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This paper reveals a trap for artificial general intelligence (AGI) theorists who use economists’ standard method of discounting. This trap is implicitly and falsely assuming that a rational AGI would have time consistent preferences. An agent with time-inconsistent preferences knows that its future self will disagree with its current self concerning intertemporal decision making. Such an agent cannot automatically trust its future self to carry out plans that its current self considers optimal.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.


Licensed to Smith College and distributed CC-BY under the Smith College Faculty Open Access Policy


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