off relations with him. Several months after Green stopped attending Lacan’s seminar Lacan visited him and asked him to come back. Green’s reply was “No, I can’t do that. Because, if you attack me viciously, hiding yourself, I can’t come and attend the seminar as if nothing happened” (ibid, p. 167). Much of Green’s work is in dialogue Lacan, and he would write and publish works on affect in 1970 and 1973 (translated into English in 2000 as *The Fabric of Affect*
in the Psychoanalytic Discourse), and on language in 1984 that took up and criticized Lacan’s thought in a direct and sustained manner.

Discovering British psychoanalysis

For a long time, Green viewed himself as undergoing, in the 1960s and 70s, “a Lacanian period, and afterwards a British period” (Kohon, 1999, p. 23). It turns out that Green was exposed to British psychoanalysis during the same period in which he was attending Lacan’s seminars. His first encounter was in 1961, before the International Psychoanalytic Association’s congress in Edinburgh, when the British Psychoanalytic Society put together a pre-Congress conference in London (Hunter, 1990, p. 168).

During Green’s stint in London he met and attended seminars given by several analysts who would become extremely influential on him, perhaps the most significant one being Donald Winnicott. Green recalled his encounter with Winnicott as “unforgettable because he was extraordinary. He talked on the squiggle technique and it was wonderful” (Hunter, 1990, p. 169). Green would later proclaim that his three most important influences, behind Freud, were Winnicott, Lacan, and Wilfred Bion.

Green met a few of Klein’s other most important followers before Bion, however. At the pre-Congress meeting in London he also listened to presentations and attended seminars by Herbert Rosenfeld, Hannah Segal, and John Klauber, all of which he was impressed by (Kohon, 1999, p. 23). It was not until the 1970s that Green began seriously studying Bion’s work, which eventuated in a meeting in 1976 that initiated a friendship that lasted until Bion’s death in 1979 (Hunter, 1990, p. 169). As we shall see, Winnicott’s and Bion’s work en masse were to become extremely important for Green’s theoretical development, especially the former’s concepts of transitional objects and phenomena, play,
and the subjective object, and the latter’s theory of thinking, theory of transformations, and
the notion that psychical functions (like thinking) can take on the role as objects for the psyche.

Green was to spend the rest of his life negotiating the influences of many the above figures, while holding an ultimately Freudian perspective in his conceptualizations of “borderline cases” or, in Green’s parlance, “non-neurotic structures” (1975). By grounding his thinking in Freudian metapsychology, as is traditional in French psychoanalysis, I would argue that Green was able to integrate the thought of Lacan, Winnicott, Bion, and many others in a manner that was both utterly unique yet loyal to Freud’s fundamental assumptions and problems. Perhaps more importantly, Green used Freud, Bion, Lacan, and Winnicott to push the boundaries of psychoanalysis in order to conceptualize some of the most disturbed modes of psychic functioning seen on analyst’s couches, cases in which “the work of the negative” (Green, 1993/1999), in its most destructive potentialities could be witnessed.

Introduction to future chapters

In the next chapter I will explore some of Freud and Green’s most basic assumptions, which, to my mind, are psychic life’s somatic origins, and thus the importance of the concept of the drive as a “frontier concept” between the somatic and psychic, a “demand for work” made upon the mind by, or in consequence of its connection to, the body (Freud, 1917a). I will elucidate Green’s arguments for retaining the concept of the drive, and his emendations of Freud’s work that include a focus on the object of the drive, or the drive-object pair, and his view of intrapsychic functioning, from the perspective of the drive and its object, being analogous to interpersonal functioning. I will also discuss
the way in which Green reads Freud, with a focus on Green’s emphasizing the revisions that Freud made beginning in 1920 including the hypothesis of the death drive, id, and repetition compulsion.

I will then, in chapter three, attempt to construct Green’s views on primary narcissism as a structure and what could be called his “theory of development.” This will require an analysis of Green’s views on the absence of the maternal object’s role of structuring the psyche, creating a psychic space for representation and symbolization. I will try to show how Green uses the thought of Bion and Winnicott in dialogue with Lacan in order to construct a theory of foundations of subjectivity that attributes equal importance to affects (and drives, the body, emotions, sexuality) and representation (signifiers, language, the cultural dimension). I will emphasize Green’s thesis of the psyche’s foundations in drive life, while claiming that Green’s overarching goal is to provide a “theory of representation” that takes into account the “heterogeneity of the psychoanalytic signifier” (Green, 1973/1999).

In chapter four I will discuss Green’s emphasis on “the negative,” especially his conception of “the work of the negative.” I will claim that Green’s notion of the negative not only throws light on defensive functioning, especially in borderline cases, but paves the way for a kind of “psychoanalytic logic” in which loss, absence, and lack serve to illuminate the unconscious and the vicissitudes of mental functioning. I will show how the work of the negative are the ways in which one copes with loss and drive excess, and Green’s emphasis on particular manifestations of it like “negative hallucination” and “negative narcissism.” I will also discuss Green’s reference points on his elaboration of the concept of the negative, including Hegel, Freud’s (1925) paper on “negation,”
Winnicott’s (1971) “negative side of relationships,” and Bion’s (1962) “no-thing.”

In the final chapter I will offer some concluding remarks on Green’s work, and attempt to spell out his “vision” for psychoanalysis. This will require a look at the respective approaches to psychoanalysis of Anglo-American and French analysts, and examining how Green’s approach relates to and can be seen as in tension with various strains of psychoanalysis. I will discuss Green’s idea of what kind of clinical program psychoanalysis should have, and why he thinks psychoanalysis should build its concepts with the clinical encounter as its sole point of reference. Lastly, I will make some points about the clinical preoccupations and influences that informed his thinking, and some clinical implications of his conception of the drives, narcissism, and the negative

Summary

- The project of introducing André Green and his work was overviewed.
- André Green’s biography was reviewed, with emphases on his encounters with important figures in mid-20th century psychoanalysis.
- A summary was given of future chapters.
CHAPTER II

Drives

“Eros, which holds together everything in the world...” (Freud, 1921, p. 90)

In this chapter, I will attempt to elucidate André Green’s conception of the drives and their importance for psychoanalysis. To accomplish this will require connecting a few lines of thought. The first is an outline of the history of psychoanalytic theory, specifically different movements’ foci away from the drives and towards intersubjectivity. A brief examination of the history of the fate of the drive concept, as it were, should throw light on Green’s rationale for maintaining it as a centerpiece in psychoanalysis, and set the stage for an examination of his conception of the “subject line,” “object line,” and “drive-object pair,” his proposed remedy for the tensions between competing psychoanalytic positions that emphasize the role of the object and object relations, the self, narcissism, and the subject, and intersubjectivity.

The second line of thought I will take up will be an articulation of Freud’s concept of the drive, along with Green’s commentary. Examining Freud’s conception of the drive in light of Green’s points of emphasis on the latter should serve to clarify both of their theoretical preoccupations, and why Green views the concept as a necessary starting point for psychoanalytic theory. I will conduct my exposition via a close reading of Freud’s definition of the drive in his 1915 metapsychological paper, “Instincts and their vicissitudes,” sprinkled with with André Green’s commentary on the text.

Thirdly, I will elucidate some of the extensions and interpretations Green makes of
Freud’s work on the drive, which form the bases of Green’s vision of psychoanalysis. I will overview some of the arguments Green makes for retaining the concept of the drive, particularly a dual drive theory that coincides with Freud’s final theory of the life and death drives. I will also further elucidate Green’s interpretation of role of the object in the psyche and the drives as the “matrix of the subject,” which are characterized by the processes of binding (Eros) and unbinding (the death drive). I will end the chapter with a look at Green’s interpretation of the drives as the “objectalizing function” and “disobjectalizing function.”

From drives to intersubjectivity: A look at the fate of the drive concept

A rather caricatured look at the history of psychoanalysis appears to reveal a striking dynamic in its evolution. One the one hand, the development of Freud’s thought is coherent yet rife with discontinuity, while post-Freudian theorists seem to pick and choose points their point of reference – the ego, object, self, etc. - and interpret Freud in light of such points. Let us see if a pattern emerges in their approaches.

Freud, of course, created psychoanalysis and was preoccupied in his early writing with the vicissitudes of the libido and its representatives – quotas of affect and ideational representatives – and the results of the repression of each. His self-analysis and study of dreams, parapraxes, and libidinal development led him create the topographical model, which theorized the different modes of functioning of System Cs., System Pcs., and System Ucs (Freud, 1900). An overarching focus of Freud’s was the status of representation in different parts of the psyche. Lacan, a figure whom Green was taught by and deeply engaged with, arguably developed his theory from Freud’s first topography and its coincident theory of representation.

In 1914’s “On narcissism: an introduction” Freud theorized narcissism,
recognizing libido and the ego instinct’s function in structuring and cathecting a primitive ego (primary narcissism), and a defensive operation in which a subject withdraws investment from the world of objects in order to inflate their ego (secondary narcissism). Here we see the precedent for Kohut’s work on the Self.

In 1917’s “Mourning and melancholia,” his study of the vicissitudes of loss, Freud examined some of the ways in which ties (cathexes) are maintained to objects, which arguably revealed the essential nature of a real, independent object for the psyche. Depressive clinical pictures demonstrated the lengths one could go in order to maintain cathexis to such an object, like sacrificing a part of the ego in order to both act as a substitute for the object and omnipotently deny its non-existence. It turned out that object-loss initiated a process that could lead to enrichment of the psyche through the working through of one’s ambivalence toward it, but also ran the risk of exposing the psyche too dangerous quantities of destructivity that the object must have served to bind. This could lead to the extremes of suicide. These are the precedents and central reference points for theorists who focused on the role of the object and object relations, like Fairbairn, Klein, and Winnicott. Their work led to various theorizations of the superego, and internal and transitional objects, psychic creations that result from the working through of loss.

In 1921 Freud began to shift his attention towards the ego’s functions beyond repression, beginning with identification in “Group psychology and the analysis of the ego” and eventually splitting and disavowal as revealed by cases of fetishism. A preoccupation at this point in Freud’s work was the ego’s contradictory features and their implications for analytic work. On the one hand the ego was the only way in to accessing and influencing a subject, the psychical territory most distant (and distinct) from the id, and the arbiter of
internal and external perception. Ego psychology was to preoccupy itself with these elements of the ego, and attempt to forge a link with academic psychology thanks to Hartmann’s positing a “conflict free sphere” (1939) and eventually his own concept of the Self (1965).

On the other hand, Freud’s theorization emphasized perhaps just as much the fact that the ego bore its stamp “made in id” (Green, 1997), and was utterly unreliable. It was unconscious of its own defenses and resistances, and willing to split itself into pieces in order to maintain certain ideas about internal or external reality. Ferenczi and Balint studied the catastrophic measures taken by the ego in reaction to trauma, and Lacan the ego’s function as an imaginary identification with one’s body image, an irrevocable site of misrecognition of the fact of being a split – between conscious and unconscious – subject. Anna Freud (1936) studied the defensive tactics of the ego in detail, and suggested that analysis focus on strengthening the ego’s agency in the face of the demands of the superego, reality, and, of course, the id. She was speaking in reference to neurotic subjects, however. As we shall see in the subsequent chapter on the “work of the negative,” the ego’s defenses must have an inchoate form of consciousness in order to be able to recognize and elaborate them; otherwise the psyche will continue to evacuate (Bion, 1962) instinctual tension through action using so-called “primitive” defenses.

