Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2023
Publication Title
The China Quarterly
Abstract
Does local democracy induce better service to citizens? While elected officials can be punished at the ballot box if they fail to address citizens’ needs, appointed bureaucrats may have policy knowledge that enables them to better serve citizens. Employing a multimethod design, this paper uses variation in local political institutions in Taiwan to assess the relative merits of direct election and bureaucratic appointment for local government responsiveness. While democratic institutions are often thought to induce responsiveness, I find that in Taiwan, with its historically strong bureaucracy and relatively new democratic institutions, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Elected and appointed officials face different incentives that motivate the latter to respond more quickly and effectively to online requests for help.
Keywords
Taiwan, local governance, bureaucracy, elections, responsiveness
Volume
254
First Page
494
Last Page
504
DOI
10.1017/S0305741023000012
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Rights
Licensed to Smith College and distributed CC-BY under the Smith College Faculty Open Access Policy.
Recommended Citation
Newland, Sara A., "Direct Election, Bureaucratic Appointment, and Local Government Responsiveness in Taiwan" (2023). Government: Faculty Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA.
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/gov_facpubs/67
Comments
Peer reviewed accepted manuscript.