A Theory of Crime and Vigilance

Authors

Jorge Vásquez, Smith CollegeFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

8-2022

Publication Title

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially optimal ones. Finally, the crime rate first rises and then falls in the property value at stake, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.

Volume

14

Issue

3

First Page

255

Last Page

303

DOI

10.1257/mic.20190339

Comments

Peer reviewed accepted manuscript.

Recommended Citation

Vásquez, Jorge, "A Theory of Crime and Vigilance" (2022). Economics: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA.
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs/77