Freud’s focus on ego coincided with his theorization of the id and the structural model (the “second topography” to French psychoanalysts) of the mind, which privileged instinctual impulses (of the id) over unconscious representations (of the System Ucs. of the topographical model). André Green is at pains to emphasize this, what he terms the “turning point of 1920” in Freud’s work. Perhaps the most significant, and least noted
change in Freud’s theory is that at this point “the id includes the drives of the two major
groups (Eros and destruction) inside the psychical apparatus” (2005, p. 101). In the first
topography only instinctual representatives belong in the psychical world, whereas in the
structural model the drives take their place in the psyche and must be tarried with. In the
id, there is “an absence of any reference to representation” (ibid), it consists in
“contradictory tensions seeking release” (ibid). The aim of the psyche is to realize
instinctual satisfaction through the act, which implies a veritable paradigm shift in Freud’s
work, from a preoccupation with “[unconscious] representation to instinctual impulse”
(ibid).

Freud’s emphasis, arguably, was not so much on the external act, which was
translated as “specific action” (1985) in the Standard Edition. Contrarily, or perhaps
complementarily, he was interested in the internalization of action, which was limited to
discharge inside the body. This brings us back to the importance of the drive. The drive,
which was also considered to possess a constant, source of pressure, was the “com-pulsion”
(Green, 2005) to seek discharge through blindly repeating primitive acts. It “owes its place
and heuristic value within the psyche to the fact that it offers a model of internalized action
no longer dependent on an external source, but finding within itself its own triggering
mechanism” (Green, 1997, p. 91).

In a later chapter I will further elaborate on the implications of Green’s emphasis
on Freud’s “turning point” in 1920. Suffice to say for now that, in Green’s view, through
his theorization of the id and the instinctual impulse, Freud turned away from any reference
to consciousness when attempting to theorize the primitive layers of the psyche. Such
references (system conscious, system unconscious, system preconscious) would no longer
suffice in explaining the processes observed in the theoretical and clinical problems that Freud was confronting like the negative therapeutic reaction, acting out, and the compulsion to repeat. The second topography and the final theory of the drives, rooted in the concept of the instinctual impulse, according to Green, attempted to throw light on such problems. The instinctual impulse, which I will show below, among other things, has the potential for representation, whereas the topographical model takes representation for granted in mental functioning. To put it rather dramatically Freud, after 1920, opened the door to a theorization of the un-representable.

After reviewing some of the jumping off points of some of Freud’s most famous successors, and André Green’s emphasis on the “turning point of 1920,” a logic becomes apparent when they are situated in the context of the history of psychoanalysis. In the last period of Freud’s work we see him radically transforming his theory, putting the drives in the forefront through his theorization of the id and the tenuously occupied territory of the ego within the psyche. According to Green, subsequent psychoanalytic theorizations could only begin by constructing supposedly more stable ground to work on – that of the object, ego, Self, etc. - and rejecting the drive. Let us briefly examine some of these approaches.

Ego psychology privileges the study of the ego for pragmatic reasons, including a desire to maintain neurosis as a point of reference for psychoanalytic theory, and align itself with the establishment of academic and empirical psychology. Although the drive appears not to fit into such an agenda, ego psychologists maintain it insofar as it influences and throws light on ego functioning. They recognize the drive and the id insofar as they offer the potential for neutralized energy at the service of the ego (Hartmann et. al.), or as
a concept that acknowledges the psyche’s link to the soma and hereditary influences (Rappaport). On the whole, they relegate the study of the drives to the natural sciences, perhaps acknowledging the presupposition that Freud’s final theory of the drives and the id are, “too biological, and what is more, mythical.” (Green, 2005, p. 55).

The story is similar with object relations. It is maintained that the pole of the object - specifically a transference object – is the most intelligible when it comes to psychoanalytic theorization. Of course, there are a manifold of theorists in the object relations camp whom have radically different relationships to the drive in their work. Melanie Klein accepted the drives whole-hog, but interpreted in a light that conflates the drive with psychological and phenomenological “derivatives,” like anxiety (almost always persecutory anxiety) in the case of the death instinct, and guilt and reparatory processes in the case of Eros. Representing the outright rejecters of the drives is Fairbairn, who favors an “object-seeking” (1952) conception of libido.

That said, the common thread in an object relations theory is a focus transference situation, which is said to replicate the infant-caregiver couple. Properly experiencing dependent relationships, from biological to psychological, becomes the keystone of the theory and clinical practice. What is left out, according the Green, is the fact that “there is no object that is not invested and moved by the drives, and, moreover, that is not itself inhabited by its own drives” (2002, p. 41). What was set in motion with object relations theory was what Green calls the “intersubjective contestation,” “as soon as the dimension of the object is developed in an excessive way in psychoanalysis, in the shorter or longer term, the birth of a movement is provoked which sets itself up as the adversary of the precedent movement, advancing a complementary and, at the same time, antagonistic
Moving from the ego to the object, narcissism, the Self, and the subject become recognized as the ones left out. This is the move that Kohut, and arguably Lacan, make. Kohut’s theorization of the Self – which is arguably the only psychoanalytic theory that does not argue that positive love relationships are essential to living satisfactory lives (cf. Eagle, 2011, p. 157) – blunts the importance of objects in favor of the development of narcissism, which he views as having an autonomous line of development. Lacan, although he discusses the “subject of the drives” in some of his later work (cf. Fink, 1995), focuses on the subject as an effect of the signifier and thus “subjected” to the order imposed on it by language. I will discuss the work of Green in relation to Lacan in a later chapter.

Finally, the logical conclusion of this movement from drives, to the ego, to the object, to the Self and the subject, is intersubjectivity. From the solipsism of Freud’s theory, which neglected the role of the object, we circle around to a new solipsism, that of the “irreducible subjectivity” put forward by Renik (1993). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to critique all of the above approaches to psychoanalysis. Instead, I will attempt to outline Green’s solution to the historical current, one that avoids the pitfalls of intersubjective contestation; a theoretical eclecticism that claims to privilege clinical phenomena (cf. Pine’s approach); as well as the all too frequent theoretical posture in which a pole of the psyche is claimed to be the quintessential one, while all the others are considered less meaningful byproducts of the latter.

So, the question could be framed as such: is there a way to construct a coherent theory that recognizes each of the above poles’ place and importance, and can include them? This is what André Green proposes in his conception of the “subject line” and
“object line.” The subject line would thus include “most of the propositions that have been made one after the other [historically] (Subject, I, Self, etc.), while assigning to each one definitions which account for its field of action” (Green, 2005, p. 114). The heuristic importance of a theory of the Self, for example, in conceptualizing narcissism, could be recognized and adopted, as the Self is the relevant pole of the subject line in such a clinical structure.

As for the object line, its components can only be conceived in terms of their heterogeneity, multiplicity, and differences, as psychoanalytic theorizations of the object emphasize its ontology and functions in different ways, depending on their contexts. One the one hand, for example, is the part of the object that is internalized by the ego through exchanges between the drives and the object in reality. On the other hand, there is the part of the object that the ego desires and wishes to appropriate, which evokes prohibitions, lack, and frustration. Further parts could be identified, as well as the various functions of objects, such as investment, arousal, attraction, satisfaction, and signaling anxiety (Green, 2005, p. 118). It should be assumed that every object has a “codeterminant” (ibid, p. 117) on the subject line - an object of the id, of the ego, of the Self, etc. - and that the relations between the two poles (subject and object) should be given equal importance to the elements of the lines.

An important overarching proposition in Green’s theory of the subject and object lines regards the centrality of the drive. “The construction of the object leads retroactively to the construction of the drive, which constructs the object.” The drive is the prime mover; it has a preconception (Bion, 1962), a “construction,” of its object before making contact with it in reality. This construction by the drive of the object can only be revealed after
contact has been made between the drive and the object in reality, however. The drive itself is in turn revealed through its construction of the object. What is more, throughout each phase of this complicated circuit, each pole (drive, internal fantasy object of the drive, and object in reality) is altered.

Taking a developmental perspective, one could say that the transactions between drive and object form the conditions of possibility for the components of the subject line, and the latter’s position in relation to various modalities of the object line. Transactions between the drive and object have the potential to both construct the various elements that make up the subject line in addition to making divisions between the elements that make up the subject and object lines possible. They will also allow for more nuanced iterations of the object to be constructed, like the object of sublimation, or of amorous love.

Drives and objects are thus dependent on each other and, for psychoanalysis, whose object is the individual psyche according to Green, the drive and its logic, as “the matrix of the subject” (200a) is its cardinal concept, which sets it apart from all other modes of thought. This is not to underestimate the role of the object, as I hope I have shown. Perhaps I should repeat a quote from above. “The object reveals the drive. If the object was not lacking, we would not know that the drive existed, for it is precisely then that it manifests itself with urgency. Conversely, I would say that there is no object that is not invested and moved by the drives, and moreover, that is not itself inhabited by its own drives” (Green, 1997, p. 41).

So, then, what is a drive?

*What is a drive? Reading Freud with Green*

I will now attempt to elucidate what a drive is using both Freud and Green, with
the intention of getting a sense of the latter’s conception through his reading of Freud. This will serve to show how Green’s interpretation of the drive reveals his definition of psychoanalysis, and his conception of the latter’s domain of research and application. It will also show Green’s emphasis on the links between the drive and representation, or force and meaning. In his 1915 paper “Instincts and their vicissitudes” Freud defines a drive: 

“If we now apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, a “drive” appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind to work in consequences of its connection with the body” (Freud, 1915, p. 121-22)

Taking Green (1980) as our guide, we can break this definition down and examine its parts:

“If we now apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view…”

Freud is talking about mental life, “the life of the mind,” from a biological point of view, that is, from the perspective of the soma which is outside of the domain of psychoanalytic research, but what the mind, according to psychoanalysis’ conception of the latter, is irrevocably “tethered” to. Freud must hypothesize about the somatic body in order to conceive of the mind, as the latter is dependent on and affected by the former significantly.

“… a ‘drive’ appears to us a concept on the frontier between mental and the somatic…”

The concept of the drive is at the frontier (or limit) of what one can conceptualize (from the point of view of biology), and also exists at the hypothetical point where the somatic and psychical meet. Since the drive is on the frontier between the mental and somatic, it is accessible to psychoanalytic research, and does not require biological research in order to conceptualize it.
“...as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind...”

Stimuli originating from within the organism (read: the somatic body) crosses the “frontier” and reaches the mind, it becomes psychical, and has some kind of mental (unconscious) representation. “Drives, although localized between mind and body, acquires the status of psychical representative, and tips the balance to this side whenever it reaches the neighborhood of the psychical, although it arises within the body” (Green, 1980, p. 232).

“... as a measure of the demand made upon the mind to work...”

Measure implies quantity, which demands to be worked on, and thus transformed (Green), or perhaps elaborated, by the psyche. Such a quantity rests within the domain of biological research, its transformations the domain of psychoanalysis.

“… in consequence of its connection with the body.”

“The psychical submits to the quantity that comes from the body to which it is bound” (Green, 1980, p. 232). Thus from the point of view of the somatic body, the psychical is submitted to do its bidding, its work. The subject, or the ego, is subjected to its drives, he is dominated by them. “He is no longer acted but acted upon; he puts on an act” (Green, 1980, p. 233).

Here we see the irrevocable connection between force and meaning, or the drive
and its representative. The “demand made upon the mind to work” should be examined further. Drawing from Freud’s conception of the id, we can see that this demand, arising from the soma, can be handled in couple of ways.

The crucial possibility for psychical development is that the demand of the soma/id gets “worked on,” which occurs through the activity of representation. “[Representation] acquires the power to present itself as a substitute object for the object of the drive. Thanks to representation, force is displaced; it is used advantageously to hold together the elements of representation and to fix them, relatively speaking, thus allowing their transformation” (Green, 2002, p. 60).

