Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-9-2025

Abstract

This paper develops a model of decentralized law enforcement to study the joint determination of enforcement intensity, criminal participation, and offense severity. A key feature of the model is that the probability of detection depends not only on enforcement effort but also on crime severity, reflecting institutional considerations such as citizen reporting and discretionary policing. This approach generates rich feedback effects that jointly determine equilibrium crime rates, arrest rates, enforcement levels, and offense severity. I use the model to evaluate the impact of several policy interventions—including harsher penalties, improved outside options, enhanced detection technologies, and changes in enforcement compensation. While enforcement discretion can sometimes blunt the effectiveness of deterrence policies, I identify a key condition—log-modularity of the detection probability—that ensures these interventions lead to socially desirable outcomes. The model not only helps rationalize recent empirical findings but also yields new testable predictions about the relationship between enforcement effort, crime severity, and arrests.

Keywords

decentralized enforcement, offense severity, crime rate, arrest rate

Version

Author's Submitted Manuscript

Included in

Economics Commons

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