From the point of view of the mother and baby, we can envision a baby attempting to recreate satisfaction experienced during or after a feed (“hallucinatory wish-fulfillment” in Freud [1900]). To do this, she must draw on what resources she has at her disposal to represent such an experience. The baby’s ability to “tolerate frustration” (Bion, 1962) and engage in representational activity, and the caregiver’s properly attuned response to the baby, which will encourage further representational activity, form the foundations of the psyche.

Green’s emphasis is on the importance of the maternal object in primitive mental functioning, a synthesis of Freud, Bion, and Winnicott. One should hear echoes of Winnicott here, especially his emphasis on the found-created dialectic in primitive mental life: a “realization” (Bion, 1962) of the baby’s hallucinatory wish-fulfillment occurs via the caregiver’s properly timed response, a “finding” of the object (Winnicott, 1971) that encourages further elaboration (Bion’s [1962] “conceptions” and “concepts” of one’s instinctual makeup.
The drive becomes psychical through representational activity, which serves to mediate between it and discharge, as well as prevent the need to utilize more dangerous defensive equipment. “Psychization,” as it were, of the drives allows the object and the goal of its activity to become substitutable, as representational activity – fantasy – continues to develop in complexity. As implied above, the proliferation of representational activity is dependent on the infant’s ability to maintain a cathexis of the primary object, which is in turn heavily dependent on her caregiver’s attuned responses.

The above processes are the working of Eros, or the life/love drives. Eros binds the infant-caregiver couple, the objects of the infant’s primitive representational activity, and the caregiver’s own fantasy (“reverie,” [Bion, 1962]) life. It should not go unsaid that the baby will be unable to realize complete satisfaction at the breast or in fantasy, and that the lack of the object (its physical absence) and lack in the object (its inability to give infant exactly what it wants) spur fantasy life further, as it is an attempt to compensate for such lacks.

The infant, ideally, will continue to develop and cathect the “subjective object” (Winnicott, 1971), until it reaches the points that it can relinquish its narcissistic cathexis and mobilize its cathexes towards a greater diversity of objects and aims (two objects, with a multiplicity of aims during the Oedipal state), as it were. It also forms the bases of what Green terms the “erotic chain” (200a). “This chain starts with the drive and its instinctual impulses, extends to that which manifests itself in the form of pleasure and unpleasure, deploys itself in the state of expectation and quest for desire, nourished by conscious and unconscious representations, organizes itself in the form of conscious and unconscious fantasies, and branches out into the erotic and amorous language of sublimations” (Green,
In the following chapter, I will attempt to expoit Green’s “developmental theory” in light of this picture of erotic, drive and representational functioning. Suffice it to say for now that, referring back to the subject line and object line, the components of each will be inscribed and reiterated through transactions between drives, their representatives, and objects.

The alternative to the potential flourishing of representational activity in response to the pressure of the drives – those of the baby herself or those of the primary object - is a grim one. If the infant is unable to elaborate on her drive activity by means of representation, or is impinged upon by its caregivers drive activity, according to Green, she has the capacity to attack her own psychic functions and structures through the processes of unbinding, or decathexis. This is Green’s conception of the death drive. Its function is to break down the links created by Eros, and ultimately the operation of linking itself. “The manifestation which seems to me the specifically characterize the destructivity of the death drive is disinvestment” (Green, 2005).

Thus, instead of aspiring towards a unified ego, beginning with the creation of the subjective object of her drive activity, which is “the narcissism of the One,” and “positive narcissism,” according to Green, the infant aspires towards a narcissism of zero, or negative narcissism (Green, 2000b). Such a process is characterized by an aspiration of a total lack of investment by the ego of objects, and eventually investment of the ego itself. Green’s concept of negative narcissism can be related to Bion’s (1959) “attacks on linking,” Lacan’s (2006) “foreclosure,” and Winnicott’s (1971) study of the “negative sides of a relationship.”
Green’s “Final Theory of the Drives”: Objectalizing and disobjectalizing function

A final note on Green’s conception of the drives should serve to conclude this chapter. As stated above, according to Green, Eros is characterized by binding processes, and the death drive unbinding processes. Green also, following Winnicott, argues for a rather striking interpretation of Eros, which he terms the “objectalizing function” (2005).

“The ego is not content with changing the status of its objects with which it enters into relationship; it creates objects out of instinctual activity, when the latter, by transforming itself, becomes an object. Thus psychic functions assume the status of objects” (Green, 2005, p. 119). Green offers the example of reading a book as a rather stereotypical example of sublimation. The instinctual object of such a process is not the book, as many object relations theorists might hold, but reading. We should hear Winnicott’s (1971) work on creativity and illusion here. Like Winnicott’s picture of the infant who must imagine she is creating the breast that feeds her, “psychic life continually creates object forms which nourish psychic life” (Green, 2005, p. 119), but it can only engage in such processes if it is able to withdraw a measure of cathexis from the primary object.

Green’s interpretation of the death drive is the “disobjectalizing function,” which was outlined without being explicitly mentioned above. The disobjectalizing function primary feature is withdrawal: it withdraws investment from objects, then the ego, and, in the worse cases, the objectalizing process itself. It is analogous to Bion’s (1959) “attacks on linking,” Lacan’s (1966) “foreclosure,” and Winnicott’s (1971) “negative sides of a relationship,” and its end results may be observed in cases of which Green has called a “syndrome of psychic desertification” (2005, p. 23). The disobjectalizing function works
to eventually deny psychic reality, when it is felt that acknowledging the latter can only result in a catastrophe, an evocation of irremovable surpluses of excitation.

**Summary**
- The concept of the drives in psychoanalysis was historically reviewed, primarily through the perspective of André Green.
- André Green’s integration of various strains of psychoanalysis that emphasize the ego, Self, subject, object-relations, and intersubjectivity – through a theory of the links and tensions between the “subject line” and “object line” - was explicated.
- Green’s interpretation of Freud’s conception of the drives was given via a close reading of Freud’s text.
- Green’s extension of the drive concept, largely due to the influences of Winnicott, was introduced in the form of the “objectalizing function” and “disobjectalizing function.”
CHAPTER 3

Narcissism

“Narcissism erases the trace of the Other in its Desire for the One.” (Green, 2001b, p. 86)

Introduction

In this chapter, I will give an overview of Green’s theory of narcissism, primarily through a reading of his 1967 (published in English in [2001b]) paper “Primary Narcissism, Structure or State?” I will begin by outlining Green’s overarching aims in his theoretical construction of narcissism as well as some of his assumptions. I will then outline his theory of narcissism as a structure and explain how some of Green’s fundamental concepts derive from the theory as outlined in his paper. I will intersperse some of the clinical implications of Green’s theory of narcissism, particularly through descriptions of Green’s concept of positive (or life) narcissism and negative (or death) narcissism.

Green’s Targets and Aims (Why Narcissism?)

Although it is not essential for understanding Green’s narcissism and the purposes of this chapter, it should be mentioned that Green wrote “Primary Narcissism, Structure or State” during the apex of his break with Lacan. The text should be considered, albeit loosely, as the beginning of Green’s theoretical departure from Lacan, and the foundations of Green’s theory of psychoanalysis.

So, Lacan’s conception of narcissism, or at least the version outlined in his paper on the “Mirror Stage” (2006) could be considered an implicit target in Green’s theorization of narcissism. To put it schematically, Lacan’s theory is that the child, once recognizing
itself in the mirror, identifies with its mirror image. This imaginary identification - with one’s body image and thus oneself as whole, integrated being – is the genesis of Lacan’s construal of the ego, which is a creation of the child’s narcissism. The ego is an image of one’s body, and narcissism is living the illusion that who one is is ultimately equitable to their body image. Perhaps more fundamental for Lacan is that narcissism, clinically speaking, is the product of being unable to tolerate one’s fact of being a “split” (between unconscious and conscious) subject (cf. Fink, 1995).

Lacan’s conception of the mirror stage and re-centering of psychoanalysis around narcissism was intended to counter the supposedly conservative theoretical trends represented by the branch of psychoanalysis called ego psychology, primarily represented by Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, and Rudolph Lowenstein (Lacan’s former and only analyst). Lacan – and Green - viewed the ego psychologists as regressing psychoanalytic theory into the territory of pre-Freudian psychology, in which wishful thinking claimed territory for the ego that psychoanalysis had shown was utterly outside of its reign.

Green agreed with Lacan’s critique of ego psychology to a very large extent, but takes them both to task for their reliance on “genetic” propositions, claims that are purely speculative – “mythical” - or furnished from the observation of babies that supposedly have relevance for clinical psychoanalysis with adults. In fact, Green believes the nearly every trend in psychoanalysis misses the distinctions to be made between a theory of states, under which genetic psychoanalytical propositions would fall and is analogous to what American psychoanalysts call “clinical theory,” and a theory of structures, in which theoretical models are created that illustrate the workings of assumed states in an abstract form. Green claims that Freud was aware of having to navigate between the two:
“But [Freud] was constantly having to navigate between a *theory of states*, which continued to retain the descriptive aspects of clinical forms, and a *theory of structures*, which created models, if not as pure conventions, at least as the development of these states to the point at which their function and meaning was revealed in the most abstract terms” (2001b, p. 56).

In Green’s opinion, it is a fruitless effort to debate whether narcissism, especially primary narcissism, which he views as having the utmost theoretical importance, is developmentally “real” or not. Primary narcissism is important insofar as it raises particularly pressing theoretical problems for psychoanalysis, especially in regards to the status of the ego.

*The Narcissistic Problem*

“How can one adhere to a line of development which goes from non-differentiation or primitive fragmentation to unified image of the ego, whereas the epistemological revolution, based on the concept of the unconscious, postulates an insurmountable split? (Green, 2001b, p. 49).

The above contradiction – development towards a unified ego, while always remaining a split subject – presumably may not be resolved by empirical research, or theorizing “developmental lines” (A. Freud, 1981) based on clinical work. It is a contradiction that is immanent to psychoanalytic theory, and must be elucidated in its theoretical terms, that is, through Freud’s concepts and abstract models. The referent of the theory is, of course, clinical phenomena. As we shall see, it shall take a precise and intricate model in order attempt to address the problems that narcissism poses, in addition to the status of the ego. Just as in psychoanalytic treatments, it often must take a long and often abstract path to make a sense of a problem that appears rather simple.

Briefly stated, Green views a theorization of primary narcissism as having the potential to elaborate how psychic functioning is possible, especially given what Freud left antagonizing Psyche when he died. These include: the id’s tendency towards the enactment
of instinctual impulses without psychical elaboration, the death drive’s tendency towards a state free of all tension, a veritable psychic death, and Eros’ tendency to bind, unify, and totalize the psyche, utterly denying the existence of the unconscious, among other things. I will show below how such tendencies crystallize in Green’s clinical conceptions of narcissism. For now, we must ask, how does a durable, stable, and organized seat of cathexes – a.k.a. the ego – emerge in the midst of such antagonisms?

I will now explore Green’s conception of primary narcissism, by going through the “logical (structural) moments” that the psyche must undergo in order to form an ego and the capacity to represent and tolerate its experiences. It should be said, finally, and in reference to states and structures that, according to Green:

“It should not be thought that we should repudiate wholesale everything in psychoanalysis pertaining to the theory of states. It represents a first level of psychoanalytic epistemology; and, in their silent communication with their analysands, or with other analysts, psychoanalysts cannot avoid expressing themselves as follows: in fact he wants this or that; at bottom he is saying this or that; he is again believing and so on. But this inevitable stage cannot be considered as the degree of organization which accounts for the analytic process” (2001b, p. 57).

*Where do cathexes originate?*

Freud waives between the ego and the when it comes to positing what is quintessential in the psyche’s earliest exchanges. Freud is referring to the ego when he uses the analogy of the amoeba as the deployer of cathexes in “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914) and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1921a), while it is implied that the id is the psyche’s source of investments once the structural model is introduced and the ego no longer represents the subject. Then, in his *Autobiographical Study*, Freud wrote:

“All through the subject's life his ego remains the great reservoir of his libido, from which object-cathexes are sent out and into which the libido can stream back again from the objects” (Freud, 1925a, p. 56).
And, again, Freud returns to analogy of the amoeba in the 1940 *Outline of Psychoanalysis*:

“It is hard to say anything of the behavior of the libido in the id and in the super-ego. All that we know about it relates to the ego, in which at first the whole available quota of libido is stored up. We call this state absolute primary narcissism. It lasts till the ego begins to cathect the ideas of objects with libido, to transform narcissistic libido into object-libido. Throughout the whole of life the ego remains the great reservoir, from which libidinal cathexes are sent out to objects and into which they are also once more withdrawn, just as an amoeba behaves with its pseudopodia” (Freud, 1940, p. 33).

James Strachey, who compiled several quotes from Freud on the sources of cathexes in his Appendix B to *The Ego in the Id* (1923), and many theorists following him, considered there to be a lack of differentiation between ego and id in the beginning. Freud argued for this, and seems to have implied it, as well, in some of his accounts.

Green takes off from Strachey’s analysis, which may or may not agree with Freud, of the undifferentiated ego-id as the primitive “reservoir” of libido. There are also Winnicottian (1971) echoes in Green’s picture of primary narcissism, in which the mother and baby are in a state of “id-relatedness” as the ego gets its share of libido. The undifferentiated ego-id, then, is both the source of supply and storage tank for cathexes:

“The primitive, undifferentiated ego-id ‘originally’ serves two functions at once: as a *source of supply* and a *storage tank*. As a source of supply, it sends its cathexes out in two directions: towards objects (centrifugal orientation) and towards the ego (centripetal orientation), thus contributing to the second function [as a storage tank]” (Green, 2001b, p. 62).

To put it schematically, object cathexes originate in the id, and, aside from the cathexes already spent on the future ego, the remaining (object) cathexes will attempt to be recuperated by the ego in order to secure a narcissistic cathexis upon separation from the object. This is the conversion from object-libido to narcissistic-libido, or secondary narcissism, in Freud (1914), and implies there must be a kind of symmetry between the
love for the object and love the ego can have for itself. In a very subtle, primitive sense, one can observe the processes in which the infamous narcissistic processes of elation and expansion occurs, and one attempts secure independence in order to barricade oneself against the disappointment inflicted by objects. This process is, of course, fueled by Eros, and falls under the banner of what Green calls positive or life narcissism.

So, the “developmental task,” so to speak, of this structural moment in narcissistic functioning, is similar to that outlined by Freud in *The Ego and the Id*:

“At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger, tries to get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id as a love-object” (Freud, 1923, p. 46).

The ego veritably seduces the id in order to garner its share of libido, and perhaps to compensate for the disappointments and inconsistences of the object. There is a twist to this process that Green points out, however, that deviates substantially from Freud’s written views on narcissism, because it accounts for how the death drive is involved in the earliest exchanges.

Once the ego’s strivings for autonomy in the object’s absence prove successful, is also possible that self-sufficiency might also prove more worthy of investment than ego-relating (Winnicott, 1958) with the object. The ego can “succeed in creating an enclosed system, and comes very close to the condition which the ego strives for in dreamless sleep” (Green, 2001b, p. 63). The extremes of this form a precedent for what Green terms negative or death narcissism: disobjectalization (see Chapter 2), a striving for the Zero, a lack of tension, and a psyche devoid of life or love to the extent that it can maintain its sense of independence.

How does this happen? How does the ego manage to retain the traces of the object
– and use them to its own advantage - while acting under the illusion that it is wholly autonomous? And, what discourages the ego from seeking the Zero or Nirvana, opting instead to be subjected to the clamor of life of Eros?

*A first organizer: The aim-inhibited instinct*

One might observe that we are on the same theoretical ground that led Hartmann (1939, 1965) and his followers to posit autonomous ego functions, neutralized drive energy, and a conflict free sphere. Underlying those concepts is the notion that the ego has an independent, epigenetic line of development in which its functions (synthesis, cognition, representation, defensive activity, etc.) unfold in accordance with it (the ego’s) ability to appropriate libido for its own means, and thus has the potential to escape the travails of the id, instinctual activity, and its repression. The drives of self-preservation are not enough to explain the ego’s activity, apparently.

Green’s interpretation of ego “autonomy,” if it should be called that, derives from a reading of the same post-1920 Freudian texts that the ego psychologists derived their theory from, but, as we shall see, is of a different sort. Again, Green’s emphasis is on the ego’s surreptitious *retaining of the object* (or traces of its cathexes from the id) in its narcissistic foundations. He argues that Freud’s (1923) conception of *aim-inhibited instinct* can account for such a process.

In *The Ego and the Id* Freud postulated, in addition to the sexual drive proper and drives of self-preservation, that there existed another constituent – or derivative – of Eros operative in the ego. These were “the instinctual impulses of an aim-inhibited or sublimated nature derived from [Eros]” (Freud, 1923, p. 40). Green finds the best description of them in the *New Lectures of Psychoanalysis*:
“Besides this, we have grounds for distinguishing instincts which are ‘inhibited in their aim’ – instinctual impulses from sources well known to us with an ambiguous aim, but which come to a stop on their way to satisfaction, so that a durable object-cathexis comes about and a permanent trend of feeling. Such, for instance, is this relation of tenderness, which undoubtedly originates from the sources of sexual need and invariably renounces its satisfaction” (Freud, 1932, p. 97).

It should be noted that this affectionate “trend of feeling” is not the result of repression; it is due to “an inhibition internal to the instinct” (Green, 2001b, p. 65), which is fitting in the context of narcissism, when repression remains unavailable to the ego. The aim-inhibited drives are not congruent with the pregenital erotic drives either, which anarchically strive for “organ pleasure” and eventually become subordinated to the “preliminary pleasures” (ibid) of genital sexuality” and ultimately facilitating union with the object. In fact, the aim-inhibited drives will be “those whose activity is best preserved,” (ibid) and remain “insubordinate,” or perhaps one could say subordinated to the ego’s narcissistic aims.

“One the one hand, there is an inhibition of aim which maintains the object by sacrificing the complete satisfaction of the wish for erotic union with it, yet conserves a form of attachment which fixes the investment of it; and, one the other, and unrestrained development of drive activity on the sole condition that aims and objects enter into the operations of permutation and substitution, the only limitation being the influence of repression and other drives” (Green, 2001b, p. 65).

The former (aim-inhibited drives) are ultimately more powerful than the latter (pregenital erotic drives). The aim-inhibited drives also have the power to “make use of the pregenital drives “which are compatible with its purpose and rejects the others” (Green, 2001b, p. 65). Rather astonishingly, it turns out that aim-inhibited drives are those “which should, first and foremost, be characterized by their link with the object” (ibid, p. 66). They ensure that the ego avoids embroilment in chaotic search of organ pleasure, and maintains its tie to the world of “whole objects” (Klein, 1940). Genital sexuality and affectionate cathexis here do not represent a biological telos, or a demand imposed by the police of
normality; they represent foundational organizers of the ego and a way of circumventing fears of castration.

Following this, and to insert an arguably genetic reference point, one could understand the genesis of instinctual inhibition of aim as occurring when the infant loses the breast and begins perceiving the mother as whole object. A question emerges: what incentive is there for the construction of the ego, inhibition of drive aims, and the coincident renunciations demanded by them? Avoiding castration anxiety, of course, but the psyche must attempt compensate for such losses. We are still in the territory of desexualization and ego construction, but have entered a new sector: that of the ideal, and perhaps even the death drive.

*The ideal, the death drive, and the ego*

The function of the ideal is a transvaluation of psychical values, pride over satisfaction, and renunciation over gratification. Renunciation is presumably demanded by the pains of the object’s inconsistency and the incest taboo, which the ego ideal becomes to internal representative of. The ego cannot easily get away with seducing the id, appropriating the id’s cathexes for its narcissistic aims. The ideal then, in a sense, is the id’s striking back against the ego, a reinstatement of its primary authority just as the ego is beginning to finds its own ground in the psychical terrain. It also servers to both maintain a relationship to the object (the mother and her cathexis in the id) through sacrifice, of course.

“Although the ego has been successful through the binding of psychical processes in gagging – even if only partially – the id, the latter can only go along with this by masking its defeat. Consequently, the id now imposes a new exigency, just as pressing as instinctual satisfaction obeying the pleasure principle, which the copy of it or the negative double” (Green, 2001b, p. 67).
But how can the ideal be accounted for in the context of narcissism? It certainly won’t be the heir of the Oedipus complex, or hinge on any other genetic propositions. It must either come from (a) alterations internal to the instinct, in a similar vein as aim-inhibition, or (b) an obscure, and probably dubious Freudian argument about phylogenesis and identifications with one’s forefathers. Both spheres are relevant when it comes to a structural theory of narcissism and ego formation, and Green sees connection between them via the death instinct’s impact on Eros in the case of the latter and a principle of kinship that interpolates generation difference between parents and child.

“The death drive repudiates actual death and restores cathexis of the father, while endeavoring to eliminate all possible tension by celebrating renunciation through the function of the ideal” (Green, 2001b, p. 68).

It is not the cathexis of the father *stricto sensu* that will serve to separate the tie between the child’s id and its objects, bolster its ego, and reign in the ideal, but a kind of principle of kinship, the fact of being of a different generation than the parents. Green quotes Freud to clarify:

“It may be that this inaugural identification is the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects… From another point of view it may be said that this transformation of an erotic object-choice into an alteration of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id and deepen its relations with it – at the cost, it is true, of acquiescing to large extent in the id’s experiences” (Freud, 1923, p. 30).

This identification is therefore an identification with what might be termed a “parental (not paternal *a la* Lacan [1966]) function.” By identifying with the parents one preserves one’s attachment to them, which is a testament to the object’s essential nature, and at the same time renounces properly erotic ties with them, metaphorically transforming the latter into relations between id, ego, and ideal, with the ego ultimately taking charge of
the situation.

It requires the work of the death drive (which is somewhat analogous the father’s separating function between mother and child, from an interpersonal perspective) for the ego to stake a claim on the id’s cathexes for its own uses, however:

“By thus getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as the sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual impulses” (Freud, 1923, p. 54).

The enrichment of the ego through its tentative seduction and appropriation of the id and separation from primary objects is a tentative process, then, as the ego must risk enlisting the death instinct in order to execute it. To “mortify” (Green, 2001b, p. 69) the libido in such a way that it becomes under the ego’s control is thus, in Green’s view, one of the most “lethal aspects of Eros” (ibid, p. 234), one that should not be considered evidence for neutralized energy operating in a conflict-free sphere. The result of the separation from one’s objects – and its coincident instinctual “defusion,” according to Freud – has deep implications for the psyche. It has the potential to push the ego into the throws of negative narcissism, in which the death drive reigns supreme and cathexis (of the ego by the id or anything else) itself is decathected, and renunciation is turned into a categorical imperative. It also has the potential to foster positive narcissism in which the ego maniacally attempts to expand its territory; indefinitely celebrating is triumphant conquest of the id.

Now that the conditions of possibility for the creation of an ego and narcissistic structure have been outlined, I will attempt to outline Green’s picture of the genesis, structure, and capacities of the ego itself. The “developmental moment” we will return to is the psyche’s response to separation, the loss of the breast and recognition of the mother
as whole person.

The Importance of Auto-Erotism

“The ego – or, initially, the ego drives – can present itself as a source of satisfaction by means of mechanisms which will last throughout life. It is legitimate to want to assign a beginning, a point of departure, for auto-erotism…” (Green, 2001b, p. 72).

“At a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking in of nourishment, the sexual instinct has an object outside the infant’s own body in the shape of his mother’s breast. It is only later that the instinct loses that object, just at the time, perhaps, when the child is able to form a total idea of the person to whom the person that is giving him satisfaction belongs. As a rule, the sexual instinct becomes auto-erotic” (Freud, 1905, p. 222).

How does this process – in which the object of satisfaction is internalized, or switched from the breast to the infant’s own body – occur? It would seem that such a moment has incredible implications for the psyche, as it marks the point at which the body – the inside – takes the place of the external world. Perhaps this is what Freud was talking about when he described the id as the ego’s “second internal world (1923, p. 55).

This moment of autoerotism also marks the point at which the subject is able to rely upon its own resources for satisfaction, and dependence on the primary object is lessened. This, as we saw, occurs thanks to the aim-inhibited drives that allowed for traces of the object (more specifically, its caresses and other caretaking gestures) to be retained. “Separation reconstitutes the couple in the subject’s own body” (Green, 2001b, p. 73).

It does not necessarily matter whether the object is physically present or absent for auto-erotism to take place, what is significant is that “the auto-erotic drive is a drive capable of satisfying itself, either in the object’s absence or presence, but independently of it” (Green, 2001b, p. 74). So, in the final analysis, the distinction between auto-erotism and other drives is that the former do not require the object’s participation, and thus mark the point at which the infant can rely upon its own psychical productions in conjunction with
transactions that occur with the object. It also marks the infant’s inscription into the order of desire and the signifier.

One must imagine auto-erotism occurring in conjunction with the infant’s biological dependence on the mother, with auto-erotism marking the establishment of the infant’s own psychical organization. “What makes auto-erotism possible is the vicariousness of the mother’s care;” (Green, 2001b, p. 74) the mothers care keeps the infant alive of course, and “shields the infant’s auto-erotism” (ibid), fostering the creation of its psychic reality and representational activity. One can hear echoes of Winnicott (1971) here, particularly his conceptions of “illusion” and “primary creativity.” The mother cares for the infant, but in such a way that the infant can feel as if he is taking care of himself. This should also throw a bit more light on the discussion or the origins of cathexes, in the ego or the id. The primordial id includes the mother, wholly and immediately cathected, while an ego forms around its own possibilities for satisfaction (Green, 2001b, p. 75). Freud stated something somewhat similar in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes:”

“Originally, at the very beginning of mental life, the ego is cathected with instincts and is to some extent capable of satisfying them on itself. We call this condition ‘narcissism’ and this way of obtaining satisfaction ‘auto-erotic’’” (Freud, 1917, p. 134).

Separation and the Double Reversal

Beyond the establishment of auto-erotism, how does the psyche negotiate separation? How is the mother’s absence integrated, and instinctual demands handled? Remember, we are in a moment where repression is unavailable to the psyche. Green draws from Freud’s (1915) “Repression” paper in order to theorize the way in which the infant negotiates instinctual demands in the mother’s absence:

“This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this state, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt
with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo – e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject’s own self” (Freud, 1915, p. 147).

These instinctual vicissitudes, according to Green, create a state in which “drive [reaches] the bodily zone which is awaiting satisfaction as if it were the object itself that had provided the satisfaction there; for, as with the inhibition of aim, the object has been retained and not exchanged” (Green, 2001b, p. 78). The function of the object, preserved in its absence via aim-inhibition, is appropriated by the subject so that the subject experiences satisfaction “as if it had been provided by the object” (ibid, p. 79). Such operations are possible within the structural moment we are describing, in which there is no clear distinction between inside and outside, and internal stimuli may be treated as if it were external, and vice versa. Again, the operations are the result of modifications internal to the instincts, and not due to a force acting against them like repression.

The “double reversal” (reversal into the opposite and turning back on the self), at this narcissistic juncture, is a transformation of activity into passivity. Freud (1917a) also refers to it as a transformation of love into hate, but such affects can only apply to a whole object. At bottom, according to Green, the double reversal “assumes the form of the love that the ego can have for itself” (Green, 2001b, p. 80). To turn the drives around one’s own self is to be “pacified” by them, while retaining the traces of the object in experiencing its (loving) response autonomously.

Being satisfied by auto-erotically is as a rule inferior to the experience of satisfaction with the object itself, but something must be said for the satisfaction that comes from being able to “get off” to one’s own psychical productions. Winnicott was very keen on this, and Green as well with his interpretation of Eros as the objectalizing function.

One must accept one’s lack in regard to the object, which cannot be totally
abolished. As stated above, it takes the work of the death drive to opt for satisfaction from “a zone of an inferior kind” (Freud, 1905, p. 182), which also allows an opportunity to attempt to abolish the fact of the object’s absence, or dependence on it, and seeking out a state without tension, and utter self-sufficiency. As described above, a state without tension corresponds to Green’s conception of negative narcissism, a striving for the Zero, while self-sufficiency corresponds to positive narcissism, striving for the One.

_A Mind of One’s Own: Negative Hallucination_

Perception of the object is linked with its absence, or perhaps only occurs when it is absent. As explored above, auto-erotism is subject’s response to the object’s absence, the beginning of its self-construction. The subject must come into being in the object’s absence, but the awareness of its absence and the space in which it will come to be in does not occur in the form of a perception proper, according to Green. The “perception” of the mother’s absence will come in the form of a _negative hallucination_.

“Negative hallucination signals, with the total perception of the object, that the latter has been put ‘outside of I,’ which is succeeded by the _I-not-I_ in which identification will be founded… _The mother is caught in the empty frame of negative hallucination and becomes a framing structure for the subject himself. The subject constructs himself in the space where the object’s investiture has been consecrated to the locus of its investment_” (Green, 1979, p. 84-5).

By negatively hallucinating the mother, the infant is able internalize the fact of her absence, while maintaining the traces of her caretaking activities. The mother is identified with negatively, “I will assume the activities of mother, who does not exist, but must have existed for me to be able to satisfy and represent myself.” Narcissistic cathexis, or cathexis of the ego, can only occur through the attempt at abolishing the fact of the object’s lack and fact of being external. In another move that can only be compared to Winnicott, Green is theorizing the subject as an internalization of the _maternal setting_, in which circuitous
transactions between the infant’s id and mother become to matrix of the subject.

Following this, the repressed will be what the infant could not appropriate through this foundational identification with the negatively hallucinated mother as framing structure. “*Introduction becomes merged with the inscription of the framing circuit, thereby constituting the matrix of identifications and corresponding with the object’s disappearance*” (Green, 2001b, p. 87). The negative hallucination of the mother also represents the conditions of the possibility for representation, a screen, or blank slate, on which all other representations will be grafted onto.

In the next chapter, I will further elaborate on Green’s concept of the negative, and *the work of the negative*, which should further illuminate the importance of the negative hallucination of the mother for the foundation of subjectivity, and its connections with representation. The negative will also be particularly important in conceiving of Green’s conceptions of psychopathology; *negative narcissism* being one of many possible manifestations of one’s tarrying with the negative.

**Summary**

- The historical and theoretical influences of Green’s theory of narcissism were outlined.
- Green’s stressing of the tensions between narcissism as a phenomenological-developmental state and as an abstract theoretical structure was emphasized.
- The significance of a theory of primary narcissism for Green, as way to conceive of how mental functioning is possible, was explained.
- Green’s theory of narcissism was reviewed in detail, with emphasis on his interpretation of the aim-inhibited instinct, the ideal, the death drive, auto-erotism, and the intrapsychic implications of separation from the maternal object.
Green’s concept of negative hallucination was introduced, and its links with Winnicott’s theory of the facilitating environment and analytic setting were touched upon.
CHAPTER 4

The Work of the Negative

“The life of God — the life which the mind apprehends and enjoys as it rises to the absolute unity of all things — may be described as a play of love with itself; but this idea sinks to an edifying truism, or even to a platitude, when it does not embrace in it the earnestness, the pain, the patience, and labor, involved in the negative aspect of things.”
—(Hegel, 1807)

“I’ve learned that working with the negative can make for better pictures.”
—(Drake, 2011)

In this chapter I will give an overview of the precedents for André Green’s emphasis on negativity – as an adjective that throws light on pre-existing concepts, and a noun (the work of the negative) that described psychic processes in their own right – in psychoanalysis. I will also describe and hopefully justify Green’s additions to the psychoanalytic notion of negativity through some of his own concepts, and elucidate the meaning of the work of the negative, which Green sees as a means of understanding all types of psychic functioning.

In discussing some of Green’s concepts like negative hallucination, negative narcissism, and subjectal unbinding, I will include a clinical example that illustrates some phenomena that Green is attempting to throw light on. When it comes to the work of the negative, I will focus on its implications for understanding and discussing defensive processes, particularly repression, negation, splitting, and disavowal. I will show Green’s rationale for selecting that series of defenses, and their important linkages with the death drive. I will also touch on the organizing elements of the work of the negative.
Negativity in Psychoanalysis

Negativity has a precedent in psychoanalytic theory, which André Green is careful to point out. It begins with Freud’s early and subsequently abandoned notion of negative hallucination before the invention of psychoanalysis, excepting one very brief mention in the “Metapsychological Supplement to The Theory of Dreams” (1917b). Then there is Freud’s famous dictum that “neurosis is the negative of perversion” and the concept of the negative therapeutic reaction. Finally, Freud wrote a paper on “Negation” (1925b) and its connections with intellectualization, judgment, and repression.

Lacan (2006) in his early work used Hegel’s notion of negativity to develop his concept of the mirror stage. Bion, who innovatively introduced the importance of Knowledge, and the K link (1962) into psychoanalysis, also emphasized negative Knowledge, alongside negative Love and negative Hate. Winnicott famously discussed the “negative side of relationships” (1971), in which the lack of the object was invested in more than its presence by the psyche.

Negative Hallucination

Negative hallucination was briefly discussed in the previous chapter on narcissism and psychic structuring, but, according to Green, it can also be viewed as an integral defensive process. Hallucinations have to do with perceptions of course, and, as Freud pointed out in his analysis of Judge Schreber, they are the result of a return of what has been abolished (or foreclosed, via Lacan [2006]) internally somewhere in the perceptual field. Positive hallucinations can thus be said to be the appearance of previously imperceptible psychic phenomena or objects externally.

Following the above definition of positive hallucination, negative hallucination,
according to Green, “is the non-perception of an object or of a perceptible psychic phenomena,” (2005, p. 218). It is the erasure, or clearing away of the perceptual field from elements that presumably have potential to evoke psychic pain or disorganization.

Clinical manifestations of negative hallucination tend to involve states in which one claims that one’s “mind has gone blank,” and sudden feelings of one’s mind being empty, lacking. Another manifestation is a sudden erasure of an interpretation by the analyst, “I did not hear a word of what you just said,” or “I can hear what you’re saying but cannot make any sense of it.” This should be contrasted to clinical manifestations of repression, which tend to have to do with forgetting. “I can’t remember what I was just thinking about,” or “Could you repeat that please? I missed it?” A desire to hear the interpretation, or make an attempt at re-remembering implies a less severe treatment of the psychical contents defended against, and the involvement of representations, rather than perceptions, which are at stake in hallucinations (both negative and positive). Representations and perceptions are intimately intertwined, however.

The above clinical description implies to an important facet of negative hallucination, and one that points to the relationship between representation and perception, which is the negative hallucination of thought. One must remember the Freudian theory of language, namely that it serves to make thought processes perceptible, and make an application from it to a theory of perception en masse first. If perception functions through evoking psychic representations – “memory traces” (Freud, 1900), which are linguistic in some cases, perhaps – one can see how negative hallucination works to prevent the evocation of internal states that are dependent, or connected with, the products of reality that trigger them. “… An internal representation, more or less
abolished, encountering an external perception which reactivates it from reality” (Green, 2005, p. 221).

Also, if thought processes are also a form of perception, one can see how a similar process operates internally, where the perception of thoughts themselves can be abolished. “Perceiving is not knowing, but re-cognizing; re-cognizing means following once again the path of a movement defined by its substitutive value for touching which is described as desirable or undesirable, or failing that, acceptable, or unacceptable” (Green, 1999, p. 210). One can imagine the multitude of possibilities along such a “path” – or chain of associations? – evoked by objects of perception, and the multitude of paths as well, that the psyche might traverse to avoid unpleasure, pain, or threats of disorganization.

Now might be a good time to take a look at the processes by which psychic elements are deemed desirable or undesirable, and such “paths” develop. The short answer is, through the work of the negative.

A Look into the Work of the Negative

Negative hallucination could arguably be the paradigmatic case of the work of the negative, as it reveals the intimate connection between perception and representation, and the way in which the psyche is willing to hemorrhage itself and its relations to the world in order to maintain a semblance of organization. André Green also includes repression, negation, splitting, and disavowal, as exemplars of the work of the negative, however. So, what are some commonalities between these defenses? Green explains:

“Let us note these processes have in common a decision, thus form a judgment. This judgment has the task of deciding yes or no; which is not the case for other mechanisms of defenses such as reversal against the self, turning something into its opposite, isolation, cancelling out reaction formation and sublimation… At bottom there is a fundamental
choice to be made, in the first person, between, ‘I accept’ or ‘I refuse,’ which has far-reaching repercussion for the psyche” (Green, 2005, p. 217).

To understand this judgment, one must remember what Freud claimed in his 1925 paper “Negation.” Firstly, he claimed that judgment is primarily between what is good, and thus can be incorporated, and what is bad, and must be rejected. He then claims, astonishingly, that the judgment of existence occurs after a judgment of attribution has occurred, implying that what has been deemed bad can be quite readily deemed non-existent.

What is significant about this is that it evokes the question of whether what in the mind, especially the unconscious mind, exists in reality or not. Following our discussion of negative hallucination and the relationship between perception and representation, one can see the possibilities open to the psyche in attempting – through the work of the negative – to eliminate elements that it finds unacceptable.

Repression, negation, and splitting, and disavowal are thus examples of the psyche’s attempt to create a veritable harmony between what is acceptable and unacceptable, under the dominion of Eros and the death drive. What is deemed to exist inside the psyche, outside the psyche, and in different parts of the psyche, or nowhere at all, will be determined by work of the negative, which does what it will to negotiate the clamors of Eros and its demands for enjoyment and unification and death drive and its demands for Nirvana and nothingness.

It is far from a matter of viewing accepting as always good and rejecting always bad, according to Green. Something, at least the excesses of the drives, must always be rejected, which might be the primordial basis for the work of the negative, in the final analysis. “We would not survive, in our current state of civilization, if we did not
recognize that everything begins with the idea of the drives being excessive or prone to excess, immoderation, *hybris*” (Green, 2005, p. 218).

Clinically, one should be reminded of the Kleinian (1940) emphasis on “integration,” mending the splits, however minute, and recognizing and making amends for the destructiveness that lurks within oneself, always already impeding on our integrating tendencies. It seems that Green would agree with this prescription, while emphasizing that one must not forget that destruction lurks in the heart of Eros, and Eros in the heart of the death drive, as the work of the negative serves as a necessary foundational for psychic organization. Even though it is utterly unclear what one is and isn’t, one must make distinctions, acceptances and rejections, in order become a subject. It is the work of the negative that maintains a degree of harmony between the poles of omnipotence and self-disappearance, a desire to live and love and to die and destroy, absolute satisfaction and bare renunciation. The work of analysis will be partially an analysis of the work of the negative and, perhaps, and reharmonization of what must be accepted and rejected, allowed to exist or not, go recognized or unrecognized.

*Negative Narcissism, Subjectal Unbinding, and the Ego’s Sense of Self-disappearance*

I have reviewed negative narcissism in previous chapters, but will give a brief overview of it here, and a more extensive clinical picture what I believe represents it. Green views narcissism as having two poles rooted in Freud’s final two drives. Positive narcissism is a striving for the One, unity, elation, and expansion under the aegis of Eros, while negative narcissism is a striving for Zero, nothingness, psychic death, Nirvana, a complete lack of tension.

Negative narcissism is a manifestation of Green’s interpretation of the death drive
and the *disobjectalizing function*. Eros can be viewed as the *objectalizing function*: it
creates objects (Winnicott, 1971), cathects objects, and can turn its own functions into
objects (book -> reading), while the disobjectalizing function destroys, disinvests, and
unbinds relations with objects, objects themselves, and the *objectalizing process itself*.
Negative narcissism, then, is an extreme form of withdrawal, in which the ego is slowly
being disinvested at its most insidious stages. Positive narcissism represents a lack of
investment in objects, and transfer of such investments to the ego, while negative
narcissism represents a disinvestment of the ego itself.

This is a somewhat schematic picture of negative narcissism.

*A Case of Negative Narcissism*

Jeanie, a 53 year old African-American woman, arrived at her initial session
appearing exhausted. She dropped into herself in a chair, and did not shift her gaze from
the floor in front of her throughout the hour. It seemed that it was extremely painful, and
particularly exhausting for her to speak, as if she had to recalibrate her psychic reserves
between words, checking whether finishing a sentence risked passing out, or some other
kind of exhaustion.

Her words seemed intended to have little to no effect. She spoke about living
alone, sometimes attending to her grandson, whom the mother of her son’s (who was in
prison) child would drop off occasionally and without warning. She shook her head
frequently and spoke about desiring to become a “counselor” herself, but feeling unable
to learn since she became ill many years ago. This illness, according to Jeanie, was a kind
of chronic fatigue, in which she lacked the energy to leave her home, socialize with
anyone, or do any kind of personal projects.
All the medical treatments that Jeanie could muster up the money to try had failed. She was living off of disability checks that she received from claiming that physical injuries she sustained in her childhood — some from parental abuse, another from being ran into by a cyclist — prevented her from working. She was her mother’s first child, the oldest of eight siblings, with four different fathers — two children to a father. Jeanie described having a positive relationship with her father, which her mother was not pleased with. She speculated once that her mother separated with her father and had two children with another man, and then four more with two different men, had to do with her envy of her children’s positive relationships to their fathers.

Both of Jeanie’s parents had died several years before, and she did not a relationship with any of her siblings’ father’s. She occasionally spoke with one of her sisters over the phone, and aside from her did not have any other connection to her family. She described their relationship as neutral; Jeanie never had anything to say, and her sister could talk your ear off. Jeanie just listened, which might have had something to do with her desire to be a counselor.

Jeanie had two children. One was in jail for murder charges, and Jeanie spoke occasionally with him on the phone. The other was “in the streets,” involved in gang activity and/or selling and using drugs extensively. Jeanie said she felt like she failed at raising her boys, a failure which she attributed to the effects of her illness and the fact that she “wasn’t ready” to bear the responsibilities of being a mother. She said she really took to the attention she received from men when she was in her late teens and early 20’s, and it wasn’t until her illness set in that she could say no to doings drugs and having sex with an interested man.
She had graduated from high school, received a degree from a local community college, and worked at a social welfare agency until her late 20’s. She said that she stopped working because her illness made going to work and being around people intolerable. She said that it felt unclear to her whether she wanted social connections. She definitely did not want a relationship with a man, and felt that she was better off staying alone and focusing on religion.

Jeanie claimed to be a devout Christian. Religion seemed to be her only investment, as she spent her days listening to gospel tapes and watching taped masses on her television. Sometimes she would read from the Bible. She said that being Christian made her feel assured that she was a good person, with the usual utter lack of assuredness in her speech.

She only ate frozen food and cereal, but occasionally made eggs and bacon. Her apartment seemed sparse, and she expressed some contentment about having neighbors that didn’t bother her, given that she lived in a poor, urban area, known for violence. It seemed that she only left her apartment for her sessions, doctor’s appointments, and the little shopping that she did. Her friends drifted away from her, and she drifted away from her friends.

During her sessions she would discuss her personal history, usually in a very repetitive manner. She sometimes questioned whether she was a good person or not, until she remembered that she was Christian and doing what she needed to do to redeem herself. She said that she did not know why she fell ill, or what it was that ailed her. She thought it had something to do with her past, and she talked about the multiplicity of traumas she had undergone extensively, but without any recognizable affect. It was as if
there was no Other to whom her speech was directed to, not me, not anyone. It just drifted away. She said that she didn’t dream or fantasize, they were both not worth it.

I am not sure if I helped Jeanie. We saw each other twice a week for nearly 10 months. Clearly she was able to invest in her treatment, but aside from recounting her past and some loose connections made between her past self and present self, I am not sure if she gained any insight. I felt interested in Jeanie, and desired to help her. She felt so sterile and absent. It felt unclear what it would take, or what it would mean for her to be re-animated, in some form.

Looking back on it, I think that Jeanie fits Green’s description of negative narcissism. She seemed utterly disinvested in life, aside from her religion, which seemed only to sustain her enough to keep her alive. She seemed invested in our treatment together as well, but I could not detect any transference reactions. Termination did not feel especially traumatic and significant, Jeanie just walked away. It is needless to say that her emotional life was vacant. It seemed that all of the traumata in her past eventuated in a need to disengage radically with life, which reached an apex when she began seeing men and had her children. Christianity might have been the only thing that kept her ego stable. I could see arguments being made for Jeanie being a PTSD sufferer or dysthymic, and I think both would fit somewhat. She did not appear depressed or traumatized, thought; she appeared absent, almost a zombie. Many bad things happened to her, and she certainly felt bad about her life, but I’m not sure how long it had been since she felt it.

*Evoking and Tarrying with the Negative*

Like all clinical pictures, it is very difficult to articulate precisely why someone
presents in one way and not another. Still, in Jeanie’s case, we see a multitude of traumas that occurred repeatedly from her toddlerhood into her early adulthood, and, perhaps most significantly when it comes to her potentially presenting with negative narcissism, no “symptomatic outlet,” as it were, for her conflicts and traumas. Jeanie suffered one trauma after the next, almost in a predictable fashion, and perhaps due to growing up in a radically unsupportive family and a radically oppressed urban environment, Jeanie felt that where was no way to “positivize” her traumatic experiences, no way to communicate them or attempt to elaborate them in some form, whether it be what one would call “symptomatic” or not.

Jeanie could not bring her terrible experiences anywhere, to hold them internally, or externalize them in any form, let alone through speech. Perhaps the only way for Jeanie to go on, having undergone such a traumatic early life, was to negate her experiences to the furthest extent possible, not to “forget” them via repression, or disavow them via splitting, but to obliterate them nearly entirely, to the point where the possibility any kind of stimulating, animating experience was foreclosed. Perhaps, for Jeanie, any kind of stimulation, internal or external, threatened to evoke the intolerable quantities of excitation that were linked to her traumatic past, and thus must have been not allowed to occur.

Certainly Jeanie’s past and psyche had not been fully erased. The traces of her past were alive for her on some level, and probably brought her into treatment, and brought her to Christianity and questioning whether she was a good person or not. The clinical task in working with Jeanie, and perhaps other subjects suffering from negative of narcissism and/or severely impacted by the work of the negative, then, was to witness
and constantly assess her animus, and to create a space in which catheaxis – of anything – is possible, and her experience could be positivized, ideally via speech, but also through her physical presence, gestures, and traces in her associations.

Treatment for Jeanie would also, hopefully, bring to light the facts of the impacts of the negative on her. It would reveal, through interpretation and insight gained over many painstaking hours, why Jeanie ended up “carrying” the negative side of her family and other important figures in her life, and why the work of the negative had to be enlisted by her to continue living with the burden of her past and internal economy. The effects of the work of the negative on her would have to be examined in minute detail, both in order to foster elaboration/positivization of her experience and to get a sense of whether the affects associated with her experiences could be tolerated and worked through.

The clinical stance required for working with Jeanie or another subject tarrying with the negative would require something similar to what Winnicott (1971) meant when he described the mother as “object-presenting” to her baby. The clinician would have to present him or herself as an object – whether it be a properly transference object, or simply as an arbiter of the treatment frame and setting, which is designed to bring to light subjects’ relationships to the negative – to be used or not-used, cathected or not-cathected, according the subject’s whims. Patience would be required in allowing Jeanie to “choose life,” as it were, and begin to take the risk required to abandon the throes of the negative and re-enter the clamor of life object-ties. The clinician also must “abandon memory and desire” (Bion, 1992) and allow the subject to decide whether change is possible, or worthwhile, while ensuring that they are fostering the creation of space in
which that decision can be made. Hopefully the subject, having been offered a space and object in the form of the clinician to cathect and positivize her experience with, will begin to find Eros and become reanimated, but the clinician must remain open to failure in the form of the subject interminably tarrying with the most crippling effects of the negative, including suicide. It is up to the clinician to be an object fit for use, and maintain an environment where both the negative and Eros are welcome, so the subject’s unconscious can make the final choice: life or death.

Summary

- A brief history of the negative in psychoanalysis was reviewed, from Freud, to Lacan, Bion, and Winnicott.
- Negative hallucination, the abolishment of a perception that evokes disorganizing or painful affects, was discussed met psychologically and clinically.
- Green’s conception of the work of the negative was discussed, including the importance of judgments made by subjects in accepting or rejecting perceptions, affects, and representations for psychic functioning. The relationship between the work of the negative and drives, and its clinical implications and relationships with integration and healthy functioning were also touched upon.
- Negative narcissism and its characteristics of withdrawal and disinvestment was elaborated, including its relationship to Green’s interpretation of Eros and the death drive as the objectalizing function and the disobjectalizing function.
- A clinical vignette was exposited that illustrated negative narcissism and the pathological effects of the work the negative. Suggestions for treatment of patients in throes of the negative were given.
CHAPTER 5

The Clinical, Conclusions

In this chapter I will make some concluding remarks on Green’s work as represented in the above pages, and some synoptic points about Green’s legacy and approach to psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice. I will conclude with a discussion of some of the clinical implications of Green’s major influences and concepts, including his conception of drives, his dual conception of narcissism (negative and positive), and the work of the negative.

French Psychoanalysis, Anglo-American Psychoanalysis, Green

Green’s approach is certainly informed by the analytic climate, as it were, of late twentieth France. To examine Green’s sources and influences in detail is beyond the scope of this project, but some remarks should be made about some of the overarching determinants of his approach.

French psychoanalytic writing, largely due to Jacques Lacan’s call for a “return to Freud” (2006) in the early 1950s, majorly consists of what might be called a series of exegetical readings of Freud’s texts. Also due to Lacan’s influence, there is an assumption among French psychoanalysts that Freud’s texts, interpreted in light of contemporary theoretical and clinical problems, are a sufficient theoretical foundation for psychoanalysis. One could argue that French psychoanalysts have most closely carried Freud’s legacy into the present, as they appear not to believe that some kind of psychoanalytic paradigm shift
– be it a turn to the ego, the Self, object-relations, intersubjectivity, compromise formations, etc. – is necessary to make theory fit the “data” of clinical observation.

Green is both a representative and vocal critic of this rather characterized version of the French approach to psychoanalysis. Green is quick to point out a precedent that was set by Lacan in his “return to Freud,” namely the insertion of “Lacanian” innovations, or radical revisions – most famously the unconscious “structured like a language” – of Freud’s work in his theory, while insisting that his ideas are far from a deviation from Freud’s texts.

One should see the problems presented by the French approach to theorizing via Freud’s texts in a veritable dialectical tension with Green’s critical portrayal of the Anglo-American approach to psychoanalytic theorizing, namely a call for a shift in emphasis towards a pole of the psyche that Freud neglected for various reasons, like the ego, Self, object, and most recently intersubjectivity and relational matrices. So, while the French fight about who’s being the most loyal to Freud and best refreshing his texts to fit contemporary theoretical and clinical problems, Anglo-American analysts fight about who’s being the most revolutionary and finally moving psychoanalysis beyond its confining Freudian legacy!

Green situates himself on the fence, as it were, between the historical tendencies represented by French and Anglo-American analysts. As was hopefully shown in previous chapters, Green’s approach could be considered a kind of archaeology of Freud’s texts, in which fragments of theories that have contemporary relevance are sought out, extracted, and elaborated upon. Green’s emphasis is certainly on elaboration and expansion, not orthodoxy, as he uses the work of what many consider to be the most innovative and iconoclastic analysts of the twentieth century, namely Bion, Winnicott, and Lacan, to guide
Green believes that Freud’s writings and conceptual apparatus are nearly sufficient theoretical resources for throwing light on what occurs in psychoanalytic treatments and cultural phenomena. Here one should hear the French Green, and the ex-student of Lacan. He also believes that the theoretical innovations of Lacan, especially his focus on the relationship between language and psyche; Bion and his theory of thinking and study of mental functioning in psychotic and borderline cases; and Winnicott and his focus on the importance of the psychoanalytic setting and transitionality are utterly essential in making sense of the patients that presumably haunt psychoanalyst’s couches today. Green seems to acknowledge the revolutionary nature of the contributions of Lacan, Winnicott, and Bion, while emphasizing that all three claimed Freud to have been their biggest influences.

I would argue that Green bridges the French and Anglo-American psychoanalytic universes in a rather striking way. He maintains the more-Freudian-than-Freud attitude of French psychoanalysts, and is at pains to emphasize the richness and contemporary relevance of Freud’s texts, if read in light of contemporary theoretical and clinical problems. Green also embodies both the revolutionary and clinical-mindedness of many Anglo-American psychoanalysts, as he claims Winnicott as his biggest influence following Freud, and views the work of both Winnicott and Bion as utterly essential – when linked with Freud – for understanding patients who do not fit into the paradigm of neurosis as theorized by Freud, namely the “non-neurotic” (Green, 1975) clinical structures which Green’s body of work is largely an attempt at conceptualizing.

The Theoretical and the Clinical

Green’s “choice” of theoretical influences, I would argue, is, for one, related to a
veritable family resemblance between Lacan, Winnicott, and Bion: thinkers who used a thorough background in Freud to create a vision of psychoanalysis that linked with and elaborated Freud’s work, elucidated new clinical territory, and bore the stamp of its iconoclastic and revolutionarily minded authors whom remained steeped in tradition. Also, and perhaps more importantly, Green’s theoretical influences and personal theoretical constructions stem from a need to make sense of his clinical experiences with patients exhibiting a kind of mental functioning that was barely addressed in Freud’s work and in the French psychoanalytic community during the 1960s, and 1970s when Green was beginning to establish his analytic practice and theoretical career.

These patients were the ones whom Green later considered to be presenting with “non-neurotic structures” (1975), or personality structures that could only be understood in terms of the ways in which they differed from neurosis (and psychosis), or “borderline cases,” or, perhaps more clearly stated, “borderline states of analyzability” (ibid, p. 5). Their symptoms, transferential manifestations, associative style, mental functioning, and stance in relation to the analytic setting differed radically from those of neurotics and psychotics as described the work of Freud, his colleagues, and the first couple of generations of French analysts whose work Green was exposed to in his psychiatric and analytic training.

So, it was partially Green’s search for theoretical resources to assist in making sense of what he was seeing in his practice that led him to begin researching the work of writers across the channel like Klein, Segal, Rosenfeld, Bion, Winnicott, and Khan, and turn away from Jacques Lacan. Green’s project became, in the 1960s, to pool the theoretical resources available that would serve useful to construct a theory of borderline states (of
analyzability), and to make sense of the multiplicity of post-Freudian developments in psychoanalysis through the lens of the “changes in analytic practice and analytic experience” (Green, 1975) that had occurred in the decades since Freud’s passing.

The following is a brief list of what Green chose to emphasize in his theorizations of non-neurotic structures and psychoanalysis en masse, some of which has been emphasized in previous chapters. The clinical implications of them are also touched upon:

1. **Freud’s final theory of the drives: Eros as binding and the death drive as unbinding.**
   Eros strives for unity (narcissism of the One), the death drive for disinvestment and a lack of excitation (Freud’s “absolute primary narcissism” [1895] and “Nirvana principle” [1924], Green’s negative narcissism). The analyst must monitor the movement of the session and patient’s mental functioning, whether it is towards integration and a sense of psychic coherence, or disintegration and a sense of non-existence, to the point of negative hallucination of the self.

2. **Freud’s second topography/structural model, in which the ego is unconscious of its defenses and the id strives for action.** The analyst must tarry with the drives and the psyche’s towards acting out instinctual impulses head on.

3. **Bion’s theory of thinking and study of mental functioning.** Subjects may attack their own capacity for representation due to an inability to tolerate absence (Bion’s [1962] “no-breast”). The analyst must use his own mental functioning and representational capacities (“alpha-function,” “reverie” [1962]) as the patient struggles to tarry with experience that feels unrepresentable.

4. **Bion’s (1962) notion of “evacuation,”** in which the psyche expels frustrating mental contents rather than symbolically elaborating them. Mental contents can
“skip” the preconscious and be transported directly from an unconscious state to reality. The analyst must “contain” (Bion, 1962) such contents (projections) and attempt to elaborate them, either internally or via speech in the form of an interpretation.

5. Winnicott’s emphasis on the analytic setting and creating a space for representation, and where object-relations may develop. One of the analyst’s roles is to maintain the integrity of the setting (“holding” [Winnicott, 1960]) and use his internal experience (“reverie” [Bion, 1962], “primary internal preoccupation” [Winnicott, 1960], to begin fostering representation activity within the analyst-patient couple.

6. Winnicott’s (1971) study of the “negative side of relationships,” in which attachments to bad objects are clung to due to the subject viewing absence intolerable and the investment in their own psychic productions impossible. The analyst attempts to present him or herself as an object that can be “used” (ibid) in such a way that will allow the patient to become invested in his internal space and psychic productions.

7. Lacan’s (2006) notion of “foreclosure,” in which psychic space is destroyed and the possibility of symbolization choked off due to its association with the evocation of quantities of intolerable excitation. The analyst must attempt to avoid the patient undergoing a “syndrome of psychic desertification” (Green) and attempt to allow the patient to find the capacity to revisit and reanimate psychic space, not as empty, but as a space with the potential (Winnicott, 1971) to be filled.
8. Pierre Marty’s (1968) theory of psychosomatics, in which it is possible for the psyche to undergo a defensive process in which links between the somatic and the psychic are untethered, leading to unrepresentable experiences being expelled into the body in the form of organic illnesses instead of psychically elaborated. The analyst must be aware of the patient’s potential tendency to, along with “acting out” in reality, “acting in” (Green, 2000b) to the body via somatization.

The above notions, which are far from exhaustive, are synthesized in Green’s theory of the drives, his theorization of primary narcissism and its clinical manifestations, and his introduction of the work of the negative. I will now give a brief overview and clinical interpretation of them.

1. The drives

As briefly stated above regarding Freud’s final theory the drives, the clinical implications of Green’s theory of the drives have to with a kind of abstract movement. Where does it feel like the session is going? What is animating it? In psychoanalysis there is always a pull towards instinctual gratification and frustration, which would be the paradigmatic example of what Green’s theorization of the drives implies. Is the patient’s discourse coalescing around some key kernels of meaning or importance? Is there a sense that the patient, or patient-analyst couple is feeling a building sense of elation and expansion, or a sense of well-being? Such sensibilities have to do with the benevolent elements of Eros, and the objectalizing function. One might say that the patient is objectalizing the treatment, and/or the analyst, i.e. appropriating them in such a way as to use at a source of organization, enjoyment, and animus.
As for the death drive, or the disobjectalizing function, a grimmer picture is in order. At times one feels like one’s patient is fading away, or like an irreparable distance is being created between patient and analyst, or perhaps the patient and his own sense of self. There is a sense that the patient or the treatment itself is falling into oblivion, falling apart, or dying. It is losing momentum, and such a process feels eerily threatening to the integrity of either or both parties.

It should also be mentioned that there is always a very minute negotiation between Eros and death drive, forwards and backwards, in the moment-to-moment interplay in the session. In one moment it seems that insight and/or an enlightening interpretation is forming from the depths, and at another there is a sense of disorganization and chaos (Bion [1962] PS<>D, Winnicott’s [1971] unintegration and disintegration) arrives and hopefully can be tolerated.

2. Narcissism

Narcissism functions somewhat similarly to the drives clinically, but might be considered more “psychological” in its implications. Again we have two poles and a spectrum lying between them: elation, expansion, and omnipotence on one end, and death, Nirvana, and stasis on the other. Negotiating this spectrum is perhaps more of an existential problem than an analytic one, yet it clearly has heaps of clinical implications.

The pull between the One and the Zero is something that is negotiated in every analytic hour, as associative discourse opens up and accelerates one’s tendencies towards feelings of elation and expansion, or stasis and deadness. In what direction each session pulls a patient and an analytic couple is quite meaningful, as is how the patient negotiates and relates to what various directions that his psychic organization tends towards. Can one
allow oneself to feel omnipotent, godlike? Can one tolerate feelings of deadness and stasis? Does one resist positive narcissistic feelings due to moral strictures or threats of disorganization? Does one feel more powerful or potent when they are feeling closer to Nirvana, as if they’ve triumphed over the clamors of life and are “beyond omnipotence,” as it were? Such questions are evoked and lines of thought opened up Green’s dual conception of narcissism.

There are also the severely pathological manifestations of the two narcissism, as perhaps exemplified in the case example in the previous chapter. These occur when one pole becomes the norm, or the only kind of psychic economy that provides a semblance of comfort. One can only feel one has the right to exist when one is utterly superior to all of those around him or her, a god among people (positive narcissism); or one has no right to exist whatsoever, in fact non-existence feels safer and more proper (negative narcissism). Like everything else, what one strives for is a certain degree of mobility and blending between the poles of the One and the Zero.

3. The Work of the Negative

Beyond throwing light on a series of defenses that employ a “yes” or “no” judgment and the working of the death drive, the work of the negative functions as a kind of clinical _hermeneutic of suspicion_. It could be considered a conceptual tool for finding the unconscious, as it were, in the midst of the clamors of a session. If the negative is something that we all must tarry with, and psychoanalysts are in a particularly privileged position to study its workings, we should be able to employ what we know about it to “reach” (as if it’s something that can be reached) the unconscious, or at least the repressed.

To employ the negative clinically is quite simply to envision the negative of
whatever is presenting for the patient, as a kind of logical principle. An example: a patient
whom recently had an extremely difficult break up – to the point where the analyst is
wondering if extra sessions should be offered as a way to support the patient and analyze
the crisis thoroughly - finds another partner surprisingly quickly and presents extremely
relieved and quiescent. Could it be said that this new partner is a kind of negative of the
other partner? Yes, it is a new person, but the patient and this new partner’s uniting was a
veritable product of the patient’s desire to achieve some quick relief from the lack of his
former partner.

The patient quite lucidly describes this new partner as different in some
fundamental, even healthy, ways that her former partner, while also sharing some special
similarities. Perhaps this is beginnings of what might be called a negative relationship – a
relationship premised upon the notion (of the patient’s) that she must be with someone if
she is without her original partner, or formed from a desire to negate the loss of her former
partner. Could we say that the patient is still unconsciously (in the same way that we might
think someone unconsciously feels that they are relating with their mother or father) with
her original partner, and is in a way attempting to negate the fact of her original partner’s
absence, the fact of her new partner’s new-ness and individuality, and the dire pains of the
loss of her original partner? The work of the negative, in this case, could be said to be
benevolently assisting the patient in handling a loss that feels intolerable, or insidiously her
clouding her internal and relational life. Regardless, the big question would seem to be: is
the negative allowing something new to emerge? And, whether the negative is preventing
or affirming novelty, what do we make of its productions? That seems to be up to the
patient’s unconscious.
Summary of Project, Implications for Social Work Practice, Further Directions

This project served as an introduction to André Green and a reading of some his most significant concepts, including the drives, narcissism, the work of the negative, and their clinical implications. Green was represented as a unique psychoanalyst, particularly when compared with British and American theorists. He retained Freud’s concepts and metapsychological framework while synthesizing the contributions of Bion, Winnicott, Lacan, and many other figures in twentieth century psychoanalysis.

Green theory is irrevocably “contemporary” – in that it takes into account new trends in (many discipline’s) theory, clinical phenomena, and social problems – vision of psychoanalysis and clinical work en masse, while maintaining very strong ties to Freud. In this sense, Green’s approach provides a veritable model for future theorizing. Many of Freud’s concepts are maintained, both because of their providing a base of axioms that distinguish psychoanalysis as a field, and a singular one at that, and their raw power in explaining clinical phenomena and the psyche’s workings. Theory also remains non-dogmatic and open-ended under Green’s vision, which is exemplified by his astonishingly elaborate readings and extensions of Freud’s concepts, which utilize Green’s clinical experiences, a plethora of psychoanalytic writings, and natural science, philosophical, and social science research.

Green’s work is also representative of the “theoretical style” and preoccupations of many French psychoanalysts, who, largely due to the influence of Lacan, continue to use Freud’s work as a central reference point in their conceptualizations of clinical phenomena that Freud did not directly address in his work. My hope is that this project revealed some of differences in theoretical style between Green and other psychoanalysts who might be
more familiar to Anglo-American readers, and provided some exposure to a psychoanalyst
whom represents a strain of psychoanalysis with some distinctly different preoccupations,
controversies, and ideologies than those that emerged throughout the history of
psychoanalysis in English speaking countries.

Beyond the theoretical and clinical implications of Green’s work outlined above, I
believe that an overarching implication of this project for psychoanalysis and social work
is its exemplifying what might be called a “cosmopolitan” approach to psychoanalysis and
theory en masse, which I believe is sorely needed in current psychoanalytic and social work
circles. What I mean by a “cosmopolitan” approach is an awareness, developed through
careful study, not only of the theoretical contributions of foreign authors, but also of the
ways in which the field has been approached and represented in other areas of the world,
and what the latter reveals about what it means to write about and practice psychoanalysis
or any kind of clinical endeavor. It seems to me that a sustained effort at differentiating and
integrating the work of psychoanalysts around the globe could open up the space for a kind
of reflexivity about the culturally-specific assumptions, conflicts, and preoccupations that
animate a nation or region’s work, and widen the theoretical and clinical terrain of
psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic social work substantially.

I believe André Green models such a “cosmopolitan” approach to psychoanalysis,
through his exhaustive knowledge of its developments around the globe, and use of the
work of psychoanalysts of many nationalities in his writings. Green does not appear to have
studied the history of psychoanalysis en masse in order to foster a kind of theoretical
inclusion-for-the-sake-of-inclusion, however. He uses the writings of others insofar as they
reveal and help address the problem he is attempting to work out. Psychoanalysts and social
workers are fortunate that their field is relatively young in this case, and thus getting a sense of its developments on an international scale is possible.

This project and Green’s work certainly have their limitations as well. Being unable to read Green’s texts in French impacted the volume of his work that I was able to access, as well as the fact that less than half of Green’s written work has been translated into English. This project was intended to introduce André Green and non-Lacanian French psychoanalysis to English speakers, but it is doubtless problematic to rely upon translated works in working with a theorist as precise as Green in attempting to do so. It would seem that being able to read multiple languages would be prerequisite to doing the kind of international study of psychoanalysis and social work that I suggested above, and interpretations of Green’s untranslated works should present a rich area for further research.

This project, in alignment with Green’s psychoanalytic writings, is more of a work of theoretical psychoanalysis than anything else. André Green’s ideas certainly have relevance to social workers, particularly those who practice in a psychoanalytic mode, but his approach appears to deviate quite intensely from the person-in-environment paradigm of American social work. Green only deals with people’s contexts and identities in a psychoanalytic manner, which certainly has its merits, but tends to cast subjects in a very homogeneous light, perhaps implying that the Oedipus complex, the drives, narcissism, the negative, etc. inhabit every person. Such assumptions, correct or not, seem to me to be quite central to the fabric of psychoanalytic theory, yet psychoanalytic theory’s viability or truth does not hinge on such universal claims. That said, a further line of research might involve researching the anthropological and sociological implications of Green’s concepts.
It is my belief that a sense of André Green’s work makes for a powerful clinical tool, and has the potential to function similarly for sociocultural phenomena, if the work is done to apply it in that manner.

Summary

- Green’s relationship to French and Anglo-American strains of psychoanalysis was explained.
- Green’s overall overarching approach to psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice was outlined, including his relationship to theorists like Freud, Lacan, Winnicott, and Bion.
- Some of Green’s major clinical preoccupations and theoretical influences were reviewed. A list was given of some of the concepts that organized Green’s theoretical and clinical work, along with their implications for psychoanalytic practice.
- Some clinical implications of Green’s ideas reviewed in previous chapters (the drives, narcissism, and the work of the negative) were reviewed.
- The entirety of this project was reviewed; further lines of research and implications of Green’s work were outlined. Limitations of this project Green’s work were touched upon.
References


Freud, S. (1895). *Project for a scientific psychology.* S.E., I.

Freud, S. (1900). *The interpretation of dreams.* S.E., V.


Freud, S. (1915). Repression. S.E., XIV.
Freud, S. (1917a). Instincts and their vicissitudes. S.E., XIV.

Freud, S. (1917b). Metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. S.E., XIV.

Freud, S. (1917c). Mourning and melancholia. S.E., XVII.

Freud, S. (1921a). Beyond the pleasure principle. S.E., XVIII.

Freud, S. (1921b). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. S.E., XVIII.

Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id. S.E., XIX.

Freud, S. (1924). The economic problem of masochism. S.E., XIX.


Freud, S. (1925b). Negation. S.E., XIX.

Freud, S. (1932). New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. S.E., XXII.


